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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR SECURING SENSORS
IN SMART DEVICES AND APPLICATIONS
by
Amit Kumar Sikder
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor A. Selcuk Uluagac, Major Professor
This doctoral dissertation introduces novel security frameworks to detect sensor-based
threats on smart devices and applications in smart settings such as smart home, smart
office, etc. First, we present a formal taxonomy and in-depth impact analysis of existing sensor-based threats to smart devices and applications based on attack characteristics, targeted components, and capabilities. Then, we design a novel context-aware
intrusion detection system, 6thSense, to detect sensor-based threats in standalone
smart devices (e.g., smartphone, smart watch, etc.). 6thSense considers user activitysensor co-dependence in standalone smart devices to learn the ongoing user activity
contexts and builds a context-aware model to distinguish malicious sensor activities
from benign user behavior. Further, we develop a platform-independent contextaware security framework, Aegis, to detect the behavior of malicious sensors and
devices in a connected smart environment (e.g., smart home, offices, etc.). Aegis
observes the changing patterns of the states of smart sensors and devices for user
activities in a smart environment and builds a contextual model to detect malicious
activities considering sensor-device-user interactions and multi-platform correlation.
Then, to limit unauthorized and malicious sensor and device access, we present,
Kratos, a multi-user multi-device-aware access control system for smart environment

and devices. Kratos introduces a formal policy language to understand diverse user

vi

demands in smart environment and implements a novel policy negotiation algorithm
to automatically detect and resolve conflicting user demands and limit unauthorized
access. For each contribution, this dissertation presents novel security mechanisms
and techniques that can be implemented independently or collectively to secure sensors in real-life smart devices, systems, and applications. Moreover, each contribution
is supported by several user and usability studies we performed to understand the
needs of the users in terms of sensor security and access control in smart devices and
improve the user experience in these real-time systems.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Smart devices such as smartphones, smart watches, smart locks, smart thermostats, smart plug-ins, and their applications have become omnipresent in our day to
day lives. The role of smart devices and their applications has expanded from making
phone calls and messaging to home security, health care, and even military applications. With the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) [LBAU17, CMT+ 19],
smart devices can now interact with each other and with the physical world to perform different tasks and take autonomous decisions. As smart devices use different
high-precision sensors to ensure seamless integration with the cyber and physical
world, they provide more efficient and user-friendly applications [LML+ 10]. However,
recent researches have proved that attackers can exploit the sensors of smart devices to
perform different malicious activities [FJP16, JCW+ 17]. Attackers can leak sensitive
information using sensors, trigger an existing malware on a device, or steal sensitive
stored information using sensors [SAU17, SPA+ 18]. Attackers can even use the sensors as a communication channel to transfer a malware in a smart device [USB14].
These sensor-based threats have become more critical with the growing popularity
of sensing-enabled applications and automation systems in smart environments (e.g.,
smart home, smart office, smart factory). Unfortunately, existing security solutions
do not consider these threats and attackers can easily bypass the solutions to initiate
sensor-based attacks in the smart devices. For instance, the Android sensor management system only enforces permission-based access control to the apps for specific
sensors (e.g., GPS, camera, audio sensors). After granting initial permission, the
user cannot control the usage of the sensors by the apps. More importantly, there
are sensors that are by default activated by the sensor management systems. For
instance, an installed app automatically gets the permission to access motion, light,
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and proximity sensors. Also, unauthorized sensor access in one device might lead to
malicious activities in other connected devices [BSAU18]. For instance, in a smart
home system, an attacker with unauthorized access to the smoke sensor can inject
false data to trigger the fire alarm maliciously. In this context, a comprehensive security framework is needed to supervise atypical sensor access and detect these emerging
sensor-based threats in both standalone and connected smart devices. Moreover, a
detailed understanding of these threats as well as the needs of the users are also of
paramount importance in this dissertation.
Investigation of Sensor-based Threats to Smart Devices & Applications:
The use of sensors in smart devices inevitably increases the functionality of the devices; however, the sensors can also be used as vehicles to launch attacks on the
devices or applications. Recently, there have been several attempts to exploit the
security of smart devices via their sensors [SAU17]. Attackers can use the sensors to transfer malicious code or a trigger message to activate malware planted
in a device [SUCB13, HSH+ 13], capture sensitive personal information shared between devices (e.g., smartwatches, smart home devices, etc.) [WMJ19, SZZ+ 11], or
even extract encrypted information by capturing encryption and decryption keys [DPSKM15]. Moreover, attackers can use the sensors of one device as an attack platform
to abuse or interrupt normal functionalities of connected devices [CA17]. For instance,
a specific on/off pattern of a smart light can trick a smart camera to capture and leak
pictures containing sensitive information in a smart home environment [SBAU19].
Recently, TrendMicro, a renowned security company, reported in 2019 three publicly
available Android apps in Google Playstore used the motion sensor to evade malware
scanners in the smartphone [Mic19]. These sensor-based threats pose a significant
risk to the smart devices as manufacturers are not fully aware yet [USB14]. Indeed,
sensor-based threats are becoming more prevalent because of the easy access to the
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sensors and the limited security measures that consider these threats. Hence, trivial
execution, easy access to the sensors, and lack of knowledge about the sensor-based
threats constitute significant risks for the smart devices. Thus, understanding these
sensor-based threats and attacks in the literature is necessary for researchers and the
community to design reliable solutions to detect and prevent these threats efficiently.
Sensor-based Threat Detection in Standalone Smart Devices and Applications: The use of sensors on smart devices (e.g., smartphone, smart watch, etc.) enables a seamless connection between the devices and the physical world. Indeed, modern smart devices come with a wide range of sensors (e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope,
microphone, light sensor, etc.) that enable more efficient and user-friendly applications [LML+ 10]. While the number of applications using different sensors is increasing
and new devices offer more sensors, the presence of sensors have opened novel ways
to exploit the smart devices [USB14]. Attackers can exploit the embedded sensors in
standalone smart devices multiple ways [USB14]. In recent years, several sensor-based
threats such as keystroke inference [HS12, MAJH16], task inference [NWX+ 20], false
data injection [Cof14], and eavesdropping [SZZ+ 11] have been reported in standalone
smart devices, especially smartphones and smart watches [SAU17]. Such sensorbased threats become more serious with the rapid growth of Apps utilizing many
sensors [CA17]. In fact, these sensor-based threats highlight the flaws of existing
sensor management systems used by smart devices. Albeit useful, existing security
schemes overlook these critical threats which directly impact the security and privacy
of the smart device ecosystem. Moreover, although embedded sensors on standalone
smart devices seem to work independently from each other, a task or activity on a
smart device may activate more than one sensor to accomplish the task. Hence, it is
necessary to secure all the different sensors and consider the context of the sensors in
building any solution against the sensor-based threats on standalone smart devices.
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Sensor-based Threat Detection in a Connected Smart Environment: The
capabilities of the smart devices in a connected smart environment (e.g., smart home,
smart office, etc.) have evolved from simply controlling lights and opening garage
doors to connecting our living spaces to the cyber world [ST17, LZCC14]. With the
tremendous growth of Internet of Things (IoT), smart devices now have advanced
capabilities to interact with other devices and create a smart environment to perform different user-defined tasks collectively. Such functionality provides more autonomous, efficient, and convenient daily operations [FRJP17]. Compared to early
smart environment/systems with fixed device setup procedures and limited functionalities, modern smart environment have adopted a more user-centric, app-based
model. Nowadays, users can download apps from the vendor’s app market (or even
develop their own) and easily set up and control the smart devices, which makes
connected smart environment more popular and versatile than ever [Sta18].
The integration of programming platforms with smart devices and sensors surely
enhances the functionalities, but also exposes the vulnerabilities of the smart devices
to attackers [BAU19]. These attackers can release malicious apps in third-party markets and public repositories (e.g., GitHub) easily. Then, careless users may download
and utilize them to control their devices. From here, the attackers can exploit smart
devices in several ways. Recently, a repository of malicious apps in different smart
platforms has been published exhibiting several vulnerabilities of the current smart
home app development ecosystem [IoT17]. Nonetheless, a security solution that comprehensively detects these emerging threats associated with smart devices and sensors
in a smart setting/environment does not currently exist and is direly needed. Recent
studies have proposed the implementation of enhanced permission models for smart
environment, which depend on specific user permissions [JCW+ 17] or the analysis
the source code of the apps to detect vulnerabilities, which is only effective against
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specific types of attacks [CBS+ 18, MBY+ 19]. In this circumstances, a context-aware
and platform-independent security framework that considers user activity contexts,
sensor-device-user interactions (e.g., movement directions, sensors activated, rooms
involved), and multi-platform correlation is needed to ensure secure operation of smart
devices and sensors in a connected environment.
Multi-user Multi-device-aware Access Control System for Smart Devices
and Settings: A smart environment/platform (e.g., smart home, smart office, smart
factory) allows multiple devices and sensors to be connected to automate daily activities and increase the overall efficiency of the homes and workplaces [Tea17,SAA+ 18].
Devices as simple as a light bulb to ones as complicated as an entire AC system
can be connected and exposed to multiple users. The users then interact with the
devices through different smart applications installed through a mobile host app provided by the smart device vendors. Traditional access control mechanisms proposed
for personal devices such as computers and smartphones primarily target single-user
scenarios. However, in a smart environment, multiple users access the same smart
device, typically via a common controller app (e.g., SmartThings App), which can
cause conflicting device settings. For instance, a homeowner may want to lock the
smart door lock at midnight while a temporary guest may want to access the lock after
midnight. Also, current smart device platforms do not allow the conflicting demands
of the users to be expressed explicitly. Finally, the current access control mechanism
in smart device platforms offer coarse-grained solutions that might cause safety and
security issues [CMT18, JCW+ 17, BSAU18]. For instance, smart devices often give
automatic full access to every user added to the system [Sam18a]. With full access, a
new user can easily add new unauthorized users, remove existing users, or reconfigure
the connected devices and sensors [TZL+ 17,SBAU19]. This benign, yet undesired action from the new user can lead to several safety issues [SPA+ 18,CMT+ 19,NSRU19].
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In these real-life scenarios, current smart device platforms cannot fulfill such complex,
asymmetric, and conflicting demands of the users as they can only handle primitive
and broad controls with static configurations.

1.1

Research Problems

This dissertation has the following five major research components and problems
investigated:
1. A detailed investigation and formal taxonomy of sensor-based threats to smart
devices and applications to identify key characteristics and impacts of these threats.
2. The design of a novel threat detection system to protect the sensors against malicious attacks in a standalone smart devices (e.g., smartphone, smartwatch) and
applications, called 6thSense.
3. The design of a novel centralized intrusion detection technique to protect the
sensors in a multi-user multi-device smart environment, called Aegis.
4. The design of a novel fine-grained access control system to restrict unauthorized
device access in a multi-user multi-device smart environment to limit and control
sensor access and resolve conflicting demands of the users, called Kratos.
5. The usability studies of the proposed frameworks to understand and support the
needs of the users and improve the users’ experience in a smart system.
In general, to protect smart devices against sensor-based threats, a security framework must ensure high accuracy in detecting sensor-based threats in both stand-alone
and connected smart settings. Additionally, the proposed framework must provide
fine-grained access control to the users to protect the smart devices against sensorbased threats emerging from unauthorized sensor access. Also, the proposed framework should be scalable to ensure effectiveness against current and future sensorbased threats to smart devices. Finally, all the components of the proposed security
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framework must operate in real-life systems with minimal overhead to assure efficient
performance.

1.2

Significance of the Studies

Cyberspace is expanding fast with the introduction of new smart device technologies dedicated to make our homes, offices, factories automated and smarter [Tea17,
SAA+ 18]. In this ecosystem, sensors and sensing-enabled applications on smart devices in smart settings have become very popular as they provide more user-friendly
and efficient functions to the users. However, these sensors and applications, if compromised, can perform different malicious activities in the devices including sensitive
information leakage, triggering existing malware, unauthorized device access, etc. For
this reason, it is important to secure smart devices against these sensor-based threats.
In this dissertation, we aim to secure the smart devices against sensor-based threats
by proposing a comprehensive security framework which focuses on five specific needs:
(1) A formal taxonomy and impact analysis of sensor-based threats to smart devices
and applications based on common vulnerability metrics (2) A scalable and effective sensor-based threat detector for standalone smart devices and applications (3)
A centralized sensor-based threat detection method for connected multi-device smart
environment (4) A fine-grained access control mechanism to protect on-device sensors
from unauthorized access in multi-user multi-device smart environment And, (5) A
detailed usability study to understand the needs of the users in terms of security and
access control in smart devices and improve the user experience in real-time systems
for each security mechanism proposed in this dissertation.
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1.3

Organization of the Dissertation

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present background information to support this dissertation. Then, in Chapter 3, we discuss the
related work for each research problem stated in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, we
provide a detailed taxonomy and provide an in-depth impact analysis of sensor-based
threats to smart devices and applications. Chapter 5 introduces a novel context-aware
security framework to detect sensor-based threats on standalone smart devices. In
Chapter 6, we present a context-aware platform independent security framework for
connected smart environment. Chapter 7 presents a multi-user multi-device-aware
fine-grained access control system for the smart environment. Finally, we conclude
the dissertation and propose future research directions in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present the necessary background information regarding the architecture of smart devices, a connected smart environment, and security needs of
sensors in smart devices. This chapter will give an overview of the fundamental
building blocks of this dissertation. More detailed information can be found in the
related chapters.

2.1

Overview of Smart Devices

In this section, we introduce the components of smart devices as they are relevant to
understand the significance of sensor-based threats and attacks.
In general, a smart device is an electronic device which has the capability to connect, share, and interact with its user, peripheral, and other smart devices using their
sensors and communication protocols [STTPLR13, Pos11, SFRS18]. These devices in
general have the following salient features:
• Sensing - Sensors in smart devices help to sense the surrounding environment and
perform different tasks based on measured events.
• Automation - Automation is the ability of a smart device to perform a task automatically based on specific events. For example, the user presence in a room can
cause a sensor to turn a light on and off.
• Accessibility - Smart devices offer easy and remote accessibility to the users. Users
can control and monitor a smart device from a remote location. For example, users
can lock or unlock a smart lock from a remote location using a smartphone.
• Context-Awareness - Context-awareness refers to the ability of a device to understand and analyze its surroundings. A smart device can understand what is
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happening around the device and perform different tasks accordingly. For example, a smart lock can automatically unlock as a specific person approaches the door.
Here, the smart lock is aware of the user’s presence in its proximity and unlocks
the door.
• Self-Learning - Smart devices can learn usage patterns and change responses to
perform different tasks without any manual instruction from the users. For example, a smart thermostat can learn the usage pattern of a user and adjust the
temperature automatically to save power.
A smart device can have all or a subset of the aforementioned features. These
features of smart devices are linked together with one common component- sensors in
smart devices. For instance, an embedded temperature sensor can be used to trigger a
smart thermostat at a pre-defined temperature which represents sensing, automation,
and self-learning features of smart devices. Again, external sensors can be connected
with smart devices using different communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee, Z-Wave,
BLE, etc.) or via cloud [sam17]. An external presence sensor can be configured with
a smart thermostat to turn on whenever a user enters a room which depicts contextawareness. Users can also control smart devices remotely that can be associated with
the embedded sensors to automate on-going tasks. Hence, sensors in smart devices
are the key components that enable aforementioned salient features in smart devices.

2.2

Smart Device Architecture

It is important to understand the smart device architecture to better visualize the
sensor-based threats and attacks. The smart device architecture can be illustrated in
four working layers (sensing, communication, data processing, and application layer)
as shown in Figure 2.1. A smart device may have all the layers or a subset of these
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Figure 2.1: Smart device architecture layers and components. Some smart devices
may have all the layers (e.g., smart thermostat) or a subset of these layers (e.g., smart
sensors).
layers. For example, a smart sensor can have sensing, communication, and data
processing layer [M+ 08] whereas a smart phone can have all four layers. Each of
these layers are explained below.

2.2.1

Sensing Layer

The main purpose of the sensing layer is to identify any phenomena in the devices’
peripheral and obtain data from the real world. This layer consists of several sensors,
where multiple sensors are typically used together by applications to collect various
data [KKZK12]. The sensing layer of smart device ecosystem can consist of both ondevice sensors and external independent sensors. In both cases, sensors are usually
integrated through sensor hubs [PJZ+ 13]. A sensor hub is a common connection
point for multiple sensors that accumulate and forward sensor data to the processing
unit of a device. A sensor hub may use several transport mechanisms (e.g., InterIntegrated Circuit (I2C) or Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)) for data flow between
sensors and applications. For on-device sensors, the sensor hub uses Inter-Integrated
Circuit (I2C) or Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) to forward sensor data to the data
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processing layer. For external independent sensors, sensor data are forwarded to the
cloud server from the sensor hub and smart devices can accumulate these data from
the cloud server using the network layer. Sensors in smart devices can be classified
into three broad categories:
Motion Sensors. Motion sensors measure the change in motion as well as the
orientation of the devices. There are two types of motions one can observe in a device:
linear and angular motions. The linear motion refers to the linear displacement of
a smart device while the angular motion refers to the rotational displacement of the
device.
Environmental Sensors Sensors such as light, pressure, etc. are used to sense the
change in environmental parameters in the device’s peripheral. The primary purpose
of using environmental sensors is to help the devices to take autonomous decisions
according to the changes in a device’s peripheral. For instance, environment sensors
are used in many applications to improve user experience (e.g., home automation
systems, smart locks, smart lights, etc.).
Position sensors Position sensors deal with the physical position and location of
the device. The most common position sensors used in smart devices are magnetic
sensors and Global Positioning System (GPS). Magnetic sensors are usually used as a
digital compass and help fix the orientation of a device’s display. On the other hand,
GPS is used for navigation purposes.
A detailed description of different sensors is given in Table 6.8.

2.2.2

Communication Layer

The communication layer acts as a channel to transfer data collected in the sensing
layer to other connected devices. In addition, the communication layer also establishes
a connection between the device and cloud server to accumulate data from the external
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Sensor Type

Sensor Name

Description

Accelerometer

• An electro-mechanical device which can measure changes in acceleration forces along x, y, and z-axis.
• Detects various types of motion like shake, tilt, etc. and adjusts the
display of the device accordingly.

Motion Sensors

Linear Acceleration Sensor

• An accelerometer which can detect acceleration along one axis without considering the effect of gravitational force.
• Helps to adjust the display with motion.

Gyroscope

• Measures the rate of change of angular momentum in all three axes.
• Detects rotational movement of the device and adjusts display accordingly.

Light Sensor

• A photodiode which changes characteristics with the change of light
intensity.
• adjusts brightness and contrast of the display of the device.
• Controls automatic lighting system.

Proximity Sensor

• IR-based sensor to detect the presence of nearby objects without
any physical contact.
• Reduces power consumption of the display by disabling the LCD

Environmental
Sensors

backlight and avoids inadvertent touches.
Temperature Sensor

• Measures temperature of the device as well as ambient temperature.
• Controls and sets the temperature in a device.

Audio Sensor

• Two types of audio sensor: microphone and speaker.
• Microphone: Detects acoustic signal.
• Speaker: Playbacks audio signal.

Camera

• Deals with light intensity, device ambiance, etc. to capture pictures
and videos of surroundings.
• Provides live video feeds.

Barometer

• Measures the pressure of the device peripheral.

Heart rate

• Measures the heart rate of the user in beat per second.

Fingerprint

• Optical or capacitive scanner to capture the fingerprint of the user.
• Provides biometric authentication.

GPS

• Captures signal from the satellite to infer the location of the device.

Magnetic Sensor

• Measures device’s magnetic field with respect to earth’s magnetic

• Helps in navigation systems.

Position
Sensors

field.
• It is also used to fix display position by considering the magnetic
field.

Table 2.1: Sensors available in smart devices.
independent sensors [RDM16, STTPLR13]. In smart devices, the communication
layer is realized by using diverse communication technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
Zigbee, Z-Wave, LoRa, cellular network, etc.) to allow data flow between other
devices within the same network. The Communication layer also simplifies remote
access to smart devices. For example, a user can control a smart light from different
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locations using an app on a smartphone. For on-board sensors, data communication
from the sensor to the processing unit is performed by different serial and parallel
communication protocols such as Serial Port Interface (SPI), Inter-Integrated Circuit
(I2C) protocol, Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI), etc.

2.2.3

Data Processing Layer

The data processing layer takes data collected in the sensing layer and analyses it to
make data-driven decisions. This layer provides processed data to installed applications to perform different tasks. Also, in some smart devices (e.g., smartwatch, smart
home hub, etc.), the data processing layer saves the results from previous analysis
to improve the user experience. For instance, the data processing layer can learn
the contexts and patterns during the user interactions to take autonomous decisions.
This layer may share the result with other connected devices via the network layer.

2.2.4

Application Layer

The application layer presents and renders the results of the data processing to the
user. In other words, the application layer is a user-centric layer which executes
various tasks for the users. There exist diverse applications, which include smart
transportation, smart home, personal care, healthcare, etc. [AIM10]. Application
layer also provides user interface to the users where users can select, control, and
monitor different applications of the smart devices.

2.3

Smart Environment

The term smart environment is commonly used to portray a residence comprising
numerous connected entities (sensors and devices) that are capable of communicating
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Figure 2.2: A smart home environment and its main components.
with each other and that can be controlled both centrally (via a hub) and remotely (via
a smartphone). In Figure 2.2, a typical architecture of a smart environment is shown.
Different smart systems such as Samsung SmartThings, Amazon Alexa, and Google
Home use similar architecture. The only difference among these platforms resides in
the communication protocols used to connect the different components [KPYK18]. A
smart environment can incorporate a single-platform structure where all the smart
devices and sensors are connected to a common access point (i.e., a hub). Smart
environment/settings can also feature a multi-platform architecture where smart devices from different smart platforms share the same physical environment without
any interconnection. Both single and multi-platform smart environment have four
basic building blocks as shown in Figure 2.2. The first block of the smart environment comprises sensors and devices in the system. These smart devices and sensors
are connected to each other via a smart hub. As there is no generic interoperability
standard among smart devices, the hub provides a common access point for all the
entities in the smart environment. In some cases, hubs also act as a controlling device
and allow users to control smart devices using voice commands (e.g., Amazon Alexa,
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Google Home, etc.). Modern smart device platforms also allow devices to perform
autonomous tasks as standalone devices. For example, LIFX smart light can directly
connect to an access point such as Wi-Fi routers and perform pre-scheduled tasks.
The installed smart devices are connected to the hub, which can be further connected
to both a cloud backend service and a smartphone/tablet companion app. Users utilize the smartphone app to control and configure the smart devices and sensors or
install different apps from the app stores. Indeed, we can group smart environment
architectures in two main categories: a cloud-based architecture where the installed
apps run in the cloud backend (e.g., SmartThings), and hub-based architecture where
the installed apps run the hub locally (e.g., Apple HomeKit). Users may also develop
their own apps using the web interface of the cloud backend part of the smart environment. For example, Samsung SmartThings allows its users to publish their own apps
and share them with other users [SSDG]. Users can develop their own app or simply
copy the source code available online to install the app in their smart environment.

2.4

Existing Sensor Management Systems and Security Needs
of Smart Devices

Modern smart devices create a many-to-many relationship between apps and sensors
that OSes manage. Managing this relation is a hard task and smart device OSes
need effective and practical sensor management schemes to ensure secure data flow
from the sensors to the apps. In addition, the sensor management in several smart
devices (e.g., smart light, thermostat, etc.) also needs to assure a secure and seamless
connection with external sensors to perform multiple tasks. Hence, an effective sensor
management system is required to manage and ensure the security of all the sensors
in the smart devices. In this section, we discuss different security requirements and
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goals of smart devices and how the existing sensor management systems address these
requirements. Furthermore, we also articulate the shortcomings of existing sensor
management systems.
To understand the security needs in smart devices, we consider the following
smart device use cases. Assume a user, Bob, has several smart devices and sensors
installed in his smart home system including smart lock, thermostat, motion sensor,
temperature sensor, and presence sensor. Here, temperature and presence sensors
are embedded in smart thermostat while the motion sensors are external sensors
connected with smart devices using different communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee,
Z-Wave, BLE, etc.) or via cloud [sam17]. We assume all the smart devices and
sensors are in the same network. Bob installed several smart apps to automate and
control tasks in smart devices. For instance, Bob installed an app in the thermostat
to automate temperature control using the embedded temperature sensor. Also, Bob
configured the external motion sensor with the smart lock to unlock the door with the
users’ motion. Based on the configurations and installed apps, the following scenarios
can happenCase 1- An attacker having access to the same network installs a malicious motion sensor without alerting Bob. How can Bob identify the legitimate sensor while
configuring the smart lock with the external motion sensor?
Case 2- Bob unknowingly installs a malicious app for the smart thermostat that
is trying to access all the embedded sensors (both temperature and presence sensor).
How can Bob limit the sensor access of the installed app?
Case 3- An attacker with the access of device peripheral captures the network
packets between external sensors and the smart lock using a sniffing device. Additionally, the attacker is trying to change environment parameters (e.g., temperature)
to change sensor reading and switch on the thermostat maliciously. How can Bob
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ensure that the attacker fails to extract any sensitive information from captured
sensor-device communication and verify whether the sensor reading is legitimate or
not?
Case 4- An attacker having access to the network sends malicious connection
requests to the external motion sensor to make it unavailable for performing predefined tasks. How can Bob confirm sensor availability while configuring the smart
lock with an external motion sensor?
To address these questions, current smart device ecosystem needs, (1) a sensor
authentication system to identify fake or compromised sensors, (2) a sensor authorization framework to limit malicious sensor access, (3) Secure data sharing to confirm
data confidentiality and integrity in sensors, (4) seamless connectivity to ensure sensor
availability. In the following sub-sections, we briefly discuss existing sensor management systems and their shortcoming in addressing the aforementioned security needs.

2.4.1

Sensor Authentication

Smart devices can connect with each other to perform tasks collectively. Although
this may increase the functionalities of smart devices, device authentication is needed
to ensure secure communication among devices. The network layer of smart devices
should have an authentication framework to connect with trusted devices and sensors. Similarly, the sensing layer of smart devices should also have an authentication
framework to detect tampered sensors in the device ecosystem.
Although sensor authentication has not been a big concern for on-device sensors, an unauthenticated external sensor can perform malicious activities in connected
smart devices [JCW+ 17]. To authenticate an external sensor in a smart device ecosystem, device fingerprinting can be utilized at the time of pairing between a smart device
and an external sensor. Here, we discuss how sensor fingerprinting is implemented in
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the Samsung SmartThings platform. Samsung SmartThings offers a capability-based
sensor management system which can control sensors of several devices from one
common platform (a hub or smartphone). When a new external sensor is installed
in the system, a pre-defined device handler is used to pair the sensor which specifies
the capabilities of the sensor. This device handler also contains the fingerprint of the
sensor. A sample device handler snippet is given in Listing 1. Here, a Fibaro motion
sensor device handler for the Samsung SmartThings platform is shown. From line 4
to 11 capabilities of the sensor are defined and after initial installation, the sensor can
provide these pre-defined functions. From line 13 to line 17, different benign commands are defined which allowed for Fibaro motion sensor in Samsung SmartThings
ecosystem. In lines 19 and 20, the fingerprint of the sensor is defined which allows the
smart device ecosystem to understand the device type and authenticate the sensor at
the time of installation. This fingerprint is hard-coded in the device handler and can
be manually modified to create new handler.
Although capability-based sensor management provides automatic authentication
of the connected external sensor at the installation time, the hard-coded capabilities
and fingerprint in the device handler can be easily altered. The device handler can
be changed manually and an attacker can easily create a fake device handler to trick
smart device user to install a compromised sensor in the smart device ecosystem.
Attackers can also exploit the sensors by mimicking the hard-coded fingerprint in a
compromised or fake sensor [CBS+ 18].
Listing 2.1: An example device handler of Fibaro Motion Sensor
1 metadata {
2 definition (name: "Fibaro Motion Sensor", namespace: "smartthings", author: "SmartThings", ocfDeviceType:
"x.com.st.d.sensor.motion", runLocally: true, minHubCoreVersion: ’000.021.00001’,
executeCommandsLocally: true)
3 {
4
capability "Motion Sensor"
5
capability "Temperature Measurement"
6
capability "Acceleration Sensor"
7
capability "Configuration"
8
capability "Illuminance Measurement"
9
capability "Sensor"
10
capability "Battery"
11
capability "Health Check"
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

command
command
command
command
command

"resetParams2StDefaults"
"listCurrentParams"
"updateZwaveParam"
"test"
"configure"

fingerprint mfr:"010F", prod:"0800", model:"2001"
fingerprint mfr:"010F", prod:"0800", model:"1001"
}

(a) Adding sensor in the
system

(b) Adding sensor in an
app

Figure 2.3: Sensor authentication and automation in Samsung SmartThings.
Furthermore, after initial authentication, all the sensor from the same vendor is
visible to any connected users to add automation rules [SBC+ 19]. Hence, an adversary
with access to the smart environment can use any installed sensors to add malicious
automation rules. Figure 2.3 shows the app installation process in the Samsung
SmartThings platform. Here, three different Fibaro motion sensors are available to
the users and users can choose any of these sensors to create new automation rules.
The current ecosystem does not allow any security measure to restrict specific sensors
after initial authentication. Again, if any of these three sensors is compromised, it
can be used as a platform to attack connected devices sharing the smart environment.
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2.4.2

Sensor Authorization

Modern smart devices use different apps to perform multiple tasks. These apps use
multiple sensors to execute a task efficiently. At run-time, installed apps can ask for
sensor access and it is necessary to check whether the requested access is legitimate as
apps can use sensors for malicious purposes. For example, a simple flashlight app in
the smartphone can access the motion sensor data which is irrelevant to the function of
the app and can leak the information surreptitiously [SAU19a]. Smart devices should
have a robust authorization framework to limit these unauthorized sensor accesses.
Sensor authorization can be implemented in both the sensing and application layers.
The sensing layer authorization can bind sensors with the apps while the application
layer authorization can offer user control over sensors [PSJA15, FHE+ 12].
Current smart device OSes offer a permission-based sensor management system
to control on-device sensor authorization at app installation time and run-time [iOSa,
Andb]. Here, we briefly discuss the Android sensor management system as Android OS holds the highest market share in the smart device domain (approximately
37%) [mar]. Whenever an application wants to access a sensor in the OS, it has
to communicate via a sensor manager framework (Figure 2.4). An application first
sends a request to the sensor manager to register the desired sensor which invokes
ListenerService service for the application. After receiving the request, the sensor
manager creates a ListenerService for the application and maps the request with the
designed sensor driver to acquire sensor data. If more than one App requests access
for the same sensor, the sensor management system runs a multiplexing process to
register one sensor to multiple Apps. This data acquisition path from the application
to the sensor driver is initiated by the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) which
binds the sensor hardware with the device driver. The sensor driver then activates
the requested sensor and creates a data flow path from the sensor to the app [andc].

21

Figure 2.4: Example sensor management system for Android.
On the other hand, Windows and Blackberry OSes use Sensor Class Extension to
connect sensor hardware with the device driver [win, bla]. Windows OS also uses
the User Mode Driver Framework to detect sensor access request and create a data
acquisition path between sensor API and the APP. In iOS, the sensor management
system is divided into four core services: Core Motion, Core Audio, Core Location,
and Core Video [iOSb]. The Core Motion service provides access to the motion sensors and some of the environmental sensors (e.g., barometer, light, proximity, etc.).
The audio sensors (microphone and speakers), GPS, and the camera can be accessed
via the Core Audio, the Core Location, and the Core Video services, respectively.
These services provide data flow between the sensors and their apps according to the
requests.
However, the main shortcoming of the permission-based sensor authorization is the
dependence on the user’s consent for sensor access. In most smart devices, permissionbased sensor authorization is implemented for a subset of the supported sensors (e.g.,
GPS, camera, audio sensor). Whenever an application is installed in a smart device, it asks the users to grant permission to access various sensors. Thus, malicious
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applications may trick the user into allowing access to sensitive sensors to launch
sensor-based attacks [SZZ+ 11,TRCK13,SAU17]. Users are typically unaware of what
the malicious applications actually do with the sensed data [PAS+ 16, PRS+ 17]. Furthermore, permissions are imposed on selected on-device sensors only (e.g., camera,
microphone, and GPS) and other sensors are automatically included without any explicit permission. Thus, applications can easily access other no-permission-imposed
sensors such as accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, etc., as discussed in the following sections in further detail. These sensors can be exploited maliciously and
various sensor-based threats (e.g., information leakage, denial-of-service, etc.) can be
launched on smart devices [SPYG15, OHD+ 12, MVCT11]. Additionally, for external
sensors, the smart device ecosystem offers one-time sensor authorization at the time
of sensor installation. After the initial installation, any connected smart device in the
same network can access the external sensor without any additional authorization
step.

2.4.3

Data Confidentiality and Integrity

One major concern is to keep the collected sensor data secure in smart devices. Smart
devices use multiple sensors to perform a task and recent studies have shown that
user activities on a smart device can be inferred using the sensor data [SAU19a].
The current smart device ecosystem implements different encryption methods in the
network layer to encrypt sensor data before sharing with the devices. For example,
Azure IoT suite, Amazon AWS, and Weave use SSL/TLS protocol to ensure secure
communication [ARC18]. Moreover, smart devices using ZigBee protocol use 128-bit
AES encryption for secure communication [AFA+ 18]. However, most of the existing
encryption schemes are available for communication between external sensors and
smart devices or cloud communication. Some smart device platforms (e.g., Apple
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HomeKit, Weave) allows disk encryption to secure saved sensor data. But any app
running in the smart devices can access these encrypted data, even collect unencrypted data from the on-device sensors [LPMS12]. These sensor data can be further
processed to gain sensitive user information such as PIN code for the devices, typed
information, even on-going tasks on a device [SAU17].

2.4.4

Sensor Availability

To perform sensor-dependent tasks, smart devices should have uninterrupted sensor
access. This requires sensor availability to the application layer of the devices from
the sensing layer. Sensor availability is more important in external sensors than ondevice sensors as attackers can target the network layer to perform a Denial-of-Service
attack. The current smart device ecosystem offers firewall rules to filter unauthorized
and malicious service requests to avoid unauthorized sensor access and avoid buffer
overflow [KMP17]. One possible solution can be fine-grained access control systems
in the application layer to ensure continuous data availability to legit app requests.
However, the existing schemes cannot detect sensor unavailability caused by forced
changes in the sensors (e.g., hacking gyroscope using acoustic signals [SSK+ 15]).

2.4.5

Existing Sensor Management Systems and Their Shortcomings

Although existing sensor management systems in smart devices acknowledge the needs
of securing sensors by addressing sensor authentication, authorization, and availability, there are several shortcomings that can be easily exploited by sensor-based threats.
(1) User Dependency. Existing sensor authorizations depend on user permission
where users are asked to allow or deny sensor access permission to an app at instal-
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lation time or run-time. However, no information about the nature of sensor usage is
presented to the users. Hence, an app can easily trick the users to get desired sensor
authorization and abuse sensors for malicious purposes [SA13, SZZ+ 11].
(2) Selective sensor authorization. Existing sensor management systems impose
permission-based sensor authorization for selective sensors such as microphone, camera, and GPS. However, any installed app can access other sensors such as motion,
light, magnetic, and proximity sensors without any explicit user permission. Attackers can exploit this limitation to get access to sensors and perform malicious activities
including keystroke inference [AHIN13], eavesdropping [MBN14], etc.
(3) Passive sensor sniffing. As smart devices allow external sensor integration
to perform various tasks, it is possible to capture the network traffic between sensors and smart devices without interrupting normal operation. Also, both embedded
and external sensors in a smart device are sensitive to environmental parameters
which can be captured by a nearby smart device. For instance, typing in a keyboard
creates a tap noise which can be captured by the microphone of a nearby smartphone [ZZT09, WLRC15]. Attackers can extract sensitive information from captured
traffic and sensor data even if proper encryption schemes are used to protect confidentiality [AFA+ 18, SBAU19]. Hence, current sensor management systems cannot
protect sensor abuse from passive sniffing.
(4) Transitive access. Smart devices create a network of devices or smart environment where several devices are connected with each other to perform multiple
tasks. Here, a newly installed smart device becomes automatically visible and can
access other devices and sensors without any explicit privilege. As current sensor
management systems use hard-coded capabilities and fingerprint to authenticate devices and sensors, attackers can introduce a compromised or fake device to capture
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sensitive sensor information and inject false data in the system to perform malicious
activities [IoT17, JCW+ 17].
(5) Indirect sensor data injection. Current sensor management systems do not
offer any verification method to check whether a sensor input is valid or not. As a
result, an attacker can target to maliciously change or control environment parameters such as light intensity or magnetic field to spoof sensor data, trigger malicious
activities, or interrupt normal device activities. For instance, an attacker can use
inaudible acoustic signals to trigger a voice command in voice-assisted devices and
interrupt drone operations [SSK+ 15, YZJ+ 19].
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CHAPTER 3
LIERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we present the related work that are closely related to the research
work presented in this dissertation.

3.1

Sensor-based Threats and Security Solutions in Standalone Smart Devices

Sensor-based threats [USB14] on smart devices have become more prevalent than
before with the use of different sensors such as user’s location, keystroke information,
etc. Several works [SUCB13] have investigated the possibility of these threats and
presented different potential threats in recent years. However, compared to reported
threats, only few prior works presented comprehensive security solutions to protect
the sensors from malicious attacks. In the following subsections, we discuss existing
sensor-based threats and proposed security frameworks to mitigate the effect of these
threats to smart devices.

3.1.1

Sensor-based Threats to Standalone Smart Devices

One of the most common threats is keystroke inference in smart devices. When a
user types in the keyboard, motion sensor readings (i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope)
change accordingly [CC12]. As different keystrokes yield different, but specific values
in motion sensors, typing information on on-screen keyboard can be inferred from
an unauthorized sensor such as motion sensor data or its patterns collected either
in the device or from a nearby device can be used to extract users’ input in smart
devices [SPA+ 18, SPYG15, Ngu15, WLRC15]. The motion sensor data can be ana-
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lyzed using different techniques (e.g., machine learning, frequency domain analysis,
shared-memory access, etc.) to improve the accuracy of inference techniques such
as [ASBS12, MVBC12, PSM15, MSS16, MAJH16]. Another form of keystroke inference threat can be performed by observing only gyroscope data. Smart devices have
a feature of creating vibrations while a user types on the touchpad. The gyroscope
is sensitive to this vibrational force and it can be used to distinguish different inputs
given by the users on the touchpad [NSN14, CC11, MBN14]. Recently, ICS-CERT
also issued an alert for accelerometer-based attacks that can deactivate any device by
matching vibration frequency of the accelerometer [CA17, SSK+ 15].
Light sensor readings also change while a user types on smart devices; hence, the
user input in a smart device can be inferred by differentiating the light sensor data
in normal and typing modes [Spr14]. The light sensor can also be used as a medium
to transfer malicious code and trigger message to activate a malware [HSH+ 13]. The
audio sensor of a smart device can also be exploited to launch different malicious
attacks (e.g., information leakage, eavesdropping, etc.) on the device. Attackers can
infer keystrokes by recording tap noises on touchpad [FKK10], record conversation
of users [SZZ+ 11], transfer malicious code to the device [SUCB13], or even replicate
voice commands used in voice-enabled different Apps like Siri, Google Voice Search,
Amazon echo, Google Smart Home etc. [DLZZ14]. Cameras of different smart devices
can also be used to covertly capture screenshot or video and to infer information
about surroundings or user activities [SA13, MLMK15, SKSP14]. GPS of a smart
device can be exploited to perform a false data injection attack on smart devices and
infer the location of a specific device.
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3.1.2

Solutions to Sensor-based Threats in Standalone Smart
Devices

Although researchers identified different sensor-based threats in recent years, no complete security mechanism has been proposed that can secure sensors of a smart device.
Most of the proposed security mechanisms for smart devices are related to anomaly
detection at the application level which are not built with any protection against
sensor-based threats [WH14]. On the other hand, different methods of intrusion detection have been proposed for wireless sensor networks (WSN) [PAL+ 08], but they
are not compatible with smart devices. Xu et al. proposed a privacy-aware sensor
management framework for smartphones named Semadroid [XZ15], an extension to
the existing Android sensor management system where users could monitor sensor
usage of different Apps and invoke different policies to control sensor access by active
Apps on a smartphone. Maiti et al. proposed a real-time activity detection framework to identify user activity on a smart device using motion sensor and allow motion
sensor access based on the detected activity [MAJH16]. Petracca et al. introduced
AuDroid, a SELinux-based policy framework for Android smartphones by performing behavior analysis of microphones and speakers [PSJA15]. AuDroid controls the
flow of information in the audio channel and notifies users whenever an audio channel is requested for access. An extension of this work is AWARE, an authorization
framework to secure privacy-sensitive sensors from malicious applications [PRS+ 17].
AWARE considers both application requests and user interface to identify malicious
user inputs in operation bindings for microphone and camera. Jana et al. proposed
DARKLY, a trust management framework for smartphones which audits applications
of different trust levels with different sensor access permissions [JNS13]. Darkly scans
for vulnerability in the source code of an application and tries to modify the run-time
environment of the device to ensure the privacy of sensor data.
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3.2

Existing Security Threats and Detection Techniques in
Connected Smart Environment

Smart environments such as smart home systems, smart offices, smart factories, etc.
have become very popular with their user-centric customization options and thirdparty app development. Developers have offered different apps to increase the functionalities of smart devices in a connected smart environment. Nonetheless, the nature
of the app-based models introduces several malicious threats to the smart environment. In the following subsections, we discuss existing security vulnerabilities that
target sensors in smart environment to perform malicious activities. We also summarize existing security solutions proposed by the research communities and developers
to mitigate these threats.

3.2.1

Security Vulnerabilities in Connected Smart Environment

In recent years, several works have outlined the security threats to connected smart
environment (e.g., smart home systems) [NSG+ 14, Sch15, DKL13]. These threats
mainly focus on three smart environment components: communication protocols,
devices, and apps. As the concept of smart environment/system is still evolving,
there are several implementation flaws in the communication protocols for smart
systems. Attackers may exploit these flaws to leak sensitive user information from
smart devices. Several prior works have reported multiple implementation flaws of
smart device’s communication protocol that can be abused to leak sensitive user
information [FG13, Sea15, MV15]. For instance, an attacker can capture the network
packets covertly using simple sniffing devices and extract shared information, even
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from the encrypted traffic [BJD16, HLM+ 16, AFA+ 18]. Fernandes et al. reported
several design flaws in popular smart home platform (e.g., Samsung SmartThings)
that includes system and app level vulnerabilities [FJP16]. Chi et al. showed that
it is possible to exploit smart home platform by triggering malicious activities from
legitimate user action [CZDY18]. As smart devices use multiple apps to automate
different tasks, researchers showed that it is possible to execute a malicious task while
performing legitimate user actions in connected devices. Moreover, current smart
device platforms use smartphone as user interface and controlling device which can
also be used to launch attacks to smart devices [SCEB16, FJP16]. Jia et al. reported
the existence of several malicious apps that can be migrated from smartphone and IoT
platforms to connected smart environment such as smart home [JCW+ 17]. Recently,
a group of researchers published an online repository, IoTBench [IoT17, CBS+ 18],
which revealed several malicious apps for existing smart platforms including Samsung
SmartThings (19 malicious apps) and OpenHab (33 third-party rules).

3.2.2

Existing Security Solutions to Smart Environment

While researchers and developers reported these various threats to smart devices and
apps in recent years, there is no comprehensive security solution that address these
threats and secure the connected smart environment. Developers have introduced
several policy-based security measures to limit unauthorized access to smart devices,
sensors, and apps which depends completely on user decisions [TZL+ 17,SGV+ 15]. On
the other hand, researchers proposed several countermeasures to bolster the security
of smart environment by implementing encrypted data traffic in smart home communication protocols (e.g., ZigBee, Z-Wave, Wi-Fi, etc.) [ARS+ 17, DKJG17, MAbM14].
Additionally, researchers proposed several static and forensic analysis tools to detect
threats in application level of smart devices and sensors [BSAU18, CBS+ 18]. In the
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followings, we discuss existing security mechanisms proposed by the researchers and
their shortcomings:
• Permission-based approach. Most of the smart device platforms use a permissionbased app management where users are asked to configure and allow permissions
(device access, sensor access, etc.) at installation time. However, once user approves
the permissions, smart platforms/systems does not provide any explicit information
about how the app is using the granted accesses. This existing coarse-grained permission model could lead to unauthorized device access and sensitive information
leakage in connected smart environment [FJP16]. Jia et al. introduced ContextIoT,
a context-aware permission model to restrict unauthorized device access and detect
malicious activities in smart home systems [JCW+ 17]. Their proposed model creates
a run-time context of each app event, and asks for user permission before executing
any unknown activity in the smart home system.
• Policy and configuration analysis. Several policy-based security measures were proposed to limit unauthorized access to smart devices and sensors in a connected smart
environment [TZL+ 17, SGV+ 15, CWR13]. Similar to permission-based approaches,
these solutions depend on user decision. Mohsin et al. presented IoTSAT, a framework to analyze threats on smart home/environment using device configurations and
enforced user policies [MAH+ 16]. IoTSAT creates a behavioral model based on device
configurations and network policies and compares it with enforced policies to identify unusual activities in the smart environment [MAH+ 16]. Wang et al. introduced
iRuler, an automation rule analysis framework to detect inter-rule vulnerabilities in
smart apps [WDY+ 19]. iRuler uses natural language processing techniques to detect
trigger-action information flow and detect security risks in implemented applets in
IFTTT platform. Similar to this work, Babun et al. proposed IoTwatch, a run-time
analysis tool to identify privacy violations in smart apps [BCMU19]. IoTwatch col-
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lects the privacy settings of the users at installation time and collects run-time privacy
sensitive data sharing in smart devices, sensors, and apps to detect privacy violations
using natural language processing.
• Network analysis. Researchers have proposed several network analysis techniques
to detect malicious activities in smart environment. Yamauchi et al. presented a
network-based intrusion detection system (IDS) that uses benign network packets
generated from user activities to detect malicious events in a connected smart home
system [YOM+ 19]. Researchers implemented a network observer in the home gateway
that learns user behaviors from the network traffic and detects malicious user commands from learned behavior. Anthi et al. proposed a supervised intrusion detection
system to detect malicious and known network attacks in smart devices [AWS+ 19a].
In a recent work, Apthorpe et al. showed that it is possible to mitigate privacy leakage
from smart home traffic by implementing traffic shaping [AHR+ 19].
• Static analysis. Recently, static analysis of smart apps have been proposed to
detect information leakage and cross-app interference. Berkay and Babun et al.
introduced a static analysis tool, SaINT, to track sensitive information in smart
apps [CBS+ 18]. SaINT performs source code analysis to trace all the sensitive information from sources to sinks and identify potential information leakage. Chi et
al. proposed a static analysis tool to extract app context from smart apps to detect
cross-app interference in a connected smart environment [CZDY18]. Their proposed
model considers data sources and sinks in an app to track the information flow and
extracts the rules presented in an app. The extracted rules are saved and compared
when a new app is installed to find possible conflicts of operations.
• Forensic analysis. Forensic analysis of smart platforms/settings has been proposed
to identify malicious events in a smart environment. Wang et al. proposed a security
tool, ProvThings, which logs run-time data from smart apps and perform provenance
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tracking to detect malicious activities [WHBG18]. ProvThings implements data collector in the source code of an app to identify data flows and create provenance
graphs. These graphs are used to infer app functionalities and detect malicious activities in the smart systems. Babun et al. proposed IoTDots, a forensic analysis tools
which can detect user behavior from logged data in a smart environment [BSAU18].
IoTDots collects data from smart apps and performs a context analysis to detect
violation of security policies in a smart environment.

3.3

Smart Device and Sensor Access Control in Multi-user
Smart Environment

In a smart environment, multiple users have access to multiple devices and sensors,
typically through a dedicated app installed on a mobile device. Traditional access
control mechanisms consider one unique trusted user that controls the access to the
devices. However, multi-user multi-device smart settings pose fundamentally different challenges to traditional single-user systems. For instance, in a multi-user
environment, users have conflicting, complex, and dynamically changing demands on
multiple devices, which cannot be handled by traditional access control techniques.
Moreover, the coarse-grained traditional access control results in over-privilege access
in multi-user smart environment. Rather than providing fine-grained user access control, most of the prior works emphasize on limiting malicious activities via controlling
app access [DZL+ 17, FPR+ 16, WHBG18, SBAU19, NSRU19] and studying device behaviors to detect malicious activities [BCMU19, LBAU17]. Moreover, several works
focus on device access control and authentication on an IoT network for single-user
scenarios [CPG+ 15, AHD+ 16, RSYS16, JCB16, RSS+ 17]. In a recent work, He et al.
present a detailed smart home user study that portrays users’ concerns of fine-grained
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access control in multi-user smart environments [HGP+ 18]. Zeng et al. discuss their
findings related to security and privacy concerns among smart home users [ZMR17].
In both works, smart home users clearly raise their concerns regarding the need of
access control mechanism in smart environment such as smart home. In addition,
these studies also summarize several design specification to reflect users’ needs in an
access control mechanism. Matthews et al., also points out relevant issues with smart
home users that share the same devices and accounts [MLT+ 16]. However, no explicit
solution for multi-user access is proposed in any of these works.
In other works, researchers explore different access control strategies when multiple
users share a single IoT device. Liu et al. suggested a user access framework for the
mobile phone ecosystem called xShare, which provides policy enforcement on file level
accesses [LRH+ 09]. Ni et al. presented DiffUser, a user access control model for the
Android environment based on access privileges [NYB+ 09], which is only effective for
a single device. Tyagi et al. discussed several design specification needed for multiparty access control in a shared environment [TSRG16]. Aside from these works,
there are few prior proposing access control systems for multi-user multi-device smart
environment. Gusmeroli et al. suggested a capability-based access control for users in
a multi-device environment [GPR13]. However, this system is not flexible enough to
express the real needs of the users. Jang et al. presented a set of design specification
for access control mechanism based on different use scenarios of multi-user smart
home system [JCP17]. Schuster et al. proposed a situation-based access control in
the smart home system which considers different environmental parameters [SST18].
Here, the authors considered state of the device along with the location of the users
to determine a valid access request. However, this work does not solve the conflicting
demands of multiple users. Yahyazadeh et al. presented Expat, a policy language
to define policies based on user demands [YPHC19]. In a recent work, Zeng et al.
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built an access control prototype with different access control options for smart home
users [ZR19]. Here, the authors considered four different access control mechanisms
and assessed in a month-long user study among seven households to understand the
users’ needs and improve the design. However, they did not implement the framework
in real-life systems and did not consider user conflicts while operating in a multi-user
smart environment.
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CHAPTER 4
TAXONOMY AND IMPACT ANALYSIS OF SENSOR-BASED
THREATS TO SMART DEVICES

4.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we provide a detailed taxonomy of existing sensor-based threats to
smart devices and applications. Sensor-based threats are emerging threat vectors to
smart devices and it is important understand the characteristics and impacts of these
threats to build secure smart devices and applications.
Summary of Contributions: The main contributions of this chapter are noted
as follows:
• We categorize sensor-based threats in smart devices based on different security
requirements and present a comprehensive threat model
• We provide a detailed taxonomy of sensor-based threats and attacks to smart devices and discuss the mechanisms and effectiveness of the attacks in a detailed way.
We also summarize the effectiveness of the threats and attacks based on known vulnerability metrics.
• We identify several open issues and discuss future research that could contribute
to secure smart devices against emerging sensor-based threats.

4.2

Threat Model

In this section, we classify sensor-based threats in smart devices based on threat type,
attacker capbilities and security requirements of smart devices.
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4.2.1

Types of Sensor-based Threats

A sensor-based threat exploits on-device or external sensors in a smart device ecosystem to perform attacks such as false data injection, eavesdropping, information leakage, etc. to jeopardize the proper operation of the device. Based on the nature of the
threats, sensor-based threats can be categorized in two categories.
• Passive threats. Passive sensor-based threats refer to the malicious sensor activities
in smart devices without obstructing the normal operation of the device. For
example, a malicious app installed in a smart device can run in the background
and observe the sensor behavior to infer the ongoing task in the device [MJ18].
Passive sensor-based threats can accomplish its malicious intents by performing
malicious activities within a smart device or by utilizing another near-by smart
device.
• Active threats. Active sensor-based threats obstruct the normal operation of the
smart device to perform malicious activities. An active sensor-based threats can
directly abuse an on-board or external connected sensor by spoofing the sensor
reading [IoT17] or obstructing sensor signals using external device [SSK+ 15].

4.2.2

Attacker’s Capabilities

To perform sensor attacks, we consider adversaries have the following capabilities in
terms of device access, security privilege, and processing capabilities.
• Device access. An adversary may need device access to perform malicious sensor
activities in a smart device. Based on the type of access needed for an adversary,
we categorized three different access types - direct access, transitive access, and
peripheral access. In direct access, an adversary can directly access the sensors
in a smart device to perform malicious activities. For example, a malicious app
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installed in a smartphone can directly access on-board sensors and collect data to
infer sensitive information [SAU17]. For transitive access, an adversary uses access
to a smart device or sensor to perform malicious sensor activities in a targeted
smart device. For example, in a smart home environment, an adversary can get
access and strobe a smart light to change the output of the light sensor and a
targeted smart light [IoT17]. In peripheral access, an adversary implanted in a
device (affected device) can perform malicious sensor activities in any smart device
in its peripheral. Here, the affected device and the targeted device share the same
environment, but are not connected with each other. For example, an adversary
can use the audio sensor of a smartphone to eavesdrop to another smartphone in
close proximity to infer keystrokes.
• Security privilege. An adversary needs different levels of security privileges to perform malicious sensor activities in a smart device. For instance, to perform eavesdropping, an adversary needs minimum (low) privileges in the targeted device while
for false data injection in a sensor, an adversary needs maximum privileges to access the sensor. In this work, we consider an adversary can have both privileges to
classify the sensor-based threats and attacks correctly.
• Processing capability. In smart devices, sensors mostly act as a triggering component to initiate automated applications. The sensed information in the smart device
sensors often needs further processing to extract important information. Hence, an
adversary needs processing capabilities to perform malicious sensor activities in
smart devices. Based on the adversary’s goal, the processing capacity may vary.
For example, an adversary extracting keystrokes from motion sensors needs higher
processing capabilities than an adversary recording phone conversation secretly off
the device [SAU19a].
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4.2.3

Threat Model

In this dissertation, we consider sensor-based threats and attacks in four working layers (sensing, communication, data processing, and application) of the smart devices.
We consider adversaries that try to abuse the sensors to perform malicious tasks as a
sensor-based threat. Additionally, this work considers passive threats to the sensors
that do not disrupt normal functionalities of the smart devices. An adversary can
be installed in a smart device to get access to the embedded sensors of the device or
external sensors connected to the smart device. An adversary that has access to the
peripheral of a targeted smart device to sniff the sensor data and network traffic is
also within the scope of this work. Furthermore, we consider an adversary that can
have direct or indirect access to the sensors of the smart devices to capture sensor
data for further analysis. Note that a physical sensor abuse or sensor tampering that
could lead to physical damage of the smart devices is not considered and outside the
scope of this work. Specifically, we consider the following threats in our threat model.
• Information Leakage. An active or passive adversary may try to access the
sensor data to steal sensitive information such as typing information, unlock code,
PIN code, etc.
• Transmitting Malicious Sensor Command. An adversary may try to abuse
sensors to transmit malicious sensor command to trigger malicious activities in a
smart device.
• False Sensor Data Injection. An adversary may try to inject false sensor data
to disrupt the normal functionalities of the smart devices.
• Denial-of-Service. An adversary may establish a sensory channel between ondevice sensors and external entities (e.g., device, signal generator, etc.) to impede
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normal sensor operation which eventually leads to obstructing an on-going task in
the smart device.

4.3

Taxonomy of Threats, Attack Methods, and Their Impact

As existing sensor management systems and security schemes cannot provide adequate
security to the sensors, attackers can exploit these sensors in various ways. In this
section, we provide a detailed discussion about sensor-based threats and attacks to
smart devices and survey the existing malicious attacks confirmed by the research
community and developers [SZZ+ 11, TRCK13, PSJA15, PMSJ16, PAS+ 16, PRS+ 17].
To understand the severity of sensor-based threats and attacks, we considered
several common vulnerability scoring metrics for sensor-based threats in our discussion [Fir19]. These scoring metrics give insights of the characteristics and impact of
the threats. Detailed of these metrics are given below.
• Attack Method (AM). Attack method reflects how the threats penetrate the
smart device to perform malicious sensor events. For sensor-based threats, we
consider three methods to assess the severity of the threat- active, passive, and
combination.
• Device Access (DA). To initiate a malicious sensor activity in a smart device,
sensor-based threats need to access the device directly or indirectly. Based on the
nature of the threat, we categorize the device access of sensor-based threats in three
categories - direct access, transitive access, and peripheral access. Direct access
refers to the threats that need access to the targeted device. In transitive access,
a sensor-based threat can preform malicious sensor activities by accessing a device
that is connected with the targeted device. For example, a sensor-based threat
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can perform malicious activities in a smart light by accessing a connected light
sensor [SBAU19]. A sensor-based threat can also execute malicious sensor-activities
by accessing the peripheral of the targeted device. For instance, keystrokes in a
smartphone can be captured by a nearby smart speaker or smart watch [MJHB18].
• Attack Complexity (AC). Sensor-based threats and attacks can target one single
sensor or multiple sensors to perform malicious tasks in smart devices. As abusing
more than one sensor at a time may require immense effort from the attacker
side, we consider two different levels (high and low) of complexity for sensor-based
threats.
• Required Privilege (RP). To get access to the sensors for initiating malicious activities, sensor-based threats need to exploit existing security mechanisms of smart
devices. As we explained in Section 2.4, sensors in a smart device can be categorized
in two categories based on access permission: no-permission imposed sensor and
permission imposed sensor. To access the no-permission based sensors, an adversary needs no excessive privilege while an adversary targeting permission imposed
sensors needs high privilege. Hence, based on permission needed for accessing sensors in a smart device we consider two categories - high privilege threats (need
excessive permission) and low privilege threats (need no permission).
• User Interaction (UI). This scoring metric portrays the need of user interaction
other than the attacker to compromise the sensor functionalities in smart devices.
Low user interaction indicates the higher impact of the sensor-based threats to
smart devices.
• Attack Impact (AI). This scoring metric represents the impact of the sensorbased threats to various security requirements of the smart device. For sensorbased threats, we choose three important security features that might get affected
- confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
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• Success Rate (SR). Success rate of the sensor-based attacks is the fraction or
percentage of success of an attack to perform malicious activities in a smart device
among a number of attempts. We categorize this metric in three categories - high
(success rate >90%), medium (success rate 70-90%), and low (success rate <70%).
In the following sub-sections, we summarize existing sensor-based threats and
attacks in four broad categories based on the purpose and nature of the threats
(presented in Section 4.2).

4.3.1

Information Leakage

Information leakage is the most common sensor-based threat for smart devices and
their applications. Sensors on smart devices can reveal sensitive data like passwords,
secret keys of a cryptographic system, credit card information, etc. This information
can be used directly to violate user privacy or to build a database for future attacks.
An adversary (e.g., malicious app) can get access to the sensor data by exploiting
vulnerabilities of existing sensor managements systems such as selective sensor authorization and user dependency (Section 2.4: use case 2). Only one sensor can be
enough for information leakage (e.g., eavesdropping using microphone [SZZ+ 11]) or
multiple sensors can be exploited to create a more complex attack (e.g., keystroke
inference using the gyroscope and audio sensors [NSN14]). Moreover, sensors of one
smart device can be used to leak information from a nearby device (passive information leakage) (Section 2.4: use case 3). In general, information leakage can be
accomplished for the purpose of (1) keystroke inference, (2) task inference, (3) location inference, or (4) eavesdropping as explained below.
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Keystroke inference
Keystroke inference is a generic threat to smart devices. Most of the smart devices
provide input medium such as the touchscreen, touchpad, keyboard (external or builtin virtual or real). Whenever a user types or gives input to a device, the device tilts
and turns which creates deviations in data recorded by sensors (e.g., accelerometer,
gyroscope, microphone, light sensor, etc.). These deviations in sensor data can be
used to infer keystrokes in a smart device. Keystroke inference can be performed on
the device itself or on a nearby device using sensors of the smart device. Keystroke
inference can be performed actively (using on-board sensors) or passively (using external sensors). Here, we summarize different keystroke inferences based on the targeted
sensors in the smart devices.
Keystroke Inference with Light Sensors - Light sensors in smart devices are
usually associated with the display unit. In general, the display unit of the smart
devices is touch-sensitive and provides a user interface to take inputs. For a constant
state and unchangeable ambiance, the readings of the light sensor are constant. Each
time a user touches and uses the touchscreen to interact with the device, he/she
tilts and changes the orientation of the device, which causes changes in the readings
of the light sensor. Each input may have a dissimilar light intensity recorded by
the sensor. These changes in the readings of the light sensor of a device can be
utilized to infer keystrokes of that particular device. An attacker can derive the
various light intensities recorded by the light sensor by trying several keystrokes in a
device and then construct a database. When users put their PINs or type something
in the touchpad, attackers can capture the data maliciously from the device and
collate these data with the database to decode keystroke information. As an example,
some researchers developed a method named PIN Skimming to use the data from an
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ambient light sensor and RGBW (red, green, blue and white) sensor to extract PIN
input of the smartphone [Spr14].
Keystroke Inference with Motion Sensors - The main purpose of using the
embedded motion sensors (e.g., accelerometer, gyroscope, linear acceleration sensor)
in smart devices is to detect changes in motion of the devices such as shake, tilt,
etc.. Accelerometer and linear acceleration sensor measure acceleration force that
is applied to a device while gyroscope measures the rate of rotation in the devices.
In smart devices with user interface (e.g., smartphone, smart watch, tablet, etc.),
the value given by the motion sensors depends on the orientation of the device and
user interactions (striking force of the finger on the device display, resistance force
of the hand, the location of the finger on the touchpad of the device, etc.). Thus,
when a user gives inputs to a device, the motion sensors’ data changes accordingly.
Generally, smart devices use two types of user interface to take user input – on-screen
user interface (e.g., touchpad) and external user interface (e.g., keyboard, keypad,
etc.). For both user interfaces, input keys are in a fixed position and for a single
keystroke, the motion sensors give a specific value [CC12]. As attackers do not need
any user permission to access the motion sensors, it is easy to access the motion sensor
data.
One common keystroke inference attack can be performed by exploiting accelerometer. As mentioned above, accelerometer gives a specific reading for each user input
on a smart device, thus, attackers can build a database of pre-processed accelerometer readings with diverse input scenarios and make a matching vector of sensor data
and keystrokes to extract users’ input [AHIN13, HGC+ 19]. The data extracted from
these attacks vary from text inputs to PINs and numbers typed in the touchpad
which is much more serious as attackers can acquire the PIN or credit card information [SPYG15, ASBS12]. Owusu et al. developed an app named ACCessory which
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can identify the area of the touchscreen by analyzing accelerometer data of smart
devices [OHD+ 12]. ACCessory can infer PIN input on smart devices based on the
detected area from accelerometer data. Accelerometer data can also be used to infer
keystroke from a nearby keyboard. Marquardt et al. presented an attack scenario
where accelerometer data of a smart device can be used to guess input on a nearby
keyboard [MVCT11]. Whenever a user types on the keyboard, a vibration occurs and
the accelerometer of the smart devices can catch this vibration and keystrokes can be
identified correctly by analyzing this data [AAUA18].
Another method of keystroke inference can be achieved by analyzing the gyroscope
data of a smart device. Gyroscope measures the angles of rotation in all the three
axes which vary based on the specific area of the touch on the screen. Many smart
devices such as smartphones, tablets, etc. have a feature when users input something
on the touchpad the device vibrates and gyroscope is also sensitive to this vibrational
force. The orientation angle recorded in the gyroscope and the vibration caused
by the input can be used to distinguish inputs given by the users. Moreover, the
data of the gyroscope can be combined with the tap sound of each key recorded via
the microphone which can increase the success rate of inferring keystrokes [NSN14,
CC11, LS19]. The combination of accelerometer and gyroscope data can also be
used for keystroke inference which yields more accurate results [XBZ12, MVBC12,
Ngu15, HB18, LCY+ 18, LL19]. Additionally, the use of pattern recognition and deep
learning algorithms can improve the success rate of keystroke inference attacks to
smart devices [BFG+ 19].
In most wearables (smart bands, smartwatches, etc.), the motion sensors are utilized for monitoring the movement of the devices. A smartwatch, which is one of
the most common wearables, maintains constant connectivity with smartphones via
Bluetooth. While wearing a smartwatch, if a user moves his/her hands from an initial
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position, the motion sensor calculates the deviation and provides the data regarding
the change of the position of the smartwatch [JLLA15]. Typing in the touchpad of
a smart device while wearing a smartwatch will change the data recorded by the
motion sensors of the smartwatch depending on user gestures. For a specific user
input interface such as QWERTY keyboard of smartphones which has a specific distance between keys, the motion sensors’ data of the smartwatch can be used to infer
the keystrokes [LZD+ 15, WLRC15, MJHB15, SDN15]. Modern wearable devices (e.g.,
Apple Watch 5, Samsung Gear VR, etc.) also provide a user interface where users
can provide inputs to the devices. Researchers showed that it is possible to infer the
user input in wearables by observing hand movements [LLC+ 19]. In a recent work,
researchers showed it is possible to infer the unlock code of a smart lock from the
gyroscope data of a smart watch [MHSJ18].
Keystroke Inference with Audio Sensors - High precision microphones used
in smart devices can sense the acoustic signals emanating from keyboards (built-in or
nearby) which can be used to infer the keystrokes on a smart device. Asonov et al.
proposed an experiment to record the sound of key tapping and infer the correct key
from it [AA04]. In this experiment, the attacker is assumed to record the acoustic
signal emanating from the device while the user types on the keyboard. Then, the
attacker matches this signal with a training dataset recorded stealthily while the same
user was typing in the training period.
Zhuang et al. showed that it would be possible to infer keystrokes by just analyzing the acoustic emanation without having a training data set [ZZT09]. In this
attack scenario, a specific key is assigned to a pre-defined class according to the
frequency of the acoustic signal it generates while being typed. The attacker then
takes a ten-minute of recording of the acoustic signal of typing on a keyboard. This
recorded signal is analyzed using machine learning and speech recognition feature
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named Cepstrum to match with the previously defined key classes and infer the input
of a keyboard.
In another work, Halevi et al. introduced a new technique named Time-Frequency
Decoding to improve the accuracy of keystroke inference from the acoustic signal
[HS12]. In this technique, machine learning and the frequency-based calculations are
combined to match the recorded acoustic signal data from a smart device with a training dataset and increase the success rate of the attack scenario. This technique also
considers the typing style of users to minimize the error rate of keystroke inference.
Berger et al. divided a PC keyboard in regions based on tap sound generated by
keys and modeled a dictionary attack [BWY06]. This attack utilizes signal processing
and cross-correlation functions to process acoustic signal emanations from a nearby
keyboard. Kune et al. proposed a timing attack on a number pad used in smartphone
and ATMs using the audio feedback beeps generated while entering PIN [FKK10].
Inter-keystroke timing and distance between the numbers on the keypad are the main
two features which are used to infer the input PIN in this attack. By analyzing the
audio feedback recorded using the microphone of a nearby smart device, these two
features are extracted and using Hidden Markov Model, the input numbers and PINs
are inferred. Lu et al. proposed KeyListener, a context-aware inference method to
predict the keystroke in QWERTY keyboard of smartphones and tablets using embedded microphones [LYC+ 19]. KeyListener uses a binary search tree algorithm to
predict the typed information and achieves over 90% success rate. Similar to KeyListener, Shumailov et al. presented an acoustic side-channel attack which uses the tap
noises of a virtual keyboard to infer the typed information in a smartphone [SSYA19].
Kim et al. further improved this work by capturing tap noises using multiple embedded microphones and combining the patterns of the acoustic signals [KJL20]. Here,
researchers developed a tapstroke detection and localization algorithms which can
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infer the typed information with 85.4% accuracy. In a recent work, Zhou et al. presented PatternListener+, an inference attack to predict the unlock patterns on an
Android device using acoustic signal [ZWY+ 19]. PatternListener+ uses the speaker
of a smartphone to play an inaudible sound and capture the reflected signal from
users’ fingertips using the embedded microphone. The reflected signal contains information of the hand movement which is further analyzed with a tree structure to infer
the pattern of the lock. Backes et al. showed that acoustic signal emanated from a
dot matrix printer which was collected by a nearby microphone of a smart device can
be analyzed to predict the text printed on a paper [BDG+ 10]. In the training phase
of this attack, words from a list are being printed, the acoustic signal is recorded and
the data is stored. The audio signal processing and speech recognition techniques are
used to extract the features of the acoustic signal to create a correlation between the
number of needles used in the printer and the intensity of the audio signal. In the real
attack scenario, the audio signal is captured by a nearby audio sensor and matched
with the previous dataset to infer the printed text.
Zhu et al. showed a context-free attack scenario using the keyboard’s acoustic
emanation recorded in a smartphone to infer keystrokes [ZMZL14]. In this attack
scenario, the acoustic signals emanated from the keyboards are recorded by two or
more smartphones. For each pair of microphones of smartphones, the recorded acoustic signal strength will depend on the distance between the typed key and the smartphones. By calculating the time-difference of the arrival of the acoustic signal, the
position of the key can be inferred.
In a similar attack, Chhetri et al. introduced a method to reconstruct the design
source code sent to a 3-D printer [CCAF16]. In this attack scenario, the acoustic signal
emanated the 3-D printer is being recorded by a recorder placed in close proximity of a
3-D printer and the recorded file is processed for extracting time and frequency domain
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Attack
name

Target
device

Target
sensor

Pin Skimming
Smartphone
Light
Text Inference
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Motion-based keystroke inference
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Keystroke inference on Android
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Input extraction via motion sensor
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Magnetometer
Accelerometer side channel attack
Smartphone
Accelerometer
ACCessory
Smartphone
Accelerometer
(sp)iphone
Smartphone
Accelerometer
Single-stroke language-agnostic keylogging
Smartphone
Gyroscope, Microphone
Touchlogger
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Taplogger
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
I Know What You Type
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope, Light
Type and leak
smartphone
Accelerometer
Risk Assessment of motion sensor
smartphone
Accelerometer
Infer tapped and traced user input
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Motion-based side-channel attack
Smartphone
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
When good becomes evil
Smart watch
Accelerometer
Mole
Smart watch
Accelerometer
(Smart) watch your taps
Smart watch
Accelerometer
Wristsnoop
Smart watch
Accelerometer
Inferring Mechanical Lock Combinations
Smart lock
Gyroscope
Inference of private information
Smartphone
Accelerometer, gyroscope
KeyListener
Smartphone
Microphone
aLeak
Smart watch
Accelerometer, Gyroscope
Keyboard acoustic emanation
Smartphone
Microphone
Keyboard acoustic emanations revisited
Smartphone
Microphone
A closer look at keyboard acoustic emanations
Smartphone
Microphone
TapSnoop
Smartphone
Microphone
Dictionary attacks using keyboard acoustic
Smartphone
Microphone
Timing attacks
Smartphone
Microphone
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks on Printers
Smartphone
Microphone
Context-free keyboard acoustic emanations
Smartphone
Microphone
PatternListener+
Smartphone
Microphone, speaker
Hearing your touch
Smartphone
Microphone, speaker
PIN skimmer
Smartphone
Microphone, Camera
Juice filming attack
Smartphone
Camera
Beware, your hands reveal your secrets!
Smartphone
Camera
Smudge attack
Smartphone
Camera
iSpy
Smart security camera
Camera
GazeRevealer
Smartphone
Camera
Compromising electromagnetic emanations
Smartphone
Magnetic
My Smartphone Knows What You Print
Smart printer
Microphone, magnetic

Target
layer
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Sensing
Sensing
Application
Application
Sensing
Sensing

Vulnerability
metrics†
AM DA AC RP UI SR

-

-

Ref.
[Spr14]
[HB18]
[CC12]
[AHIN13]
[SPYG15]
[ASBS12]
[OHD+ 12]
[MVCT11]
[NSN14]
[CC11]
[XBZ12]
[BFG+ 19]
[LLC+ 19]
[HGC+ 19]
[Ngu15]
[LS19]
[LZD+ 15]
[WLRC15]
[MJHB15, MJHB18]
[SDN15]
[MHSJ18]
[LCY+ 18]
[LYC+ 19]
[LL19]
[AA04]
[ZZT09]
[HS12]
[KJL20]
[BWY06]
[FKK10]
[BDG+ 10]
[ZMZL14]
[ZWY+ 19]
[SSYA19]
[SA13]
[MLMK15]
[SKSP14]
[Avi12]
[RWG+ 11]
[WCGS19]
[VP09]
[SLB+ 16]

†

Attack Method (AM): Active- , Passive- ; Device Access (DA): Direct- , Transitive- , Peripheral- ; Attack Complexity (AC): High- , Low- ; Required Privilege (RP):
High privilege- , Low privilege- ; User Interaction (UI): Needed - , not needed - ; Success Rate (SR): High (>90%) - , medium (70-90%) - , low (<70%) - .
‡
Any type of keystroke inference impacts the confidentiality of the smart device.

Table 4.1: Summary of keystroke inference via sensors in smart devices.
features. These features are then cross-matched with a training dataset collected in
a learning phase to infer the correct design. Song et al. improved this attack by
adding magnetic sensor data to accurately reconstruct the physical prints and their
G-code [SLB+ 16].
Keystroke Inference with Video Sensors - Modern smart devices come with
powerful cameras which can both take still pictures and record high definition videos.
By applying image processing techniques in captured images, keystroke inference can
be done. Simon et al. developed a malware named PIN skimmer which uses the front
camera of a smartphone and microphone to infer PIN input in a smartphone [SA13].
PIN skimmer records the tap sound on the touchpad of a smartphone and records
video using the front camera of the phone. The movement recorded in the video is
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then analyzed to detect which part of the touchscreen is used. This information is
then combined with the tap sound to infer the inputs correctly.
Another potential malware attack on the smart devices using the camera is Juice
Filming Attack [MLMK15]. In this attack scenario, a malicious app uses the camera
to take screenshots when any user-input is given in the touchpad and save the images
on the storage unit (internal ROM or external memory card) of the device. Most
of the smart devices use USB for heterogeneous applications (e.g., charging, data
transfer, etc.) and when the compromised device is connected to the laptop or any
other device with a storage unit, the app transfers the stored pictures to the storage
device from which attackers can easily extract the information.
Shukla et al. showed a method to infer the PIN input by analyzing the hand
position using the recorded video [SKSP14]. In this method, a background application
gets access to the camera of the smartphone and records a video when a user starts
typing in a touchpad. Then, analyzing the hand position and the position of the
smartphone, an attacker can extract the inputs given in a touchpad. Another version
of this attack is to record the typing scenario using an external camera. In this
scenario, a camera of a smart device (e.g., smartphone, smart glass, smart surveillance
system, etc.) is used to record the video of typing the PIN. In both cases, the input
PIN can be inferred with high accuracy.
Adam J. Aviv introduced another type of attack named Smudge Attack using
an external camera to infer pattern lock of a smart device [Avi12]. In this attack
scenario, a smart device is placed in between two cameras of other smart devices
(smartphone or smart glass) and high definition pictures are taken. Whenever the
user gives the unlock pattern in the touchpad, some smudge marks are left on the
screen, and captured by the cameras, which leak information about the unlock pattern
to an attacker.
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Raguram et al. developed a process named iSpy which can reconstruct the typed
text by analyzing the reflection of the touchscreen in a reflective surface such as
sunglass or smart glass [RWG+ 11]. The experimental setup of iSpy includes a high
definition camera which can capture the video of the reflective surface while a user
types in the touchpad of a phone. The reflection of the phone is being extracted from
the video and consecutive frames are analyzed to extract stable pictures of the phone
screen. Features (hand position, motion in the screen, etc.) are extracted from stable
pictures extracted from the video and by using machine learning techniques, key press
detection is done and typed text can be inferred successfully. In more recent work,
Wang et al. proposed GazeRevealer, a novel side-channel attack to infer keystrokes
in a smart device using the eye movement of the users [WCGS19]. GazeRevealer uses
the front camera to capture video and analyzes to extract multiple features such as
eye movement, head position, etc. These features are used to train a classifier which
can predict the keystroke in real-time with high accuracy.
Keystroke Inference with Magnetic Sensors - Besides the aforementioned
attack scenarios, electromagnetic emanations from the keyboard can be used to infer
the input of a computer. As magnetic sensors of smart devices are sensitive to electromagnetic emanations, they can be used as the attack medium. Vuagnoux et al.
showed that both wired and wireless keyboards emit electromagnetic signals when a
user types and this signal can be further processed to infer keystroke [VP09]. In this
method, electromagnetic radiation is measured by the magnetic sensor of a smart device when a key is pressed and using the falling edge transition technique, an attacker
can infer the keystrokes.
Lessons learned for keystroke inference - We summarize the aforementioned
threats and attacks in Table 4.1 with common vulnerability metrics. We can see smart
devices with user input module (touchscreen, keypad, numeric keypad) are mostly the
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targeted device for keystroke inference. These threats and attacks affect the confidentiality of the sensor data. Another interesting fact we observe is the majority of the
threats and attacks targets motion sensor (22 out of 42 reported threats and attacks)
which does not require any permission to access in current smart device security
schemes. Thus, these threats and attacks can easily access sensor data and extract
keystroke information easily. For the targeted layer, we can notice the keystroke inference in smart devices only targets sensing (34 out of 42) and application (8 out of
42) layer. We can also observe a trade-off between attack complexity and required
privilege in sensor-based threats targeting sensors in smart devices. For example,
keystroke inference from the motion sensor (e.g., accelerometer) does not require any
privilege to perform while keystroke inference from the audio sensor needs permission
to access the microphone. However, accessing the motion sensor needs active vulnerability which may disrupt the on-going task in the smart device. On the other hand,
capturing keystroke using the audio sensor can be both active and passive which increases the severity of the threat or attack. The outcomes of keystroke inference also
have diverse effects on smart devices and users. As keystroke inference is directly
related to user activities in smart devices, it impacts sensitive user information. Attackers can infer various typed information including device unlock code, password,
banking information, typed and printed information, etc. These inferred information
can be used to initiate another attack or directly used for malicious purposes such as
ransom, data hijacking, identity theft, etc. In summary, passive keystroke inference
with minimum required privilege (e.g., [MJHB15, SDN15, VP09]) can severely affect
the confidentiality of the smart devices.
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Task Inference
Task inference refers to a type of attack which reveals the information of an on-going
task or an application in a smart device. Task inference reveals information about the
state of the device and attackers can replicate this device state to launch an attack
without alerting security policies implemented in the device. Sensors associated with
smart devices show deviation in the reading for various tasks running on the devices.
This deviation in the reading can be used to infer the running process inside a device
and application of the device.
Task Inference with Light Sensor - Light sensor of a smart device can be
used to infer an on-going task on a device. Smart devices with display emit lights
with distinct intensity for different tasks. For example, playing separate videos in
a smart TV will change the emitted light intensity based on the background and
video quality. This change in light intensity can be used to infer an on-going task
on the display. Chakraborty et al. showed that light intensity changed in a flat
panel display (e.g., smart TV, smart monitor, etc.) can be used to infer what is
written on the screen by a light sensor of a smartphone [COS17]. In this attack, an
Android-powered smartphone is placed in front of the display to capture the light
intensity emitted from the screen. These captured light signals can be sampled and
deconvoluted to infer the task on the monitor such as on-going videos, specific web
pages, etc. Berkay et al. used a smart light to passively leak the status of a smart
home [CBS+ 18]. In this attack, if no user is present inside the home, a smart light will
maliciously trigger an on-off pattern to notify the user. Maiti et al. proposed a new
attack vector to infer the audio and video of a smart TV using the light emitted from
a smart light [MJ18]. Here, researchers used the multimedia-visualization feature of
smart light which creates a vibrant lighting effect in conjunction with audio and video
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playing nearby. Based on the light intensity emitted in audio frequencies, researchers
successfully inferred an on-going audio or video.
Task Inference with Magnetic Sensors - Magnetic sensors in smart devices
has the role to fix the orientation of the device with respect to Earth's magnetic field.
Data recorded by a magnetic sensor change in the presence of an external magnetic
field in the device's peripheral. This deviation in data can be used to identify the
tasks running on a device. Many smart devices have a storage unit and whenever data
is written or read from this storage unit, a change in the reading of the magnetic sensor can be observed. Magnetic sensors of a smart device can be used not only to infer
information of the device itself, but can also be used as a medium to fetch information
from a nearby device. Biedermann et al. showed that the magnetic sensor of a smartphone could be used to infer on-going tasks in a storage unit like the hard drives of
the computers and servers [BKS15]. When an application is running on a computer,
the hard drives generate a magnetic field which can be sensed by a magnetic sensor of
a smartphone. Various actions cause distinct readings on the magnetic sensor which
can be used to track the users’ action. This can be considered as a serious threat
to the device and attackers can fetch valuable information in this way. Ning et al.
proposed DeepMag+, a side-channel attack to exploit on-board magnetic sensor for
inferring smart apps installed in a smart device [NWX+ 20]. DeepMag+ captures the
on-board magnetic sensor data while executing installed apps in a smart device and
uses convolutional neural network to fingerprint the apps. Additionally, DeepMag+
can combine motion sensor data with magnetic sensor to increase the inference accuracy up to 98%. Similar to this work, Matyunin et al. presented MagneticSpy ,
a novel website and application fingerprinting method exploiting magnetic sensors of
a smart device [MWA+ 19]. MagneticSpy analyzes the electromagnetic disturbances
caused by the mobile processors which are proportional to the CPU workload. By
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Target
sensor

Target
layer

-

-

-

-

Vulnerability
metrics†
AM DA AC RP UI SR

[COS17]
[CBS+ 18]
[BKS15]
[QS01]
[OC15]
[MJ18]
[AFA+ 18]
[NWX+ 20]
[CJX+ 19]
[MWA+ 19]
[Ano16]
[HON+ 12]
[HON+ 12]
[BN18]
[NVHBN16]
[ZH19]
[FGSS19]
[SZZ+ 11]
[DLZZ14]
[LWZ+ 13]
[CMV+ 16]
[MBN14]
[AWL+ 19]
[KLW+ 19]

Ref.

Table 4.2: Summary of task inference, location inference, and eavesdropping via sensors in smart devices.

Attack Method (AM): Active- , Passive- ; Device Access (DA): Direct- , Transitive- , Peripheral- ; Attack Complexity (AC): High- , Low- ; Required Privilege (RP): High privilege, Low privilege- ; User Interaction (UI): Needed - , not needed - ; Success Rate (SR): High (>90%) - , medium (70-90%) - , low (<70%) - .
‡
Any type of information leakage impacts the confidentiality of the smart device.

†

Target
device

LightSpy
Smartphone
Light
Application
IoTBench
Smart light
Light
Application
Hard drive side-channel attacks
Smartphone
Magnetic
Sensing
Electro-magnetic Analysis of smart cards
Smart card
Magnetic
Sensing
Task
Power analysis attack
Smart devices
Any embedded sensors
Sensing
Light Ear
Smart light
Light
Application
Inference
Peek-a-boo
Smart home devices
Motion, light, temperature
Communication
DeepMag+
smartphone
Magnetometer
Sensing
MagAttack
smartphone
Magnetometer
Sensing
MagneticSpy
smartphone
Magnetometer
Sensing
VoipLoc
Smartphone
Microphone, speaker
Sensing
ACComplice
Smartphone
Accelerometer
Application
Location
Inferring Your Secrets from Android
Smart Navigation device
Microphone, speaker
Application
inference
Permission less Location Attack
Smartphone
Magnetic
Application
Inferring User Routes and Locations
Smartphone
Accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetic
Application
MISSILE
Smartphone
Accelerometer, gyroscope
Sensing
Prying into Private Spaces
Smartphone
Accelerometer, gyroscope
Sensing
Soundcomber
Smartphone
Microphone
Application
VoicEmployer
Smartphone
Microphone, Speaker
Application
Eavesdropping
CPVT
Smartphone
Microphone, Speaker
Application
Hidden voice commands
Smart car
Microphone
Application
Gyrophone
Smartphone
Gyroscope
Sensing
Spearphone
smartphone
Accelerometer
Sensing
I Can Hear Your Alexa
smart speaker
Microphone
Communication

Attack
name

analyzing the deviance in different working conditions, MagneticSpy can infer the
on-going CPU activity with high accuracy (up to 90%).
An electromagnetic (EM) emanation is a common phenomenon for smart devices.
Electromagnetic emanations occur whenever current passes through a device and a
task is running on a device. EM emanation attacks can also be observed in FPGAbased (Field-programmable gate array) smart devices [QS01,CCDP04,AARR03]. Attackers can record electromagnetic emission data generated from the FPGA-based
smart devices to deduct which kind of application is running in the system and also
the states of logic blocks of the devices. Such information leakages make the system
vulnerable to the user. Smart cards also emit EM waves while performing various
tasks which can be captured by a radio frequency (RF) antenna and the task can be
inferred from the radiation [RW]. Cheng et al. proposed MagAttack, a side-channel
attack to abuse the magnetic sensor of smart mobile devices [CJX+ 19]. User activities such as application launching and operation has a slight but significant effect on
CPU’s power consumption, and hence in the EM emissions. An attacker can capture
this EM emission using the magnetic sensors of a smart device and infer the on-going
user activities in a laptop or workstation.
Task Inference with Power Analysis - Power analysis is a form of sensorbased threat where an attacker studies the power consumption and power traces of
the sensors for extracting information from the devices [ÖOP03]. O’Flynn et al.
introduced an attack scenario where the power analysis attack is launched against
IEEE 802.15.4 nodes [OC15], which is a standard low power wireless protocol used
in smart devices. Low power smart devices use this protocol standard for various
communication purposes such as connecting to a network, communicating with other
devices, etc.. In this attack scenario, an attacker uses differential power analysis in the
sensors. As packets transmitted from the smart devices are encrypted, power analysis
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on the sensors can infer which encryption process is running in the device. Again,
diverse encryption process leads to diverse power profiles which reveal associated
information (e.g., key size, block size, etc.) about the encryption process. Encryption
process also depends on the packet size which can be observed in the power profile
and attackers can infer what type of information is being transmitted based on the
packet size.
Task Inference from sniffing sensor data - In a connected environment such
as smart home, several smart devices are connected with each other and with multiple
sensors. These sensors communicate with the devices using various protocols (e.g.,
WiFi, ZigBee, Z-Wave, etc.) and work as triggering devices for several automated
tasks. An attacker can sniff the communication traffics in the smart environment
and infer user and device actions which can be considered as a privacy violation.
Acar et al. showed that it is possible to infer user activities and devices states by
capturing the communication packets and extracting sensor data in a smart home
environment [AFA+ 18]. In this attack scenario, an adversary in close proximity of
the smart environment can sniff the communication packets and infer the states of
the devices (active/inactive). In addition, authors showed that the attacker could
deduce the actions of the users (e.g., walking, opening doors, etc.) using machine
learning techniques in captured traffics.
Lessons learned for task inference - Similar to keystroke inference, task inference in smart devices also affect the confidentiality of the devices. From Table 4.2,
we can observe the majority of the task inference threats (6 out of 10 reported threats
and attacks) are passive which indicates the high impact on the smart devices. Another interesting fact is the majority of these threats does not need any additional
privilege (9 out of 10) to bypass existing security schemes. Also, task inference threats
target sensing (6 reported threats), application (3 reported threats), and communica-
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tion (1 reported threat) which indicates a broad attack surface of these threats. One
limitation of reported task inference attacks is the lack of extensive evaluation of the
attacks. To understand the effectiveness of a sensor-based attack, it is necessary to
check the success rate of the attack on real-life smart devices. The majority of the
task inference attacks are not appropriately evaluated with known evaluation metrics
such as success rate, error rate, precision, etc.. Without proper evaluation metrics,
especially without reported success rate, it is hard to understand the effectiveness
and feasibility of task inference attacks on a smart device. Task inference directly
impacts the confidentiality and privacy of the smart device users by leaking sensitive
information such as user activity, installed security measures, installed apps on smart
devices, etc. Attackers can profile a user based on task inference attacks to perform
diverse types of malicious activities such as gaining access to the smart device and environment, bypassing security measures to leak data, manipulate or obstruct on-going
tasks, etc. [AFA+ 18].

Location Inference
Researchers developed a novel location-privacy attack based on acoustic side-channels
[Ano16]. The attack is based on acoustic information embedded within foregroundaudio disseminated in a closed environment (i.e., conference room). The researchers
studied how audio, generated by secure messaging clients in voice-call mode, can
be abused to generate a location fingerprint. The attack leverages the pattern of
acoustic reflections of the human voice at the user's location and does not depend
on any characteristic background sounds. The attack can be used to compromise
location privacy of participants of an anonymous VoIP session, or even to carry out
confirmation attacks that verify if a pair of audio recordings originated from the same
location regardless of the speakers. Other researchers have also shown that several
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heuristics can be used to identify sensitive locations (i.e., home and work locations)
of a victim whose personal device is under an adversary control [PMSJ16]. Han et
al. showed that it is possible to infer the location of a user using the accelerometer
of a smartphone [HON+ 12]. Here, researchers first derived an approximate motion
trajectory from accelerometer reading and correlated the trajectory with the map to
infer the exact location of the user. Zhou et al. showed that it is possible to infer
the location of the user by analyzing verbal directions provided by navigation apps
of a smart device [ZDH+ ]. Researchers measured the on/off times of the speaker
controlled by the navigation app to leak the driving instructions to the attacker. In
a more recent work, Block et al. introduced a new location inference technique using
the smartphone’s magnetometer [BN18]. Here, researchers used small fluctuations
originated by nearby magnetic fields while the smartphone is in motion to build a
trajectory path of the user. Narain et al. proposed a combination of sensor data
(accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer) to further improve the accuracy of
the inferred location [NVHBN16]. In a recent work, Zheng et al. proposed a location eavesdropping attack using the mobile inertia/motion sensors [ZH19]. Here,
researchers showed that in the presence of specific indoor structures (e.g., elevators,
fire stop doors, etc.), motion sensors display specific patterns which can be utilized
to infer the location correctly. Similar to this work, Fyke et al. used the motion
sensors data to recreate user’s movement and plot maps and landmarks in private
spaces (e.g., home, workplace, etc.) [FGSS19].
Lessons learned for location inference - Although location inference attacks
impact the confidentiality of smart devices, all of the threats (7 reported threats and
attacks) are active which limits the consequences (Table 4.2). Also, to execute malicious sensor activities, these threats need direct access to the devices which affect
the easy deployability of these threats in real-life smart devices. One can also observe
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from Table 4.2 that the success rate of these attacks is low to medium range. Compared to keystroke and task inference attacks, location inference poses less effects on
the security of the smart devices. However, leaking location information can violate
user’s privacy and propagate other attacks including a targeted physical attack on
the user’s vehicle [ZDH+ ].

Eavesdropping
Many smart devices such as voice-enabled speakers use audio sensors for making calls,
recording audio messages, receiving voice commands, etc. Eavesdropping refers to a
type of attack where a malicious app records a conversation stealthily by exploiting
audio sensors and extract information from the conversation. An attacker can save the
recorded conversation on a device or listen to the conversation in real-time. One of the
recent examples of eavesdropping via the microphone of a smartphone is Soundcomber
[SZZ+ 11]. In this example, a malicious app covertly records when a conversation is
initiated from the device. As the recording is done in the background, a user does
not have any idea about the recording. Several companies like banks, social security
offices, credit card companies, etc. have automated voice messaging systems and users
have to say their private information such as credit card numbers or social security
numbers at the beginning of the call. Thus, Soundcomber does not have to record
all the conversations to extract data. Only the beginning part of the conversations
will be enough for extracting private information of the user. Moreover, a specific
conversation can also be recorded by identifying the dialed number on a smartphone.
The touchpad of the smartphone creates corresponding tones when any number is
dialed. This tone can be recorded and processed to identify the dialed number. After
that, when the desired number is dialed, the conversation can be recorded and then
processed to extract information.
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Another way to exploit microphones is to attack through voice assistant apps,
e.g., Apple’s Siri and Google Voice Search. Most of the smart devices nowadays
have built-in voice search apps. Diao et al. developed a malware named VoicEmployer which can be installed on the device to record the voice command given in
a smartphone [DLZZ14]. This malware can use the recorded command for various
malicious activities such as replicate malicious voice command, transfer information
to paired devices, etc. Cyber Physical Voice privacy Theft Trojan horse (CPVT)
is another malware which uses the microphone of smartphones to record conversations [LWZ+ 13]. The recording of the conversation can be controlled by external
control channels like SMS, Wi-Fi, or Sensory channels [USB14]. An attacker can
trigger CPVT and create command about when to start recording and when to stop
recording using SMS, Wi-FI, or even sensors. Recorded conversations are stored in
the device and the attacker can gain the stored files using Email, SMS, or connecting
via USB. Carlini et al. showed that it is possible to exploit voice assistant apps by
inserting hidden voice commands [CMV+ 16]. In this attack, the attacker first records
voice commands of the user and extracts features from the recorded audio clips. From
the extracted features, a new command is generated which is not understandable by
humans, but recognized by the voice assistant apps. In a recent work, Kennedy et al.
showed that it is possible to infer the voice command given to a voice assistant device
(e.g., Amazon Alexa) by capturing the network packet and using natural language
processing [KLW+ 19].
The gyroscope on smart devices is also sensitive to an acoustic signal. The typical
sampling rate of gyroscope covers some frequency of audible range which can be
used to reconstruct the speech of a user. Michalevsky et al. proposed a new way
of eavesdropping by analyzing vibrational noise in gyroscope caused by an acoustic
signal [MBN14]. As the gyroscope does not cover the full audible range, this new
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process can distinguish speakers and one-syllable words by using signal processing
and machine learning techniques. In a recent work, Anand et al. showed that the
on-board accelerometer could be used to eavesdrop and reconstruct the speech of a
user [AWL+ 19]. While a user talks on a smartphone, the loudspeaker of a smartphone
shows some reverberations which impact the accelerometer reading. This deviation in
accelerometer can be further analyzed to extract sensitive information such as speaker
identification and gender classification.
Lessons learned for eavesdropping - Eavesdropping mostly affects smart devices with audio sensors and impacts the confidentiality of the devices. From Table 4.2, it is visible that the majority of the eavesdropping are active attacks (4 out of
5 reported threats and attacks) and require additional privileges (4 out of 5 threats
and attacks) to bypass the existing security schemes. These threats also need users
to interact with the system to perform malicious tasks that limit the impact of these
threats. For performing eavesdropping, the majority of the threats and attacks also
need direct access (4 reported threats) on a targeted smart device. Because of these
dependencies, the impact of eavesdropping is lower than other types of information
leakage attacks. Nevertheless, the information captured in the eavesdropping attack
can be used to perform various malicious activities such as leaking private conversation, gaining physical access to a secured environment, etc. [ZQL+ 19].

4.3.2

Transmitting Malicious Sensor Commands

Sensors available in the smart devices can be used to transmit malicious sensor patterns or triggering commands to activate malware that may have been implanted in
a victim’s device [USB14]. Sensors may be employed to create unexpected communication channels between device peripherals. Such channels can be used to exchange
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Target
sensor

Target
layer

Table 4.3: Summary of other sensor-based attacks in smart devices.

Attack Impact (AI): Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), Availability (A); Attack Method (AM): Active- , Passive- ; Device Access (DA): Direct- , Transitive- , Peripheral- ; Attack
Complexity (AC): High- , Low- ; Required Privilege (RP): High privilege- , Low privilege- ; User Interaction (UI): Needed - , not needed - ; Success Rate (SR): High (>90%) , medium (70-90%) - , low (<70%) - .

†

Target
device

Vulnerability
Ref.
metrics†
AI AM DA AC RP UI SR
Out-of-band command
Smartphone
Light
Sensing
I
[HSH+ 13]
Creating seizures using strobed light
Smart light
Light
Application
I
[FJP16]
IoTBench- Side channel attack
Smart light
Light
Application
I
[CBS+ 18]
Out-of-band command via magnetic sensor
Smartphone
Magnetic
Sensing
I
[HSH+ 13]
Transmitting
Out-of-band command via audio sensor
Smartphone
Microphone
Sensing
I
[HSH+ 13]
malicious
Inaudible sound as a covert channel
Smartphone
Microphone
Sensing
I
[Des14]
sensor
Sensor side channels
Smartphone
Microphone
Sensing
I
[SUCB13]
commands
Skill squatting attack
Smart Speaker
Microphone
Sensing
C, I
[KPM+ 18]
DolphinAttack
Smart Speaker
Microphone, Speaker
Application
C, I
[ZYJ+ 17]
Injecting inaudible voice commands
Smart voice assistant
Microphone, Speaker
Application
C, I
[YZJ+ 19]
Vaspy
smartphone
Microphone
Application
C, I
[ZCWZ19]
GPS spoofing attack
Smart navigation device
GPS
Application
I
[TPRC11]
GPS jamming
Smart navigation device
GPS
Application
I
[Cof14]
Spy-sense
Smart sensor network
Data processing I
[GD13]
Injected and Delivered
Smart cars, drone
Accelerometer, gyroscope
Sensing
I
[TLLH18]
False sensor
This ain’t your dose
Smart medical device
Light
Sensing
I
[PSS+ 16]
data
Illusion and dazzle
Smart car
Light
Application
I
[SKKK17]
injection
Remote attacks on automated vehicles
Smart car
Light, Camera
Application
I
[PSFK15]
REEVE
Smart voice assistant
Microphone
Application
I
- [YCW+ 18]
Using AI to Hack IA
Smart voice assistant
Microphone, Speaker
Application
I
[ZCL+ 18]
Light Commands
Smart voice assistant
Light
Application
I
[SCR+ 19]
Rocking drones
Smart drone
Gyroscope
Communication A
[SSK+ 15]
Denial-of-Service
Pairjam
Smart home device
Microphone
Communication A
[MZL20]
Attack
name

critical sensor parameters (e.g., devices’ motion, light intensity, magnetic field, etc.)
or to transmit malicious commands (Section 2.4: use case 3).
Transmitting via Light Sensors - Light sensors can be used as a potential
method of transmitting signals and malicious commands [JPPS11]. It is easier to
transfer a bit stream via a light source by turning it on and off. Since the light sensor
of a smart device can distinguish the intensity of the light source, the light intensity
change can be decoded as a bit stream in the device. By controlling the voltage of a
light source, an attacker can easily transfer trigger messages and can activate malware
implanted in a device. Hasan et al. showed that TV screen or laptop monitor could
also be used to transfer trigger messages to a compromised smart device by changing
the light intensity of the monitor [HSH+ 13]. Fernandes et al. showed that a smart
light could be maliciously programmed to strobe the light at a high rate and if the
user has the health problem of seizure, this action will trigger the user’s seizures
which is really dangerous [FJP16]. Berkay et al. showed that a smart light could
be programmed to operate in a specific pattern to trigger a smart camera and take
pictures surreptitiously [CBS+ 18].
Transmitting via Magnetic Sensors - As mentioned earlier, magnetic sensors
of a smart device are sensitive to the magnetic fields of the device's peripherals.
By changing the magnetic field of the device ambiance, one can easily change the
readings of the magnetic sensor which can be used as a triggering message of malware.
Triggering messages encoded by an electromagnet can be sent to a smart device
and there will be some deviations in the magnetic sensor's readings of the device
due to this message. These deviations can be calculated and the triggering message
can be extracted from this electro-magnetic signal. Moreover, the magnetic field
deviations can be calculated in x, y, and z-axis and divergent values of the magnetic
field deviations can be interpreted as disparate triggering messages [HSH+ 13].
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Transmitting via Audio Sensors - Audio sensors can be used to transmit
malicious commands to activate a malicious application in a smart device. Hasan et
al. showed that a triggering message embedded in an audio song can be detected by
the microphone and can trigger a malicious app in a smartphone [HSH+ 13]. Moreover,
microphones used in modern smart devices can detect audio signals with a frequency
lower than the audible range. Malware can be transferred using this audio channel
as a covert channel to bypass the security measures of the device. Deshotels et al.
showed that the ultrasonic sound could be used to send information to smartphones
without alerting the user or any security measurement implemented on the device
[Des14]. Subramanian et al. showed that a trojan can be transferred by encoding
it in an audio signal and transferring it using a buzzer [SUCB13]. In a recent work,
Zhang et al. showed that it is possible to transmit an inaudible acoustic signal to
smart speakers to trigger malicious activities [ZYJ+ 17]. Yan et al. performed a
feasibility study of previous work and concluded that it is possible to trigger several
malicious events in smart devices including making a phone call, changing state of
connected devices, etc. [YZJ+ 19]. Kumar et al. showed that valid voice commands
could be used to trick smart speakers (e.g., Amazon Alexa, Amazon Echo, etc.) to
perform malicious activities in skill squatting attack [KPM+ 18]. Here, researchers
used misinterpretations of valid commands made by the smart speaker to trigger a
malicious activity. For example, ’test your luck’ can be misinterpreted by the smart
speaker as ’test your lock’ which can unlock the door. In a recent work, Zhang et al.
proposed Vaspy, a malicious app installed in the smart device to exploit voice assistant
devices [ZCWZ19]. Vaspy silently observes smartphone activities and captures the
phone call conversations to extract the voice activation commands. Upon extracting
the voice command, Vaspy uses a machine learning model to analyze user behavior
and choose a specific time to launch an attack surreptitiously.
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Lessons learned for transmitting malicious sensor commands - The threat
of transmitting malicious sensor commands mostly affects the integrity of smart devices (Table 4.3). The majority of the threats and attacks (9 out of 11 reported) needs
an additional privilege to bypass the existing security schemes. Also, upon successful
attack, malicious sensor commands trigger malicious activities in the smart devices
which obstruct normal operations. Thus, transmitting malicious sensor commands
(all reported threats and attacks) act as active attacks to the smart devices. Another
interesting fact we observe transmitting malicious sensor commands do not need any
direct connection to the device. Only transitive (2 out of 11 threats) or peripheral
access (9 out of 11) is enough to transmit malicious commands to the targeted smart
devices. However, the success rate of most of the threats and attacks is high, indicating the high impact on smart devices. This trade-off between excessive privilege and
success rate determines the effects of the threats and attacks.

4.3.3

False Sensor Data Injection

The applications of smart devices largely depend on data collected by sensors available
on the devices. By altering the sensor data, one can control the applications of smart
devices. False sensor data injection refers to an attack where the sensor data used
in the smart applications is forged or intentionally changed to perform malicious
activities. The false sensor data can be injected in the devices by accessing the device
physically or by using various communication mediums (Bluetooth, ZigBee, Z-Wave,
Wi-Fi, cellular network, etc.) covertly. An attacker can also introduce fake sensors
in the IoT environment to inject false generated data and initiate malicious activities
(Section 2.4: use cases - 1 and 3) [CBS+ 18,HAUA18]. Moreover, the sensors of smart
devices can also be used to alter data typed or stored on the devices.

67

Tu et al. presented a spoof attack, where an out-of-band signal is inserted in smart
devices via motion sensor [TLLH18]. This signal injection results in deviation in sensor output which disrupts the normal functionality of the smart devices. Park et al.
used infrared light to disrupt normal operation of a smart medical device [PSS+ 16].
Here, researchers used a medical infusion pump to inject the spoof light signal and
change the dose of the medicine in the device. In another recent work, Shin et al.
exploited the light sensor of a smart car to change the output of the automatic obstruction detection system [SKKK17]. Petit et al. improved this attack by combining
camera reading of a smart car to change the output of autonomous vehicle [PSFK15].
In a recent work, Zhou et al. proposed an attack to exploit the voice assistant of a
smart car [ZQL+ 19]. In this attack, the adversary inserts malicious commands in an
audio or video file which can inject malicious commands to the voice assistant apps
upon playing.
The smart voice assistant is deployed in several smart devices such as smartphone,
smart speaker, smart home hub, etc. These smart assistants usually triggered with
a specific command such as ”Hi Google”, ”Hey Siri”, or ”Alexa”. Recent researches
showed that it is possible to inject malicious commands to smart voice assistants by
exploiting the microphone of the smart devices. As smart voice assistants constantly
scan for desired a triggering command, an adversary needs no additional privilege
to inject malicious audio signals to the device. Yuan et al. proposed REEVE, a
stealthy voice manipulation attack to smart voice assistant [YCW+ 18]. REEVE uses
benign audio signals such as TV or radio as a medium and insert malicious trigger
commands which can be detected by a nearby voice assistant device. The researchers
tested this attack on consumer voice assistant devices (Amazon Echo) and achieved
high success rate. Zhang et al. improved this attack by eliminating the need of
external audio signals [ZCL+ 18]. Here, researchers developed a spyware which can

68

abuse the microphone of a smartphone to record phone conversations and detect the
trigger messages. Later, the spyware replays the recorded command using the speaker
of the same smartphone to inject false commands to the voice assistant service.
Tippenhauer et al. showed another attack scenario in GPS-enabled devices to
change the real location of the device [TPRC11]. In this attack scenario, a vehicle
with a GPS enabled device is used. The attacker transmits a forged GPS signal to
the device to alter the location of the vehicle. In this way, the real location of the
vehicle is disguised and the attacker can perform any physical attack on the disguised
vehicle. The GPS data used in the smartwatches can expose the location of a user
and this GPS data can then be forged and a new location can be given as a false
input in the GPS [Cof14].
The power analysis attack on smart devices can also be used for injecting false
data. The power analysis on smart devices running an encryption algorithm can
reveal information about the encryption process including the block size, key size,
even the actual encryption key [YN17]. This information can be used to encrypt a
false data and replace the original data on the device. Thus, attackers can inject false
encrypted data in the communication channel to change the action of a device for
specific commands. Giannetsos et al. introduced a malicious app named Spy-sense,
which monitors the behavior of the sensors in a device and can manipulate data by
deleting or modifying it [GD13]. Spy-sense exploits the active memory region of a
device and alters the data structure and reports back important data to a server
covertly.
Lessons learned for false data injection - False data injection impacts the
integrity of the smart devices as these threats and attacks disrupt the output of an
on-going task. From Table 4.3, it is evident that the majority of the threats and
attacks are simple and do not need any user interaction (8 out of 11 reported threats
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(a) Types of sensors

(b) Active vs. passive

(d) Device access

(c) Targeted
mechanisms

security

(e) Targeted layers

(f) Types of threats

Figure 4.1: Overview of sensor-based threats and attacks to smart devices.
and attacks) to perform malicious tasks. Also, false data injection attacks are passive
by nature (7 out of 11 threats) and do not need any excessive privilege (6 out of
11 threats) to perform the attack. Another interesting fact we observe is the effect
of the successful attack directly impact the on-going activities of the smart devices.
Hence, false data injection attacks are method-wise passive, but effect-wise active.
However, the majority of the existing false data injection attacks did not report any
success rate. Without proper evaluation, it is hard to understand the effectiveness of
the reported attacks in real-life smart devices. Hence, further investigation is needed
to properly evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks on real-life smart devices. The
effects of false data injection are diverse as it can manipulate the targeted smart
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device to perform numerous malicious activities. For instance, false data injected in
smart voice assistant can give the attacker access to any connected device in a smart
environment which can cause device theft, undesired physical access to properties,
unauthorized bank transactions and online shopping, etc. [ZCL+ 18, YCW+ 18].

4.3.4

Denial-of-Service

Denial-of-Service (DoS), by definition, is a type of attack where the normal operation
of a device or application is denied maliciously. DoS attacks can be active attacks
where an application or task is refused forcefully or passive attacks where attacking
one application can stop another on-going task on the device. An adversary with
access to smart device network and peripheral can send unauthorized access request or
malicious signals to interrupt an ongoing task in smart devices (Section 2.4: use case
4). Indeed, recently, ICS-CERT published an active alert for a list of accelerometers
used in smart devices which can be exploited using vibrational force [CA17]. Every
accelerometer has a working frequency and if an external vibrational force can match
this frequency, it is possible to turn off the devices forcefully. This reported threat is
applicable for 20 different types of MEMS accelerometer which are used in multiple
commercial and consumer smart devices. Hence, the impact of this threat is severe
in real-life smart devices. Son et al. showed that it is possible to obstruct the
flight control of a drone by exploiting gyroscope using a sound signal [SSK+ 15]. The
MEMS Gyroscopes deployed in drones have a sensing mass inside of the sensor which
is constantly vibrating. The gyroscope measures the rotational motion of the device
with respect to the sensing mass. When the resonant frequency of the gyroscope is
matched by an audio signal, an attacker can obstruct the normal performance of the
gyroscope and change the course of the drone, or even turn it off. In a recent work,
Mao et al. presented Pairjam, a DoS attack that uses inaudible noises to disrupt
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pairing between smart devices [MZL20]. In a smart environment, multiple smart
devices are connected with each other to perform various tasks. The interconnection
between the devices follows a device authentication/pairing method to ensure secure
communication. Pairjam abuses the audio sensor of smart devices the inject inaudible
noise signal in the smart environment which disrupts the normal pairing method and
makes a targeted smart device unavailable for pairing.
Lessons learned for DoS - Denial-of-Service impacts the availability of the
targeted sensor and disrupts an on-going task immediately in a smart device. There
are only two reported DoS attack on smart devices which are passive and achieves
high success rate (Table 4.3). However, one of the reported DoS attack [SSK+ 15]
uses the MEMS accelerometer and gyroscope which is used by a vast number of
smart devices [CA17]. This increases the impact of DoS attacks on smart devices.
Moreover, both of these DoS attacks are applicable to both standalone and connected
smart devices which widens the attack surface. Hence, DoS attacks have a high impact
on real-life smart devices.

4.3.5

Summary of the Threats and Attacks

We categorized 89 reported sensor-based threats and attacks by the research community and industry in four categories. Additionally, we explained the attack methods
and discuss the impacts of the sensor-based attacks based on common vulnerability
metrics (attack impact, attack method, attack complexity, required privilege, user interaction, success rate). Some interesting findings of the aforementioned sensor-based
threats and attacks are listed below:
• Type of sensors targeted: Existing threats and attacks target nine different sensors including both permission and no-permission imposed sensors discussed in
Section 2.4. One interesting fact we observe that the majority of the threats and
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attacks target no-permission imposed sensors which make the existing permissionbased sensor management system ineffective. From Figure 4.1(a), one can notice
that 60% of the total threats and attacks target no-permission imposed sensors
whereas only 40% of the reported threats and attacks target permission-imposed
sensor which needs to bypass existing sensor management systems.
• Active vs. passive: As previously mentioned, sensor-based threats and attacks
can be active or passive depending on the attack method. From Figure 4.1(b),
one can notice the high percentage of active sensor-based threats and attacks on
smart devices. While the majority of these are active, passive attacks and threats
are also a point of interest to the attackers. As passive threats or attacks do not
affect the normal functionalities of the devices, these may remain unnoticed to the
implemented security mechanisms and perform malicious activities surreptitiously.
• Targeted security mechanisms: Sensor-based threats and attacks target various security mechanisms of the devices (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, availability) which
make them hard to detect. Figure 4.1(c) shows different security mechanisms targeted by the sensor-based threats and attacks. One can notice that most of these
threats and attacks aim to violate data confidentiality (74%) followed by integrity
(24%) and availability (2%) of the sensors.
• Device access needs: To perform malicious sensor activities, sensor-based threats
and attacks need device access (direct or transitive). Figure 4.1(d) illustrates the
device access needs of sensor-based threats. While approximately 54% of the threats
need direct or transitive access (42% direct and 12% transitive), 47% of the threats
do not need any access to execute the malicious activity. As a sensor-based threat
without any need of device access can easily bypass any security mechanism, the
impact of the threats is high. Additionally, the exclusiveness of device access needs
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of sensor-based threats manifests the shortcomings of the existing permission-based
sensor management system.
• Affected layers: Smart devices typically have four architectural layers and attackers
can target any of these layers to initiate a sensor-based attack. From Figure 4.1(e),
it is evident that the most affected layer is the sensing layer followed by the application layer. As modern smart devices offer diverse sets of apps that use sensors
for enhanced functionalities, attackers target these layers to modify and perform
malicious activities in smart devices. The apps in smart devices directly bind the
sensing and application layer which is the main reason for increasing threats to
these layers.
• Interest of the attackers: From the discussion above, we can infer the most common
sensor-based threats and attacks to smart devices is keystroke inferences followed by
task inference and transmitting malicious sensor commands. As keystroke inference
attacks typically target smart devices with user interfaces, we can observe higher
number of sensor-based attacks in smartphones and smart watches. Figure 4.1(f)
shows the common sensor-based threats and attacks to the smart devices.
• Effect of the sensor-based threats and attacks: In Table 7.4, we summarize the
effects of sensor-based threats and attacks on smart devices. One can notice that
keystroke inference attacks can leak diverse typing information such as passwords,
PIN input, hand gestures, printed texts, etc. by exploiting a smart device directly or
using a smart device to extract information from a nearby device. Task inference
attacks reveal the nature of on-going tasks on smart devices either in the user
interface of the device or in a connected smart environment. Sensor-based threats
can also infer the geo-location of a smart device user as well as create a location
map of users’ route. By performing an eavesdropping attack using sensors, an
adversary can capture users’ conversations and smart device commands to extract
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Attack type

Keystroke
Inference

Task
Inference

Location
Inference

Eavesdropping

Transmitting
malicious
commands

False Sensor
Data
Injection

Denial-of-Service

Effect

Reference

Information of lock code or PIN of a
smart device.

[Spr14, CC12, AHIN13, SPYG15,
OHD+ 12, NSN14, CC11, XBZ12,
BFG+ 19, Ngu15, LS19, LCY+ 18,
LYC+ 19, KJL20, ZWY+ 19, SSYA19,
SA13, SKSP14, RWG+ 11]
[HB18]

Typing information (typed text, notes,
commands, etc.) in an embedded or virtual keyboard.
Drawing patterns or unlock patterns on
a smart device.
Typing information of a nearby keyboard or device.

Printed information in a printer.
on-going task reflected on user interface
of a smart device.
On-going task by a user in a single
smart device or connected smart environment.
Information of an on-going task in a
near by device.
Geo-location of a user interacting with
a smart device.
Mapping smart device users’ motion
and routes to detect location.
Capturing conversation of the users using on-board sensors surreptitiously.
Stealthily record a conversation or command and replaying it to get access to
a smart device and perform malicious
activities.
Transmitting malicious sensor command to a nearby smart device and execute malicious activities.
Transmitting malicious commands using a smart device in a connected smart
environment.
Injecting false sensor data to change the
output of a smart device or a specific
application running in a smart device
application.
Using sensory channel to disrupt an ongoing task in a smart device.
Injecting inaccurate sensor signal to
make a device unavailable in a smart
environment.

[ASBS12, MLMK15, Avi12]
[MVCT11,LLC+ 19,HGC+ 19,LZD+ 15,
WLRC15, MJHB15, MJHB18, SDN15,
MHSJ18, LL19, AA04, ZZT09, HS12,
BWY06, FKK10, ZMZL14, WCGS19]
[BDG+ 10]
[COS17, MJ18]
[CBS+ 18, AFA+ 18]

[BKS15, QS01, OC15, NWX+ 20,
CJX+ 19, MWA+ 19]
[Ano16, HON+ 12, BN18]
[NVHBN16, ZH19, FGSS19]
[SZZ+ 11, MBN14, AWL+ 19]
[DLZZ14, LWZ+ 13]

[HSH+ 13, Des14, SUCB13, KPM+ 18,
ZYJ+ 17, YZJ+ 19, ZCWZ19]
[FJP16, CBS+ 18]

[TPRC11, Cof14, GD13, TLLH18,
PSS+ 16, SKKK17, YCW+ 18, PSFK15,
SCR+ 19]
[SSK+ 15]
[MZL20]

Table 4.4: Effect of sensor-based attacks on smart devices.
information and accessing a targeted device. An adversary transmitting malicious
sensor commands can trigger malicious events on a smart device which can be
propagated to nearby smart devices. Additionally, introducing false sensor data
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in a smart device can change the output of a smart device and make a device or
sensor unavailable for performing a task (DoS).

4.4

Open Issues, Future Directions, and Recommendations

The concept of making devices ’smart’ is no longer in the developing stage and new
research ideas related to smart devices are emerging these days. In this section,
we discuss open issues and future research directions in the context of sensor-based
threats and attacks to smart devices.

4.4.1

Open Issues and Future Directions

Due to the lack of knowledge among users and research communities, sensor-based
threats become compelling to the attackers to exploit the security of smart devices
and perform malicious activities. There are several open issues that exist in smart
devices that need attention from developers, researchers, and users. These open
issues can be categorized in three major areas - (1) Smart device architectures and
platforms, (2) Further investigation of existing threats, and (3) Solutions to detect
sensor-based threats. In the following discussion, we briefly explain these open issues
and summarize future research directions needed to counter sensor-based threats.
Smart device architectures and platforms. The smart device industry is
growing rapidly and these smart devices are different from each other in terms of
hardware, software, implementation, and functionalities. To understand the sensorbased threats, it is important to understand the smart device architecture and functionalities properly. Researchers and developers can investigate the following open
issues in smart device architecture to understand the consequences of sensor-based
threats properly.
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Study of Smart Device Architectures and Sensor Operations - With the introduction of IoT, the number of smart devices in different domains is increasing rapidly. The
smart devices have several internal architectures (i.e., software and hardware) with
less knowledge available, which is an obstacle to secure sensors in these devices. For
instance, there are several operating systems (e.g., Linux, Android, Contiki, TinyOS,
etc.) available for smart devices which vary in terms of functionalities, operations,
and integrated security features. Moreover, smart devices can connect with each other
and create a network of smart devices to perform various tasks. The lack of knowledge of device architectures can affect the security of the devices as security flaws in
one smart device can cause the compromise of other connected smart devices. Additionally, in a smart connected environment, multiple smart devices use one sensor
to automate various tasks [SBAU19]. Hence, compromising one sensor can trigger
malicious activities in several connected smart devices. Researchers and developers
should study the smart device architectures (both standalone and connected smart
devices) and functionalities to understand the sensor mechanism which will help to
understand the consequences of emerging sensor-based threats.
Adoption of Standard Security Mechanisms - Currently, there exist several operating systems for smart devices that manage their on-board and external connected
sensors in distinctive ways (Section 2.4). These dissimilarities make it hard to converge for a general security scheme to protect sensors of the smart devices [Liv16].
For example, in a smart environment, several smart devices from different vendors
can share the same sensors and physical environment. Any sensor-based threats compromising normal functionalities of a sensor can propagate to several connected smart
devices. In this scenario, installing vendor-specific sensor security schemes surely increase the security of smart devices from a specific vendor. However, sensor-based
threats targeting smart devices from another vendor can compromise connected smart
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devices even with an installed vendor-specific security scheme [SBAU19]. Moreover,
installing different security schemes in different smart devices can lead to high resource usage and introduce overhead in the smart environment. Hence, a comprehensive vendor-independent sensor security scheme is needed to secure sensors of smart
devices in a connected smart environment. One of the future research efforts should
be the standardization of development platforms for smart devices which will make it
easier for researchers to come up with universal security measures to defend against
sensor-based threats and attacks. Therefore, researchers should investigate the possibility of a common security mechanism for authentication of sensor data as well as
authorization of legitimate sensor access.
Fine-grained Control of Sensors - Existing sensor management systems of smart
devices offer permission-based sensor management which completely depends on user
consent. Apps generally ask for permission to access specific sensors on installation
time and once the permissions are granted, users have less control over the sensors’
usage by the apps. Again, the user permission is enforced only to secure a limited number of the on-board sensors (e.g., microphone, camera, GPS). Granting permission
to these sensors automatically grant permission for other sensors such as accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, etc. In recent years, researchers have also shown that
both permission-enforced (microphone, camera, GPS) and no permission-enforced
(accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, etc.) sensors are vulnerable to sensor-based
threats and attacks. Therefore, a fine-grained sensor management system is needed
to verify compliance between sensor access and user intent.
Further Investigation of Sensor-based Threats. Several prior works have
reported many sensor-based threats to smart devices in recent years. However, these
sensor-based threats are unique from one another in terms of attack methods, targeted
devices, and attack consequences. To understand sensor-based threats, it is important
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to study the existing threats and use the knowledge to enhance the security of smart
devices to tackle new sensor-based threats.
Study of Malicious Sensor Behavior and User Perspectives- Sensor-based threats
are relatively new and there are only a few comprehensive studies available to understand the threats properly. This lack of knowledge is lucrative for attackers to target
and trick smart device users to install malicious apps and perform malicious sensor
activities [SWW15]. Users carelessly install any third-party apps with illegitimate
sensor permissions which can compromise smart devices [FHE+ 12, fel12]. Therefore,
to secure sensors in smart devices, it is important to understand how users, smart
devices, and apps are using sensors to perform and automate various tasks and what
their views of sensor-based threats are. Researchers may perform additional usability
studies to better understand how users can contribute to improving sensor access
control via their inputs in smart devices.
Prevent Leakage of Sensor Data - Smart devices can autonomously sense their
surrounding environment which can be used to prevent information leakage from the
devices. Sensors in smart devices can anticipate an on-going task and detect the
pattern of information accessed by the task. These sensor patterns vary for different
activities and by observing these sensor behaviors, it is possible to prevent information
leakage in smart devices [SAU17].
Control Sharing of Data among Sensors - Communication on smart devices become more sensor-to-sensor (i.e., machine-to-machine) compared to human-to-sensor
or sensor-to-human (human-to-machine or machine-to-human) and the introduction
of a huge number of sensors in smart devices is speeding up this shift. As smart
devices deal with sensitive personal data, sensor-to-sensor communication channels
should be secured, which helps in end-to-end security for the devices. Secure end-toend communication from sensors to the devices and among devices is vital to avoid
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information leakage [HFH15, Web10]. Devices should share encrypted sensor data to
avoid any information leakage via packet sniffing [AFA+ 18]. Sensor data should also
be available to all the connected devices continuously to ensure unimpeded performance.
Security Measures for Sensor-based Threats. Currently, there is no comprehensive solutions to detect sensor-based threats in smart devices. The existing
solutions focus on specific threats or sensors which are ineffective in addressing sensorbased threats extensively. Researchers and developers should focus on the following
open issues to develop effective security measures to detect sensor-based threats properly.
Device Independent Security Measure - The majority of the existing solutions to
secure sensors in smart devices focus on smartphone overlooking the security needs of
other smart devices [STTPLR13]. However, the number of different smart devices are
also increasing rapidly. Several prior works have verified that not only smartphones
but all the smart devices (e.g., smart watch, smart home devices, etc.) are vulnerable to emerging sensor-based threats [SBAU19, NSRU19]. Additionally, smartphones
can be used as a platform to launch sensor-based threats to other smart devices as
smartphones act as controller device for several smart devices such as smart lock,
smart camera, etc. [KS16]. Hence, researchers should consider sensor-based threat as
a general threat to smart devices to develop device independent security measures.
Protect Sensor Data when at Rest - Smart device applications deal with multiple sensor data at a time and tampered data in the smart devices can impact the
normal behavior of applications. To ensure the authenticity of sensor data, various
end-to-end encryption mechanisms may be applied from the sensors to the program
requesting it. Various security features of the hardware such as ARM TrustZone may
be adopted to achieve secure data flow inside the devices [NPDS13]. Researchers

80

may also invest their effort in studying the adoption of the blockchain technology as
a way of designing highly distributed systems able to provide attestation and verification among multiparty and heterogeneous components part of a larger smart device
ecosystem.
Protect Integrity of Sensor Operations - The research community has not invested
enough effort in studying the design and development of tools for automated detection
and analysis of sensors-based threats. For instance, no tool is available to automatically identify and analyze adversary-controlled sensors that would compromise the
integrity of sensor operations, as well as the integrity of the data generated or modified by such operations. Also, no tool is available to automatically identify dangerous
configurations in enforced access control policies, which may lead to risky operations
by trusted programs that may compromise the integrity of the entire connected smart
device environment.
Adoption of Intrusion Mechanisms to Detect Attacks - In recent years, multiple
efficient techniques (e.g., machine learning (ML) and neural network (NN)) were
applied to detect threats in various application domains. These detection techniques
should be explored in detail to design novel intrusion detection mechanism, for smart
devices and applications, able to identify when unsafe operations are authorized.
Therefore, researchers should investigate NN and ML classification algorithms as
viable solutions to identify and differentiate legitimate from illegal sensing activities.

4.4.2

Recommendations

Vendors - Vendors have to consider the emerging sensor-based threats and attacks
and get the security requirements right for every embedded and connected sensors.
With the introduction of IoT, sensors can be external devices and connected via
different communication means. Hence, vendors need to consider sensors as embedded
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components as well as independent before implementing security measures. Smart
device vendors also should have a strong research strategy to understand the sensorbased threats and attacks and its consequences to secure the devices.
End-users - The main victims of the sensor-based threats and attacks are endusers. Attackers mostly target end-users with less technical knowledge of sensor-based
threats to perform malicious activities such as information leakage, task inference, etc.
Although it is hard to understand the technical part of different sensor-based threats
and attacks, end-users should know the consequences of these threats and attacks and
be cautious before using any risky apps in the devices. Additionally, end-users can
follow good security practices such as rejecting any suspicious sensor access, disabling
automatic data sharing between apps, etc. to secure their devices and information.
Users can also raise their concerns to the vendors regarding sensor-based threats and
attacks.
Developers - Developers can play an important role in securing smart devices
against sensor-based threats and attacks. Modern app-based platforms increase the
popularity of smart devices rapidly and developers can build numerous apps and
publish them in app markets. To secure the devices from the sensor-based threats and
attacks, developers can follow the guidelines published by the vendors to minimize the
sensor data abuse in the apps [anda]. Developers can also follow good app developing
practices such as the use of encrypted sensor data in the app, trusted data flow path,
use of only essential sensor permission, etc. Developers can also help the vendors to
build specific security measures against the sensor-based threats and attacks.
Research community - Several on-going research efforts have already confirmed
the necessity of securing sensors in smart devices [SAU17, KPM+ 18]. The research
community can help the industry to address the sensor-based threats and attacks
efficiently and propose various solutions. Researchers along with the industry experts
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should jointly propose a standard practice in app development to minimize the sensor
abuses in smart devices. Furthermore, researchers should report newly found sensorbased threats to the vendors immediately to reduce the consequences.
Summary - In summary, there are several interesting research problems that may
be tackled by the research community toward improving the security of sensors in
smart devices and applications. While following the above directions toward better
protection mechanisms against the sensor-based threats and attacks, researchers have
to identify the key characteristics that differentiate IoT security from the commodity
system security. Such unique characteristics will guide toward the design of innovative
mechanisms that will be robust against the sensor attacks.

4.5

Conclusion

The growing popularity of topics like smart home, smart office, smart city is increasing
attention towards security issues in smart devices and applications. In this chapter,
we surveyed a lesser-known yet serious family of sensor-based threats and attacks to
smart devices. We provided a detailed analysis of recent sensor-based threats and
attacks and discussed how these threats and attacks can be used to exploits various
sensors in smart devices. We also discussed some of the challenges for future research
work in this area. In conclusion, we believe this chapter will have a positive impact in
the research community by documenting recent sensor-based threats and attacks to
smart devices and motivating researchers to develop further comprehensive security
schemes to secure these devices against sensor-based threats and attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
SENSOR-BASED THREAT DETECTION IN STANDALONE SMART
DEVICES

5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we present a novel intrusion detection (IDS) framework called 6thSense,
as a comprehensive security solution for sensor-based threats for standalone smart
devices (e.g., smartphone, smart watch, etc.). The proposed framework is a contextaware IDS and is built upon the observation that for any user activity or task (e.g.,
texting, making calls, browsing, driving, etc.), a different, but a specific set of sensors
becomes active. In a context-aware setting, the 6thSense framework is aware of the
sensors activated by each activity or task. Here, context-aware refers to the ability
of inferring user activities by tracking different sensors’ data of a device. 6thSense
observes sensors data in real time and determines the current use context of the device according to whether the current sensor use is malicious or not. 6thSense is
context-aware and correlates the sensor data for different user activities (e.g., texting, making calls, browsing, etc.) on the smart devices and learns how sensors’ data
correlates with different activities. As a detection mechanism, 6thSense observes sensors’ data and checks against the learned behavior of the sensors. In 6thSense, the
framework utilizes several Machine Learning-based detection mechanisms to catch
sensor-based threats including Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and a set of other ML
algorithms (e.g., PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Hoeffding Tree, and Multilayer Perception). In this chapter, we present the design of 6thSense on different
Android devices (smartphone and smart watch) because of its open-source nature,
large market share [and16], and rich set of sensors. To evaluate the efficiency of the
framework, we tested it with data collected from real users (100 different users, 16
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different typical daily activities for smartphone and smart watch [act15a] including
153600 and 307200 different event-state information, respectively). We also evaluated
the performance of 6thSense against three different sensor-based threats and finally
analyzed its overhead. Our evaluation shows that 6thSense can detect sensor-based
attacks with an accuracy and F-Score over 96%. Also, our evaluation shows a minimal overhead on the utilization of the system resources. Note that, this work is an
extension of our previous work [SAU17]. We significantly improved the framework
from our prior work and implemented 6thSense on smart watch and smart phone.
We also evaluated the performance with new user data and analyzed the performance
overhead in further detail.
Contributions: In summary, the main contributions of this chapter are threefold:
• First, the design of 6thSense, a context-aware IDS to detect sensor-based threats
in standalone smart devices utilizing multiple machine learning based models from
Markov Chain to Naive Bayes to LMT.
• Second, the extensive performance evaluation of 6thSense with real user experiments over 100 users for different standalone smart devices (smartphone and smart
watch).
• Third, testing of 6thSense against three different sensor-based threats.

5.2

Differences from Prior Works

Though there is no direct comparable work to compare 6thSense with, differences
between existing solutions and our framework can be noted as follows: The main
limitation of Semadroid [XZ15] is that the proposed solution is only tested against a
similar type of attack scenario (information leakage by a background application). Semadroid also does not provide any extensive performance evaluation for the proposed
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scheme. Finally, this work depends on user permissions to fully enforce an updated
policy on the sensor usage which is vulnerable as users might unknowingly approve the
sensor permissions for malicious Apps. Real-time activity detection proposed by Maiti
et al. considers motion sensors to identify user activity on a smart device which is
only effective against keystroke inference [MAJH16]. In Darkly [JNS13], the proposed
framework is not tested against any sensor-based threats. Audroid presented a policy
enforced framework to secure only the audio channels of a smart device. Albeit useful,
similar to the others, this work does not consider other sensor-based threats, either.
More recent work AWARE also considers selective sensors (e.g., camera and microphone) to identify malicious sensor accesses of the applications [PRS+ 17]. Compared
to these prior works, 6thSense provides a comprehensive coverage to all the sensors
in a smart device and ensures security against different types of sensor-based threats
with high accuracy.

5.3

Adversary Model and Design Assumptions

In this section, we discuss different threats that may abuse sensors to execute malicious activities on a smart device. Different design features and assumptions are also
explained in this section.

5.3.1

Adversary Model

For this work, we consider the following sensor-based threats similar to [USB14]:
• Threat 1-Triggering a malicious App via a sensor. A malicious App can exist in the
smart device which can be triggered by sending a specific sensory pattern or message
via sensors.
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• Threat 2-Information leakage via a sensor. A malicious App can exist in the device
which can leak information to any third party using sensors.
• Threat 3-Stealing information via a sensor. A malicious App can exist in the device
which can exploit the sensors of a smart device and start stealing information after
inferring a specific device mode (e.g., sleeping).
In this work, we cover these three types of malicious sensor-based threats. To build
our adversary model, we consider any component on a smart device that interacts with
the physical world as a sensor [PSJA15]. We designed specific malware to represent
above-mentioned threats and test our proposed framework against these malware.

5.3.2

Design Assumptions and Features

In designing a comprehensive security scheme like 6thSense for sensor-based threats,
we note the following design assumptions and features:

Figure 5.1: Context-aware model for 6thSense.

• Context Awareness: The main feature of 6thSense is context awareness which
refers to the ability to sense the physical environment and adapt its operations accordingly in realistic cases [TK12]. 6thSense builds a context-aware model by observing
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the sensors’ behaviors on a smart device in different usage scenarios. When a user is
performing a task on a smart device, several sensors (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope,
light sensor, etc.) may remain active. This active state of different sensors is not
constant and can change over time. This shifting in sensor’s state over time should
be considered correctly to understand the context of an activity. 6thSense divides
the total execution time of an activity into smaller times and observes the sensors’
states (on/off) over a short time span. Thus, whenever a sensor state is changed,
6thSense can understand the context and take a decision according to the context.
For example, while a user is walking with a smartphone on his hand, several sensors
(i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, etc.) remain active. If we divide the time
of the activity in smaller times, we can see different sets of sensors active for different
sensor states (Figure 6.1). In this way, 6thSense considers all device states to understand the context of the activity and differentiate between benign and malicious
activities.
• Sensor co-dependence: A sensor in a smart device is normally considered as an
independent entity on the device. Thus, one sensor does not know what is happening
in another sensor. However, in this work, given an activity, we consider sensors as
co-dependent entities on a device instead of independent entities. The reason for this
stems from the fact that for each user activity or task on a smart device, a specific
set of sensors remains active. For example, if a user is walking with a phone in hand,
motion sensors (i.e., gyroscope, accelerometer), the light sensor, GPS will be active.
On the contrary, if the user is walking with the phone in the pocket or bag, instead
of the light sensor, the proximity sensor will remain active. Thus, a co-dependent
relationship exists between sensors while performing a specific task. Each activity
uses different, but specific set of sensors to perform the task efficiently. Hence, one
can distinguish the user activity by observing the context of the sensors for a specific
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task. 6thSense uses the context of all the sensors to distinguish between normal
user activities and malicious activities. In summary, sensors in a smart device are
individually independent, but per activity-wise dependent and 6thSense considers the
context of the activities in its design.
• Adaptive sensor sampling: Different sensors have different sampling frequencies. To monitor all the sensor data for a specific time, a developed solution must
consider and sample the sensor data correctly. 6thSense considers sampling the sensor
data over a certain time period instead of individual sensor frequencies which mitigates any possible error in processing of data from different sensors. 6thSense collects
each sensor data separately and samples the data according to their corresponding
frequencies. These sample data are merged together to build contexts of different
user activities in smart devices.
• Faster computation: Modern high precision sensors on smart devices have high
resolution and sampling rate. As a result, sensors provide large volume of data even
for a small time interval. A solution for sensor-based threats should quickly process
any large data from different sensors in real time while ensuring a high detection rate.
To address this, we use different machine learning algorithms as detection techniques
of 6thSense which are proven simple and fast techniques.
• Real-time monitoring: 6thSense provides real-time monitoring to all the sensors
which mitigates the possibility of data tempering or false data injection on the device.
• Configurability: 6thSense is configurable to provide different needs and flexible
deployments. For example, 6thSense offers both online and offline training mode for
different machine learning detection techniques to reduce power consumption.
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5.4

Detection Techniques: Theoretical Foundation of 6thSense

In this section, we describe the theoretical foundation of the detection techniques
used in 6thSense. For the context-aware IDS in 6thSense, we utilize several different
ML-based techniques including Markov Chain, Naive Bayes and, a set of other ML
algorithms (e.g., PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Hoeffding Tree, and Multilayer
Perception) to differentiate between normal and malicious behavior on a smart device.
As explained in Section 4, we consider the context awareness of user activities
in a smart device which shows state transition and sensor co-dependence feature
in a smart device. The Markov Chain model can illustrate these properties of the
smart device’s sensors accurately based on different user activities in the transition
matrix. Another advantage of using Markov Chain model is that it is easy to build
the model from a large dataset and computational requirements are modest which
can be met by resource-limited devices. On the other hand, the Naive Bayes model
can build multiple activity contexts from sensor data and identifies whether a test
dataset belongs to a user activity or a malicious activity. The Naive Bayes model
uses the sensor co-dependence feature to build the activity context and classifies data
accordingly. In addition to this, the Naive Bayes technique is chosen for its fast
computation rate, small training dataset requirement, and ability to modify it with
new training data without rebuilding the model from scratch.
Apart from the Markov Chain and the Naive Bayes model, other ML techniques
are also common in malware detection because of their high accuracy rate [YLAI17,
SPA+ 18]. We also investigate how other ML algorithms perform in building a contextaware model from sensor data and detecting sensor-based threats on a smart device.
Our main purpose is to check whether popular ML algorithms can understand and
build an effective context-aware model for sensor-based threats. A discussion of these
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approaches in the context of 6thSense is given below. The efficacy of these different
approaches utilized in 6thSense is analyzed in Section 7.

5.4.1

Markov Chain-Based Detection

Markov Chain model can be described as a discrete-time stochastic process which
denotes a set of random variables and defines how these variables change over time.
There are two main assumptions for Markov Chain model: (1) Probability distribution
of the state at time t+1 depends on the state at time t only. Here, the state refers to
the overall condition of the stochastic process. (2) A state transition from previous
timestamp (t) to next timestamp (t+1 ) is independent of time. Markov Chain can
be applied to illustrate a series of events where what state will occur next depends
only on the previous state. In our study, a series of events represents user activity
and state represents condition (i.e, values, on/off status) of the sensors in a smart
device (Figure 5.2). We can represent the probabilistic condition of Markov Chain as
in Equation 1 where Xt denotes the state at time t [Kei12].
P (Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) = P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = Xt ),
(5.1)
when, P (X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) > 0.

In our study, we observe the changes of condition of a set of sensors as a variable
which changes over time. The condition of a sensor indicates whether the sensor
value is changing or not from a previous value in time. Let us assume S denotes a set
which represents current conditions of n number of sensors. So, S can be represented
with S = {S1 , S2 , S3 , ..., Sn }, where S1 , S2 , S3 , ..., Sn = 0 or 1. For a specific time, t,
we consider the combination of all the sensors’ conditions in the smart device as the
state of our model. As we consider change in a sensor’s condition as binary output
(1 or 0, where 1 denotes that sensor value is changing from previous instance and 0
denotes that sensor value is not changing), the number of total states of our model
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Figure 5.2: Markov Chain model for 6thSense
will be exponents of 2. For example, if we consider the total number of sensors in
set S is 10, the number of states in our Markov Chain will be 210 and the states can
be represented as a 10 bit binary number where each bit will represent the state of a
corresponding sensor. For this, pij denotes the probability that the system in a state
j at time t+1 given that system is in state i at time t. If we have n number of sensors
and m = 2n states in our model, Markov Chain can be constructed by the following
transition probability matrix:
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p13



 p21 p22 p23
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 ... ... ...


 ... ... ...

pm1 pm2 pm3

... ...

p1m





p2m 


... ... ... 



... ... ... 
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(5.2)

The transition probability matrix of this Markov Chain can be constructed by
observing the transitions from one state to another state for a certain time. Assume
that, system’s states are X0 , X1 , . . . , XT at a given time t = 0, 1, . . . , T . We can
represent the transition probability matrix as follows:
Pij =

Nij
,
Ni

(5.3)

where, Nij = the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1 where Xt in state i and Xt+1
in state j ; Ni = the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1 , where Xt in state i and
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Xt+1 in any other state. The initial probability distribution of this Markov Chain can
be represented as follows:


Q = q1 q2 q3 . . . . . . q m

(5.4)

where qm is the probability that the model is in state m at time 0. Probability
of observing a sequence of states X1 , X2 , . . . , XT at a given time 1, . . . , T can be
computed using the following equation:
P (X1 , X2 , . . . , XT ) = qx1

T
Y

PXt−1 Xt

(5.5)

2

For 6thSense, instead of predicting the next state, we determine the probability of
occurring a transition between two states at a given time. We train our Markov Chain
model with a training dataset collected from real users and build the transition matrix
accordingly. Then, we determine sensor working condition for time t and t+1. Let us
assume a and b are sensor’s state in time t and t+1. We determine the probability
of transition from state a to b which can be found by looking up in the transition
matrix and calculating P(a,b). As the training dataset consisted of sensor data from
benign activities, we can assume that if transition from state a to b is malicious, the
calculated probability from transition matrix will be zero.

5.4.2

Naive Bayes Based Detection

The Naive Bayes model is a simple probability estimation method which is based
on Bayes’ method. The main assumption of the Naive Bayes detection is that the
presence of a particular sensor condition in a task/activity has no influence over the
presence of any other feature on that particular event. The probability of each event
can be calculated by observing the presence of a set of specific features.
Assume p(x1 , x2 ) is the general probability distribution of two events x1 , x2 . Using
the Bayes rule, we can have the following equation:
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p(x1 , x2 ) = p(x1 |x2 )p(x2 ),

(5.6)

where p(x1 |x2 ) = Probability of the event x1 given that event x2 will happen. Now,
if we have another variable, c, we can rewrite Equation 7 as follows:
p(x1 , x2 |c) = p(x1 |x2 , c)p(x2 |c).

(5.7)

If knowledge of c is sufficient enough to determine the probability of event x1 , we can
state that there is conditional independence between x1 and x2 [MS12]. So, we can
rewrite the first part of Equation 8 as p(x1 |x2 , c) = p(x1 |c), which modifies Equation
8 as follows:
p(x1 , x2 |c) = p(x1 |c)p(x2 |c).

(5.8)

In 6thSense, we consider users’ activity as a combination of n number of sensors
(Figure 5.3). Assume X is a set which represents current conditions of n number of
sensors. We consider that conditions of sensors are conditionally independent (See
Section 4.2), which means a change in one sensor’s working condition has no effect
over a change in another sensor’s working condition. As we explained earlier, the
probability of executing a task depends on the conditions of a specific set of sensors.
So, in summary, although one sensors’ condition does not control another sensor’s
condition, overall probability depends on all the sensors’ conditions. For example, if a
person is walking with his smartphone in his hand, the motion sensors (accelerometer
and gyroscope) will change. However, this change will not force the light sensor or
the proximity sensor to change its condition. Thus, sensors in a smart device change
their conditions independently, but execute a task together. From Equation 9, we
can have a generalized formula for this context-aware model [MS12]:
p(X|c) =

n
Y

p(Xi |c).

(5.9)

i=1

In our contextual activity-oriented model, we have a set of training data for users’
activities. Assume that B represents a set which denotes m numbers of user activities.
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Figure 5.3: Naive Bayes model for 6thSense
We can determine the probability of a dataset X to be classified as a user activity
using the following equation:
P (Bi |X) =

P (X|Bi )P (Bi )
,
P (X)

(5.10)

where i = 1, 2, . . . , m. As the sum of all the conditional probabilities for X will be
1, we can have the following equation which will lead to Equation 12—
m
X

P (Bi |X) = 1.

(5.11)

i=1

P (X|Bi )P (Bi )
.
P (Bi |X) = Pm
i=1 P (X|Bi )P (Bi )

(5.12)

This calculated conditional probability then is used to determine the benign user
activity or malicious attacks in 6thSense. In this way, we compute the probability of
occurring an activity over a certain period of time.
We divide the sensor data into smaller time values (1 second) and calculate the
probability of each instances to infer the user activity. The calculated probability per
second data is then used in the expected value theorem to calculate total probability.
If the probability of the first instance is p1 with a value of a1 , probability of the second
instance is p2 with a value of a2 and so on, up to value an , the expected value can be
calculated by the following formula:
E[N ] =

a1 p1 + a2 p2 + a3 p3 + . . . . . . + an pn
.
a1 + a2 + . . . . . . + an
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(5.13)

As all the values of a1 , a2 , ... ..., an are equally likely, this expected value becomes
a simple average of cumulative probability of each instances. We infer the user activity
by setting up a configurable threshold value in the 6thSense framework and checking
whether calculated value is higher than the threshold or not. If it is lower than the
threshold value, a malicious activity is occurring in the device.

5.4.3

Other ML-based Detection Techniques

In addition to the Markov Chain and the Naive Bayes models above, there are other
machine learning algorithms (such as PART, Logistic Function, J48, LMT, Hoeffding
Tree, and Multilayer Perception) that are very popular for anomaly detection schemes
because of their fast computation and easy implementation.
In the alternative detection techniques, we used four types of ML-based classifier
to build a context-aware analytical model for 6thSense. The following briefly discusses
these classifiers and our rationale to include them:
Rule-based Learning. Rule-based ML works by identifying a set of relational rules
between attributes of a given dataset and represents the model observed by the system [GPY+ 07]. The main advantage of the rule-based learning is that it identifies
a single model which can be applied commonly to any instances of the dataset to
make a prediction of outcome. As we train 6thSense with different user activities,
the rule-based learning provides one model to predict data for all the user activities
which simplifies the framework. For 6thSense, we chose, PART algorithm for the
rule-based learning.
Regression Model. Regression model is widely used in data mining for its fast
computation. This type of classifier observes the relations between dependent and
independent variables to build a prediction model [SKE+ 12]. For 6thSense, we have a
total 11 attributes where we have one dependent variable (device state: malicious/be-
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nign) and ten independent variables (sensor conditions). Regression model observes
the change in the dependent variable by changing the values of the independent
variables and build the prediction model. We use the logistic regression model in
6thSense, which also yields with high accuracy against conventional Android malware [SKE+ 12].
Neural Network. Neural network is another common technique that is utilized
by researchers for malware detection. In neural network techniques, the relation between attributes of dataset is compared with the biological neurons and a relation
map is created to observe the changes for each attribute [LVM09]. We chose Multilayer Perceptron algorithm for training the 6thSense framework as it can distinguish
relationships among non-linear dataset.
Decision Tree. Decision tree algorithms are predictive models where decision maps
are created by observing the changes in one attribute in different instances [YWLY07].
These types of algorithms are mostly used in a prediction model where output can
have a finite set of values. For 6thSense, we utilized and tested three different decision
tree algorithms (J48, LMT (Logistic Model Tree), and Hoeffding tree) to compare the
outcome of our framework.

5.5

6thSense Framework

In this section, we provide a detailed overview of our proposed context-aware IDS
framework, 6thSense, for detecting sensor-based threats on smart devices. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, 6thSense has three main phases: (1) data collection, (2) data
processing, and (3) data analysis. In the Data Collection phase, we use a custom
Android App to collect the sensor data for different user activities and the collected
sensor data are then processed in the Data Processing phase. In Phase 3, the collected
data is fed into detection models and the end result indicates whether the current
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state of the device is malicious or not. The following sub-sections briefly describe
these three phases.

5.5.1

Data Collection Phase

In this phase, 6thSense collects data from different sensors of a smart device. There
can be multiple sensors in a smart device. 6thSense considers nine sensors in total
to identify different user activities using a sensor-rich Android device. The sensors
selected are accelerometer, gyroscope, light sensor, proximity sensor, GPS, audio
sensor (microphone and speaker), camers, and headphone. The chosen sensors are
then categorized into two following categories.
No-permission-imposed sensors in 6thSense: For 6thSense, we chose four nopermission imposed sensors (i.e., accelerometer, gyroscope, light, proximity sensors).
We can also refer these sensors as data-oriented sensors in the context of 6thSense
because values provided by these sensors need to be observed to infer user activities.
For example, accelerometer’s and gyroscope’s values change with motion and they
give values on X, Y, and Z axes. To detect whether a sensor is activated or not for
a specific activity, one needs to observe values of these sensors.
Permission-imposed sensors in 6thSense: We chose five permission-imposed sensors to build the context-aware model (microphone, GPS, speaker, camera, and headset) of 6thSense. The conditions of these sensors can be represented by their logical
states (on/off status) for different user activities. Hence, we also referred to these
sensors as logic-oriented sensors in the context of 6thSense. For example, microphone
has only two values to identify users’ activity: on and off. So, it can be represented
with 0 or 1 to detect if the camera is on or off correspondingly.
To collect the data and logical values from sensors, we built a custom Android
App and 6thSense used this in the data collection phase. In Android, this App uses
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sensoreventlistener API to log numerical values of the data-oriented sensors. On the
other hand, the App determines the state of the sensor and logs 0 or 1 if the sensor is
on or off, respectively. This App uses the user permission to use the microphone, GPS,
and camera to record the working conditions of these sensors. For GPS, we consider
two datasets - either GPS is turned on or not and either location is changing or not. In
total, six different logic state information for five aforementioned permission-imposed
sensors are collected by this App.
Note that 6thSense considers different typical daily human activities [act15b] that
involve the smart devices (e.g., smart watch, smart phone, etc.) to build the contextual model. These activities include walking, talking, interacting (playing games,
browsing), driving (as driver and passenger). Furthermore, the number of activities
is configurable in 6thSense and is not limited to aforementioned examples. As also
explained in the evaluation of 6thSense, a total of seven and nine typical daily activities are selected for smart watch and smart phone respectively as they are considered
as common user activities [act15a]. 6thSense collects these data using the App for
different users to train the framework which is then used to distinguish the normal
sensor behavior from the malicious behavior. In summary, the aforementioned App
collects data from eight different sensors for different typical user activities. 6thSense
observes sensor state (combination of working conditions (i.e., values, on/off status)
of different sensors) in a per second manner for each user activity. Each second of data
for user activity corresponds to 512 state information from eight different sensors.

5.5.2

Data Processing Phase

In the second phase of the framework, 6thSense organizes the data to use. As different
sensors have different frequencies on the smart device, the total number of readings
of sensors for a specific time period is different. For example, the accelerometer and
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gyroscope of LG Watch Sport have a sampling frequency of approximately 418 Hz
and 32 Hz, respectively while the light sensor has a sampling frequency of 5 Hz. Thus,
the data collected in Phase 1 needs to be sampled and reorganized. 6thSense observes
the change in the sensor condition in each second to determine the overall state of our
device and from this per second change, 6thSense determines the activity of users.
For this reason, 6thSense takes all the data given by a single sensor in a second and
calculates the average value of the sensor reading. This process is only applicable for
the data oriented sensors as mentioned earlier. Again, the data collected from the App
is numerical value as given by the sensor. However, for the detection model, 6thSense
only considers the condition of the sensors. 6thSense observes the data collected by
the aforementioned App and determines whether the condition of sensors is changing
or not. If the sensor value is changing from the previous value in time, 6thSense
represents the sensor condition as 1 and 0 otherwise.
The logic state information collected from the sensors need to be reorganized, too
as these data are merged with the data collected from the collected values from the
other sensors to create an input matrix. We consider the condition of the sensors to be
the same over time and organize the data accordingly. The reorganized data generated
from the aforementioned App are then merged to create the training matrices.

5.5.3

Data Analysis Phase

In the third, 6thSense uses different ML-based detection techniques introduced in the
previous section to analyze the data matrices generated in the previous phase.
For the Markov Chain-based detection, 6thSense uses 75% of the collected data
to train 6thSense and generate the transition matrix. This transition matrix is used
to determine whether the transition from one state to another is appropriate or not.
Here, state refers to generic representation of all the sensors’ conditions on a device.
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Figure 5.4: Overview of 6thSense.
For testing purposes, we have two different data set — benign activities or trusted
model and malicious activities or threat model. The trusted model consists of 25% of
the collected data for different user activities. We tested the trusted model to ensure
the accuracy of the 6thSense framework in detecting benign activities. The malicious
activities are built from performing the attack scenarios mentioned in Section 5.3.
6thSense calculates the probability of a transition occurring between two states at a
given time and accumulates the total probability to distinguish between normal and
malicious activities.
To implement the Naive Bayes-based detection technique, 6thSense uses the training sessions to define different user activities. In 6thSense, seven typical user activities
are selected in total for smart watch as listed in Table 3. In addition to these user
activities, we consider walking with smart device in pocket and making a video call
as typical user activities to test 6thSense in smart phone. 6thSense uses ground truth
user data to define these activities. Using the theoretical foundation explained in
Section 5.4, 6thSense calculates the probability of a test session to belong to any of
these defined activities. As 6thSense considers one second of data in each compu-
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tational cycle, the total probability up to a predefined configurable time interval (in
this case five minutes) is calculated. This calculated probability is used to detect
malicious activities from normal activities. If the computed probability for all the
known benign activities is not over a predefined threshold, then it is detected as a
malicious activity.
For the other alternative machine-learning-based detection techniques, 6thSense
uses WEKA, a data mining tool which offers data analysis using different machine
learning approaches [HFH+ 09].

5.6

Performance Evaluation of 6thSense
Sensor
type

Name

Accelerometer
No-permission imposed
sensors

Gyroscope
Light Sensor
Proximity Sensor

Microphone
Permission-imposed sensors

Speaker

Camera

Model
(Smart Watch | Smart Phone)

Specification
(Smart Watch | Smart Phone)

Bosch BMI160 Acceleration Sensor |
MPU6500 Acceleration Sensor
Bosch BMI160 Gyroscope Sensor |
MPU6500 Gyroscope Sensor
APDS-9306 Light Sensor |
TMG399X RGB Sensor
LG Wear Detection Sensor |
TMG399X proximity sensor
Qualcomm Snapdragon Wear 2100
built in microphone | Qualcomm
Snapdragon 801 Processor built
in microphone
Qualcomm Snapdragon Wear 2100
built in speaker | Qualcomm
Snapdragon 801 Processor built
in speaker
N/A | Samsung S5K2P2XX

78.4532 m/s2 , 417.67 Hz, 0.01 mA |
19.6133 m/s2 , 203.60 Hz, 0.25 mA
17.453293 rad/s, 31.95 Hz, 0.01 mA |
8.726646 rad/s, 203.60 Hz, 6.1 mA
30000 lux, 5 Hz, 0.11 mA |
600000 lux, 5.62 Hz, 0.75 mA
1V, 0.15 mA | 8V, 0.75 mA

120 dB, .12 mA | 86 dB, .75 mA

90 dB, .18 mA | 110 dB, 1 mA

N/A | 12 megapixels, 30 fps, 4.7 mA

Table 5.1: Sensor list of LG Watch Sport and Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos smartphone
used in experiment.
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of the proposed context-aware IDS framework, 6thSense, in detecting the sensor-based threats on smart devices (smartphone
and smart watch). We tested 6thSense with the data collected from different users
for benign activities and adversary models described in Section 5.3. As discussed
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earlier, 6thSense considers three sensor-based threats: (1) a malicious App that can
be triggered via a light or motion sensors, (2) a malicious App that can leak information via audio sensors, and (3) a malicious App that steals data via audio sensors.
Furthermore, we measured the performance impact of 6thSense on the devices and
present a detailed results for the efficiency of the 6thSense framework on both a smart
watch and smart phone.

5.6.1

Training Environment and Dataset

In order to test the effectiveness of 6thSense, we implemented it on both a sensorrich Android-based smart watch and smartphone. We used the LG Watch Sport as
a reference Android smart watch with Android Wear version 2.0 to collect sensor
data for different typical user activities. We chose this Android device as the LG
watch sport is a second generation, stand-alone Android wearable that provides a
rich set of sensors. A list of sensors of LG Watch Sport is given in Table 5.1. As
discussed earlier, we selected 7 different typical user activities or tasks to collect user
data (Table 3). These are typical basic activities with the smart watches that people
usually do in their daily lives [act15a]. The user activities/tasks are categorized in
two categories as generic activities and user related activities.
Generic activities are the activities in which the sensor readings are not affected
by the smart device users. Sleeping wearing smart watch, driving with the smart
watch using GPS as a navigator, and driving with smart watch in hand are three
generic activities that were considered in this work. Basically, in the generic activities,
sensors’ data are not affected by different users since users do not interact with the
smart watch directly. For example, if a user is sleeping, sensors activity will be
irregular depending on sleeping pattern. There will be less movement detected in
the device and sensor data will be changed accordingly. For user-related activities,
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in which the sensor readings may be affected by the user, we identified four different
activities including walking, playing games, browsing, and making voice calls via
smart watch.
For implementing and evaluating the performance of 6thSense on smartphone, we
chose Samsung Galaxy S5 Duos with Android OS version 7.1.2 (Android N) which
provides a broad range of sensors. Samsung currently holds approximately 23.3% of
total market share of smartphones [sam17] and is the largest Android operated smartphone manufacturer which motivates to implement 6thSense on Samsung smartphone.
In addition to user activities used in the smart watch data collection, we considered
two more user-related activities (walking with the device in pocket/bag and making
video calls) for testing 6thSense on the smartphone.
6thSense was tested by 100 different individuals (50 smart watch users and 50
smartphone users) while the sensor data was collected from the smart watch and
the smartphone. We note that our study with human subjects was approved by the
appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) and we followed all the procedures
strictly in our study. To train and test 6thSense on the smart watch, we collected 200
sets of data for four user-related activities for the smart watch where each dataset
comprised of 300 seconds of data from the selected sensors mentioned in Section 5.5.
We also collected three sets of data for each general activity. We asked the different
users to perform the same activity to ensure the integrity for different tasks. We
also asked the users to perform the tasks naturally without any influence of the lab
environment. Users performed these tasks in a real-life workplace and outdoor in a
natural environment. Additionally, users chose their preferred place, walking routes,
and apps in the entire data collection process. For example, to collect data in walking
scenario, users chose their preferred walking routes both inside their workplace and
outside environment. Note that each five minutes of the data collected for user-related
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and generic activities corresponds to 300 events with 512 different states. So, a total
of 153,600 different event-state information were analyzed by 6thSense for a user
activity. For testing 6thSense on a smartphone, we collected data from 50 different
individuals for nine different activities. We considered nine different sensors to build
the context-aware model and each dataset depicted 300 events with 1024 different
states and a total of 307,200 event-state information [SAU17].
For the malicious dataset, we created three different attack scenarios considering
the adversary model mentioned in Section 4. For Threat 1, we developed two different
Android Apps which could be triggered using the light sensor and motion sensors on
the smart watch. We also created the same malicious Android app for the smart
phone. To perform the attack described in Threat 2, we developed a malware that
could record conversations as audio clips and playback after a specific time to leak the
information. This attack scenario included both the microphone and speaker on the
smart watch and smart phone. We developed another version of this app which could
record conversations as audio clips in smartphone using a connected smart watch.
Also, for Threat 3, we developed a malicious App that could scan all the sensors
and if none of the sensors were changing their working conditions, the malicious App
could open up the microphone and record audio clips surreptitiously. For Threat 3,
we developed another version for smart devices with camera (e.g., smartphone) where
a malicious App can scan all the sensors of a device and if device was inactive, the
malicious App could activate camera and record videos covertly. We developed an
updated version of this attack which could start recording via microphone in a smart
watch if the connected smartphone was inactive. This version of the app could bypass
the security feature introduced on Android P [and18b]. In summary, we created 10
different malware that could perform malicious activities in Android-powered smart
phone and smart watch. We collected 18 different datasets (a total of 62,850 event-
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state information) from these three attack scenarios to test the efficacy of 6thSense
against these adversaries in a smart watch.
In order to test 6thSense, we divided the collected real user data into two sections
as it is a common practice [URC+ 13]. 75% of the collected benign dataset was used
to train the 6thSense framework and 25% of the collected data along with malicious
dataset were used for testing purposes. For the Markov Chain-based detection technique, the training dataset was used to compute the state transitions and to build
the transition matrix. On the other hand, in the Naive Bayes-based detection technique, the training dataset was used to determine the frequency of sensor condition
changes for a particular activity or task. As noted earlier, for the smart watch, there
were seven activities for the Naive Bayes technique. We split the data according to
their activities for this approach. For the analysis of the other ML-based approaches,
Task Category

Task Name

1. Sleeping
2. Driving as driver
3. Driving as passenger
1. Walking with smart
watch in hand
2. Playing games
User-related Activities
3. Browsing
4. Making phone calls
5. Walking with device in
pocket/bag†
6. Making video calls†
Generic Activities

†

Only considered for smart phone.

Table 5.2: Typical activities of users on a smart device [act15a].
the data in benign and malicious classes were used to train and test 6thSense using
10-fold cross validation for different ML algorithms.
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Smart Watch
Threshold† Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy
0
0.66
0.33
1
0
0.77
1
0.77
0.22
1
0
0.85
2
0.88
0.11
1
0
0.92
3
0.97
0.02
0.98
0.01
0.97
5
0.99
0.001
0.89
0.11
0.96
6
1
0
0.84
0.16
0.95
†

F-score
0.79
0.87
0.94
0.98
0.94
0.92

Recall
0.62
0.86
0.96
0.98
1
1

Smart
FN Precision
0.38
1
0.14
1
0.04
1
0.02
1
0
0.9
0
0.8

Phone
FP Accuracy
0
0.68
0
0.88
0
0.96
0
0.98
0.1
0.98
0.2
0.96

F-score
0.76
0.92
0.97
0.98
0.94
0.89

Number of consecutive malicious state is considered as threshold

Table 5.3: Performance evaluation of Markov Chain based model.

5.6.2

Performance Metrics

In the evaluation of 6thSense, we utilized the following six different performance metrics: Recall rate (sensitivity or True Positive rate), False Negative rate, Specificity
(True Negative rate), False Positive rate, Accuracy, and F-score. True Positive (TP)
indicates number of benign activities that are detected correctly while true negative
(TN) refers to the number of correctly detected malicious activities. On the other
hand, False Positive (FP) states malicious activities that are detected as benign activities and False Negative (FN) defines number of benign activities that are categorized
as malicious activity. F-score is the performance metric of a framework that reflects
the accuracy of the framework by considering the recall rate and specificity. These
performance metrics are defined as follows:
TP
,
TP + FN
FN
F alse negative rate =
,
TP + FN
TN
P recision rate (T N rate) =
,
TN + FP
FP
F alse positive rate =
,
TN + FP
TP + TN
,
Accuracy =
TP + TN + FP + FN
2 ∗ Recall rate ∗ P recision rate
F − score =
.
Recall rate + P recision rate
Recall rate (T P Rate) =

(5.14)
(5.15)
(5.16)
(5.17)
(5.18)
(5.19)

In addition to the aforementioned performance metrics, we considered Receiver Operating Characterstic (ROC) curve and Precision Recall Curve (PRC) as other per-
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formance metrics for 6thSense. As our collected dataset is imbalanced (number of
benign events is higher than the malicious events), the accuracy of the framework
can be influenced by the dataset. To address data imbalance problem in 6thSense,
we used PRC as a performance metric which considers data imbalance and reflects
the base-rate fallacy correctly [RDL+ 15].

5.6.3

Evaluation of Markov Chain-Based Detection

In the Markov Chain-based detection technique, we question whether the transition
between two states (sensors’ on/off condition in each second) is expected or not. In
the evaluation, we used 66 testing sessions in total for the smart watch, among which
51 sessions were for the benign activities (both generic and user-related activities)

(a) ROC curve for Markov
Chain

(b) PRC curve for Markov
Chain

(c) ROC curve for Naive Bayes

(d) PRC curve for Naive Bayes

Figure 5.5: ROC curve and PRC curve of different detection techniques on smart
watch (—–) and smart phone (—–).
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and the rest of the sessions were for the malicious activities. For evaluation in the
smartphone, we have 80 testing sessions in total (65 benign sessions). A session is
composed of a series of sensory context conditions where a sensory context condition
is the set of all available sensor conditions (on/off state) for different sensors. As
discussed earlier in Section 6, a sensor condition is a value indicating whether the
sensor data is changing or not. In this evaluation, the sensory context conditions
were computed every one second. For Markov Chain-based detection, we referred each
sensory context condition as state of the device of that particular moment. 6thSense
provides both online and offline training method to reduce performance overhead
of the resource-constrained devices. As the highest battery life is 430 mAh for LG
watch sport, training with different user data will consume more power which will
increase power-accuracy trade-off of our framework; hence, we chose offline training
method [LG17]. For the test dataset, we used the transition matrix generated from
the training period to determine whether transition from one state to another is
malicious or not. We observed that in real devices, sometimes some sensor readings
would be missed or real data would not be reflected due to hardware or software
imperfections. And, real malicious Apps would cause consecutive malicious states on
the device. Therefore, to overcome this, we also kept track of number of consecutive
malicious states and used it as a threshold after which the session was considered
as malicious. Table 5.3 displays the evaluation results associated with the Markov
Chain-based detection technique. When the threshold for consecutive malicious states
is 0, i.e., when no threshold is applied, the accuracy is just 77% and FNR is as high
as 33%. With increasing the threshold value, the accuracy first increases up to 97%
then starts decreasing.
The logical cut-off threshold should be three consecutive malicious occurrences
which has both accuracy and F-score over 97%. In Table 5.3, different performance
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indicators for Markov Chain based detection are also presented. We can observe
that FN and TN rates of Markov Chain-based detection decrease as the threshold
of consecutive malicious states increases. Again, both accuracy and F-score reach to
a peak value with the threshold of three consecutive malicious states on the device.
From Figure 5.5, we can see that FP rate remains zero while TP rate increases at the
beginning. The highest TP rate without introducing any FP case is over 88%. After
88%, it introduces some FP cases in the system. For the cut-off threshold of three
consecutive malicious occurrences, TP rate of 6thSense increases over 97% with FP
rates as low as 0.01%.
Table 5.3 also depicts evaluation of Markov chain model on the smartphone. Similar to the smart watch, TP rate and FP rate increase with consecutive malicious
occurrences and FN and TN decrease with the threshold on a smartphone. The
plausible cut-off threshold should be three consecutive malicious occurrences which
is the same for the smart watch. The peak accuracy and F-score can be achieved
for this threshold value which is over 98%. From Figure 5.5, we can also notice that
the highest possible TP rate without introducing any FP cases is 98%. Figure 5.5(b)
shows PRC curve for Markov Chain-based detection on both the smartwatch and the
smart phone. We can see that for both the smart watch and the smartphone, area
under PRC are approximately 1 which is ideal result for our imbalanced dataset. In
summary, Markov Chain-based detection in 6thSense can acquire accuracy over 97%
and auPRC approximately 1 with low FP rates (1.43%) for both the smart watch
and the smartphone.

5.6.4

Evaluation of Naive Bayes-based Detection

In the Naive Bayes-based detection technique, 6thSense calculates the probability
of a session to match it with each activity defined in Section 5.6.1. Here, 6thSense
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Smart Watch
Threshold† Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy
55%
1
0
0.53
0.47
0.96
57%
1
0
0.6
0.4
0.96
60%
1
0
0.67
0.33
0.97
62%
0.96
0.04
0.67
0.33
0.94
65%
0.89
0.11
0.67
0.33
0.87
67%
0.86
0.14
0.67
0.33
0.85
†

F-score
0.69
0.75
0.80
0.79
0.76
0.75

Smart
Recall FN Precision
1
0
0.6
1
0
0.7
1
0
0.7
1
0
0.7
0.94
0.06
0.7
0.88
0.12
0.7

Phone
FP Accuracy
0.4
0.93
0.3
0.95
0.3
0.95
0.3
0.95
0.3
0.9
0.3
0.85

F-score
0.75
0.82
0.82
0.82
0.80
0.78

Calculated expected probability is considered as threshold.

Table 5.4: Performance evaluation of Naive Bayes model.
Algorithms
PART
Logistic Function
J48
LMT
Hoeffding Tree
Multi-layer Perceptron

Smart Watch
Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy
0.98
0.012
0.69
0.30
0.98
0.99
0.01
0.35
0.65
0.97
0.99
0.01
0.71
0.29
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.95
0.05
0.99
1
0
0.07
0.93
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.65
0.35
0.98

F-score
0.80
0.49
0.81
0.97
0.12
0.81

Smart Phone
Recall FN Precision FP Accuracy
0.99
0.01
0.65
0.35
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.28
0.72
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.65
0.35
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.93
0.07
0.99
1
0
0.06
0.94
0.99
0.99
0.01
0.69
0.31
0.99

F-score
0.79
0.43
0.79
0.96
0.11
0.82

Table 5.5: Performance of other different machine learning based-detection techniques
tested in 6thSense.
checks the calculated probability of an activity from dataset against a threshold to
determine the correct activity. If there is no match for a certain sensor condition with
any of the activities, 6thSense detects the session as malicious. Table 5.4 shows the
evaluation results.
For the smart watch, for a threshold value of 55%, FN rate is zero. However,
FPR is too high (47%), which lowers F-score of the framework. For a threshold of
60%, FPR decreases while FNR is still zero. In this case, accuracy is 97% and Fscore is 80%. If the threshold is increased over 65%, it reduces the recall rate which
affects accuracy and F-score. The evaluation indicates that the threshold value of
60% provides an accuracy of 97% and F-score of 80%. Also, From Figure 5.5, one
can observe the relation between FPR and TPR of Naive Bayes-based detection. For
FPR larger than 0.33, TPR becomes 1.
For Naive Bayes-based detection on the smartphone, we considered nine activities in total (three general activities and six user-related activities) [SAU17]. From
Table 5.4, we can observe that TP rate FP rates decrease with the threshold value
while FN and TN increase. When the threshold is 60%, the peak accuracy (95%)
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and F-score (82%) are achieved for the smartphone. Precision-Recall curve for Naive
Bayes model is given in Figure 7.8(b). We can notice that PRC curve is more irregular compared to Markov Chain-based approach. Calculated auPRC for Naive
Bayes-based approach is 0.7 for the smart watch and the smartphone, both of which
indicate less efficient method for imbalanced dataset.

5.6.5

Evaluation of Alternative Detection Techniques

In alternative detection techniques, we used other supervised machine learning techniques to train the 6thSense framework for both the smart watch and the smart phone.
For this, we utilized WEKA and it provides three types of analysis - split percentage
analysis, cross-validation analysis, and supplied test set analysis. We chose 10 fold
cross-validation analysis to ensure that all the data was used for both training and
test. Thus, the error rate of the predictive model would be minimized in the cross validation. In Table 5.5, a detailed evaluation of different machine learning algorithms is
given for 6thSense. For Rule Based Learning, 6thSense has the best result for PART
algorithm, which has an accuracy of 0.98 and F-score of 0.80. On the other hand,
for Regression Analysis, we use the logistic function which has high FPR (0.65) and
lower F-score (0.49). Multilayer Perceptron algorithm gives an accuracy of 0.9878
and F-score of 0.80, which is higher than previously mentioned algorithms. However, FPR is much higher (0.35), which is actually a limitation for intrusion detection
frameworks in general. Compared to these algorithms, Linear Model Tree (LMT)
gives better results in detecting sensor-based attacks. This evaluation indicates that
LMT provides an accuracy of 0.99 and F-score of 0.972 for the smart watch.
From Table 5.5, one can also see performance of different machine learning algorithms in 6thSense on a smartphone. Here, LMT achieves the highest accuracy and
F-score of 0.99 and 0.96, respectively. Multilayer Perception algorithm also performs
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well with F-score of 0.82. However, false positive rate is high in this algorithm which
decreases the performance. In summary, LMT works efficiently in both the smart
watch and the smart phone.

5.6.6

Comparison of Detection Methods

In this subsection, we give a comparison among the different machine learning-based
detection approaches tested in 6thSense for defending against sensor-based threats
on the smart watch and the smartphone. For all the approaches, we select the best
possible case and report their performance metrics.
Table 5.6 depicts comparison among different detection approaches on the smart
watch. For Markov Chain-based detection, we chose three consecutive malicious
states as valid device conditions. On the other hand, in Naive Bayes approach, the
best performance is observed for the threshold of 60%. For other machine learning
algorithms tested via WEKA, we chose LMT as it gives highest accuracy among
other machine learning algorithms. These results indicate that both Markov Chain
and LMT provide high accuracy and F-score compared to the Naive Bayes-based
approach.
On the contrary, Naive Bayes model displays higher recall rate and less FNR than
other approaches. However, the presence of FPR in IDS is an issue to the system
since FPR refers to a malicious attack that is identified as a valid device state. Both
Markov Chain and LMT has lower FPR. Again, as our dataset is imbalanced (number
of benign activities is higher than malicious activity), we chose auPRC as one of the
performance metric of 6thSense. From Table 5.6 we can see that Markov Chainbased detection has the highest auPRC (0.926) followed by LMT (0.892) and Naive
Bayes (0.646). In summary, considering F-score, accuracy, and auPRC of all three
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approaches, we conclude that Markov Chain and LMT both performs effectively for
6thSense.
In Table 5.6, we present a comparison of different machine learning-based detection
techniques used in 6thSense on the smartphone. Again, we chose the best possible
(Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT) cases for all of the approaches and compare
them in Table 5.6. Similar to results in the smart watch, threshold for Markov Chainbased detection is three consecutive malicious state. For Naive Bayes-based detection,
best performance can be observed for 60% threshold probability. From Table 5.6, we
can observe that Markov Chain and LMT performs with high accuracy and F-score
compared to Naive Bayes-based approach. Naive Bayes model also introduces high FP
rate (0.3) which indicates poor performance for IDS. On the contrary, Markov Chain
and LMT shows lower FP rate (0 and 0.0694 respectively). Again, from Figure 7.8(b),
we can observe that Naive Bayes model has low auPRC compared to Markov Chainbased detection in Figure 5.5(b). LMT also has high auPRC (0.91) which is suitable
for our imbalanced dataset. In summary, both Markov Chain and LMT performs well
for 6thSense on the smart phone with high accuracy, F-score, and auPRC.
Markov Chain Naive Bayes
LMT
Performance
(Smart Watch| (Smart Watch| (Smart Watch|
Metrics
Smart Phone) Smart Phone) Smart Phone)
Recall rate
False Negative
Rate
Precision rate
False positive
rate
Accuracy
F-Score
auPRC

0.9770 | 0.98

1|1

0.9998 | 0..998

0.0230 | 0.02

0|0

0.0002 | 0.0002

0.9857 | 1

0.67 | 0.7

0.9458 | 0.9306

0.0143 | 0

0.33 | 0.3

0.0694 |

0.9795 | 0.9833
0.9813 | 0.9899
0.926 | 0.947

0.9720 | 0.9492
0.80 | 0.8235
0.646 | 0.686

0.998 | 0.9997
0.972 | 0.964
0.892 | 0.91

Table 5.6: Comparison of different machine-learning-based approaches proposed for
6thSense on Smartwatch and Smartphone (i.e., Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and
LMT).
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5.6.7

Performance Overhead

As previously mentioned, 6thSense collects data in an Android device from different sensors (permission and no-permission imposed sensors). In this sub-section, we
measure the performance overhead introduced by 6thSense on the tested Android
devices (smart watch and smartphone) in terms of CPU usage, RAM usage, file size,
and power consumption. Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table 5.9 give the details of the
performance overhead of 6thSense on the smart watch and the smartphone.
For no permission-imposed sensors, the data collection phase logs all the values
within a time interval which causes an increased usage of RAM, CPU and Disc compared to permission-imposed sensors. For the power consumption, we observe that
no permission-imposed sensors use higher power than permission-imposed sensors.
This is mainly because permission-imposed sensors are logic-oriented and have lower
sampling rate, which reduces its resource needs. The overall performance overhead is

Parameters

Time

No-permission
imposed sensors
(Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)

CPU Usage
RAM Usage
(MB)

N/A

5.5% | 3.9%

2.5% | 0.3%

N/A

17 | 23

11 | 14

1 min
5 min
10 min
1 min
5 min
10 min
1 min
5 min
10 min

4 | 6.5
7.5 | 9
10 | 12
10.5 | 13.5
45.6 | 96.67
78.4 | 133.33
1.32 | 2.68
8.7 | 23.4
32.56 | 55.35

0.001 | 0.001
0.001 | 0.002
0.001 | 0.003
2 | 3.12
16.5 | 27.4
27 | 45
0.1 | 0.23
2 | 9.63
9 | 17

Disc Usage
(MB)
Power
Consumption
(mW)
Power
Consumption
(without
datafile)

Permission-imposed
sensors (Smart Watch|
Smart Phone)

Table 5.7: Performance overhead of data collection.
as low as 5.5% of CPU, less then 17MB RAM space, and less than 10MB disc space
for the smart watch. Compared to the smart watch, performance overhead for the
smartphone is higher because of higher number of sensors. Nevertheless, smartphone
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offers more resources (CPU speed, RAM size, disc size) than the smart watch which
minimizes the effect of performance overhead. Performance overhead for the smartphone is as low as 3.9%, less than 6.5MB RAM space, and less than 12MB disc space.
Thus, 6thSense’s overhead is minimal and acceptable for an IDS system on current
smart devices. One of the main concerns of implementing 6thSense on smart device
is the power consumption.
Table 5.7 also shows the power consumption of the Android app used in 6thsense.
For one minute, 6thsense consumes 10.5 mW power which increases upto 78.4 mW for
ten minutes on a smartwatch. For a smartphone, 6thSense consumes upto 133.33 mW
power for ten minutes. The main reason of this high power consumption is that all the
sensors are kept on for the data collection and all the data are saved on device for later
analysis. To mitigate power-performance trade-off, in practical settings, the data are
not saved on device rather a real-time analysis is done, which indeed decreases the
power consumption. Without saving the data, the power consumption significantly
becomes smaller. From Table 5.7, we can observe that the power consumption of
6thSense becomes 32.56 mW which is almost 2 times lower than otherwise on a
smartwatch. For real-time analysis, power consumption of 6thSense decreases 2.4
times on the smartphone. As all the sensors do not have to remain on for the analysis
part, data can be observed if the smart device is in unlocked status to lower the power
consumption.
Moreover, for the data analysis phase of 6thSense, we also implemented Markov
Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT-based detection methods on the Android smartphone
and smart watch. Table 5.8 shows the performance overhead of different detection
techniques used in 6thSense on a smart watch. All three detection techniques yield
less than 2% CPU usage and 10 MB of RAM usage. Note that we consider the
disc usage as a performance overhead for the data analysis phase since results can be
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Parameters Markov Chain Naive Bayes LMT
CPU Usage
RAM Usage
Disc Usage
(For 5 Min)
Power
Consumption
(For
5
min)

1%
6 MB

1.5%
10 MB

1%
10 MB

<1 MB

<400 kB

<400 kB

1 mW

2 mW

2.5 mW

Table 5.8: Performance overhead of the data analysis phase in 6thSense on smart
watch.
stored for further performance evaluation of the framework. Our extensive evaluation
shows that the disc usage for the data analysis of 6thSense is less then 1 MB in all
the three detection methods for 5 minutes of analysis. Table 5.8 also provides the
power consumption of different detection techniques of 6thSense. We can observe
that the power consumption of the data analysis phase is comparatively lower (less
than 5 mW) than the data collection phase of 6thSense. Finally, Table 5.9 shows
performance evaluation of different detection techniques of 6thSense on an Android
operated smartphone. 6thSense performs with minimum overhead with less than 3%
CPU usage, 17 MB RAM usage, and 2 MB of disc usage. Power consumption in the
smartphone is also as low as 6 mW for different detection techniques implemented
on 6thSense. In summary, different detection methods used in 6thSense offer lower
performance overhead in the system.
Parameters Markov Chain

Naive Bayes

LMT

CPU Usage
RAM Usage
Disc Usage
(For 5 Min)
Power
Consumption
(For
5
min)

1.2%
12 MB

2.5%
15 MB

1%
17 MB

<2 MB

<1 MB

<1 MB

4.5 mW

6 mW

3 mW

Table 5.9: Performance overhead of the data analysis phase in 6thSense on smartphone.
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5.6.8

Power-efficiency Trade-off

One major concern of implementing a security framework in smart devices is powerefficiency trade-off. As smart devices such as smart watch and smart phone are
resource constrained devices, an efficient security framework should work accurately
with limited resources. 6thSense uses all the available sensors in a device to understand the state of the device and detects sensor-based threat based on state transition
model. This can be a drawback in terms of power consumption of the device. To
address this limitation, we performed a power-frequency trade-off study to determine
the working condition of 6thSense in real-life settings. According to Nielsen, average
American adult spends around 3 hours everyday on their smartphone [nie17].
We consider this as an average time that 6thSense has to run to detect any sensorbased threats in a smart device. In Figure 7.8(c) and 7.8(d), we illustrate the average
power consumption graph for 6thSense with different scanning frequency in a smartphone and a smart watch, respectively. One can notice that 6thSense consumes 310
mW power for scanning continuously for 3 hours in a smart phone (Figure 7.8(c)).
Average power consumption lowers to 234 and 174 mW with 5s and 15s time interval
respectively. For smart watch, highest average power consumption for 6thSense is 220
mW for continuous scan. Average power consumption becomes as low as 174 mW
and 148 mW for 5s and 15s time interval respectively.

5.7

Discussion

• Sensor-based threats in real-life settings: One limitation of 6thSense is the adversaries (sensor-based attacks) used in the evaluation were constructed in a labenvironment. Note that as of this writing there are no real sensor-based malware in
the wild. However, many independent researchers have confirmed the feasibility of
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.6: Power vs frequency graph for (a) smart watch (b) smartphone
sensor-based threats for smart devices [SPA+ 18]. Indeed, more recently, ICS-CERT
also warned the vendors and the wider communities about the possibility of exploiting
the sensors of a device to alter sensors’ output in a controlled way to perform malicious
behavior in the device [CA17]. Google also acknowledges the sensor-based threats by
restricting sensor access for background apps in version of Android [and18b]. To understand the sensor-based threats and limitation of existing solutions, we built the
proof-of-concept versions of the sensor-based threats discussed in Section 4. We also
note that to ensure the reliability of the malware (i.e., specific malicious Apps) for the
threats described in Section 4, we checked how they perform with respect to the real
malicious software scanners. For this, we uploaded our malware on VirusTotal and
tabulated the results of the performance of 60 different malware scanners available at
the VirusTotal website in Table 5.10. As seen in this table, the sensor-based threats
are not recognized by the different scanners. In conclusion, current malware scanners
are not aware of these threats yet and our malware can be reliably used to test the
efficiency of 6thSense.
• Power monitoring app: Different smartphone and smart watch vendors offer power
monitoring apps which monitor running apps (both background and foreground apps)
and minimize the power consumption of the device. For example, Samsung provides
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Adversary Model

Detection Ratio

Threat-1
Threat-2
Threat-3

0/60
0/60
0/62

Table 5.10: VirusTotal scan result for the adversary models.
a power monitoring app that prevents background apps to drain power. Power monitoring apps activate sleep mode which disables the updates and notifications for the
inactive apps. This conflicts with the malicious apps described in Section 7.1. However, the power monitoring app only works when the app is in the background. If a
foreground app has malicious sensor logic, it can easily bypass the power monitoring
app and initiate an attack. As power monitoring apps restrict important updates
(e.g., messages from text apps, alarm apps, etc.), users can turn-off or modify this
feature for convenience [pow17]. Moreover, the smart watches do not have any power
monitoring option which makes them vulnerable to sensor-based threats. In summary, power monitoring app can restrict sensor-based threats to some extent, but can
not nullify them entirely.
• New OS feature: Recently, Android introduced a new version of OS (Android P)
which restricts camera and microphone usage if an app runs in the background. This
feature certainly acknowledges the sensor-based threats and restricts sensor misuse
in a smartphone. However, Android P only eliminates one threat model described
in Section 4 and 7.1. Different malicious apps can still access other sensors in the
background and perform multiple malicious activities. As explained in Section 7.1,
Threat Model-1 uses motion and light sensors which does not have any conflict with
Android P. Threat Model-2 uses the microphone of a connected smart watch which
bypasses the security feature of Android P. Threat Model-3 triggers the camera of a
smartphone if all the other sensors are inactive. Here, the malicious app opens the

120

camera in the foreground which is allowed by Android P. We developed an updated
version of this attack which could start recording via microphone in a smart watch
if the connected smartphone was inactive and thus, bypass the security feature of
Android P. Again, Android P only nullifies the threat if the app is installed in a smart
phone. A malicious app installed in a smart watch can trigger the camera of a smart
phone without any restriction. Also, only 1% of Android-powered devices support
Android P currently which makes majority of the devices vulnerable to sensor-based
threats using camera or microphone surreptitiously [and18a]. In short, even with the
introduction of the new OS, sensor-based threats can still affect normal operations of
the smart devices.
• Optimum scanning frequency: As smart devices are resource-constrained devices,
an optimum scanning frequency is needed for 6thSense to lower the power consumption of the device. In Section 7.8, we illustrated that by scanning the sensors in
fixed intervals (15s) and unlocked states, power consumption can be lowered by approximately 43%. However, some sensor-based threats can bypass the lock state and
perform malicious activities in smart devices. To address this limitation, 6thSense
can use the context-aware model to detect the lock state of the device and monitor
limited sensors to minimize the power consumption. As Android P is restricting some
sensors (microphone and camera), 6thSense can use this feature and select limited
sensors to scan in the locked state. In short, performance of 6thSense can be configured in terms of power consumption by selecting optimum scanning frequency and
combining with existing permission model of OS.

5.8

Conclusion

Wide utilization of sensor-rich smart devices created a new attack surface namely
sensor-based attacks. Accelerometer, gyroscope, light, etc. sensors can be abused
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to steal and leak sensitive information or malicious Apps can be triggered via sensors. Security in current smart devices lacks appropriate defense mechanisms for such
sensor-based threats. In this paper, we presented 6thSense, a novel context-aware
task-oriented sensor-based attack detector for smart devices. We articulated problems
in existing sensor management systems and different sensor-based threats for smart
devices. Then, we presented the design of 6thSense to detect sensor-based attacks on
sensor-rich smart devices (smartwatch and smartphone) with low-performance overhead. 6thSense utilized different machine learning (ML) techniques to distinguish
malicious activities from benign activities on a device. To the best of our knowledge,
6thSense is the first comprehensive context-aware security solution against sensorbased threats. We evaluated 6thSense on real devices with 100 different individuals. 6thSense achieved over 97% of accuracy with different ML algorithms including
Markov Chain, Naive Bayes, and LMT. We also evaluated 6thSense against three different sensor-based threats, i.e., information leakage, eavesdropping, and triggering a
malware via sensors. The empirical evaluation revealed that 6thSense is highly effective and efficient at detecting sensor-based attacks while yielding minimal overhead.
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CHAPTER 6
SENSOR-BASED THREAT DETECTION IN A CONNECTED SMART
ENVIRONMENT

6.1

Introduction

In this chapter, we present Aegis, a novel platform-independent context-aware security framework to detect malicious sensor and app behavior in a connected smart
environment (e.g., smart home, smart office, etc.). Aegis observes the changing patterns of the states (active/inactive) of smart sensors and devices for user activities in a
smart environment and builds a contextual model to detect malicious activities. Here,
context-awareness refers to the ability of Aegis to understand the changes in sensors’
and devices’ states due to ongoing user activities and determine if the behavior in
the smart environment is benign or not. Smart devices are normally configured with
different sensors to provide autonomous control and uninterrupted operations. Thus,
different sensors in a connected smart environment can sense user activities (motion,
opening doors, etc.) and trigger associated smart devices to perform pre-defined
tasks. Aegis correlates these sensor-device relations with different user activities and
builds a context-aware model to define benign user behavior. Aegis also uses smart
app contexts to understand the trigger-action scenarios between installed smart devices and sensors and automatically upgrades the framework if new devices are added
to the smart environment/platform. As a security framework, Aegis observes the
current states (active or inactive) of sensors and devices and checks with the learned
user behavior to detect any malicious behavior. Specifically, Aegis utilizes a Markov
Chain-based machine learning technique to detect malicious behavior. Additionally,
Aegis uses an action management system to alert the users in the event of malicious

behavior and considers user responses to improve the context-aware model for better
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accuracy (adaptive training mode). We tested Aegis in real-life smart home system
(an example of connected smart environment) scenarios where 20 different users performed typical daily activities in three different home layouts generating over 85000
sensor-device correlated events. Furthermore, we considered different device settings
(sensor-device relations), apps, smart device platforms (four different platforms including Samsung SmartThings, Philips HUE, LIFX Smart Light, and Amazon Alexa)
and user policies to evaluate the performance of Aegis against five different threats.
Our extensive evaluation demonstrates that Aegis can detect different threats to
smart devices and sensors with high accuracy and F-score (over 95%). In addition,
Aegis yields minimum overhead in terms of latency and computing resource utiliza-

tion, making this solution suitable for real-life deployment.
Summary of Contributions: The main contributions of this chapter are noted
as follows:
• Aegis. We present a novel context-aware security framework to detect malicious
activities (both sensor and app activities) in connected smart environment. We capture sensor-device co-dependence in smart environment to understand the context of
the user activity and detect malicious behavior. Additionally, we implemented an
action management system to alert users about Aegis’s findings.
• User-specific configurations. We designed Aegis to support different smart
environment layouts (e.g., three different smart home layouts) and configurations.
Aegis allows easy integration of new devices and apps creating app contexts and re-

configuring the training data automatically. We also introduced an adaptive training
model to automatically improve the detection mechanism from user responses.
• Real-life implementation. We implemented Aegis in Samsung SmartThings
platform and performed detailed evaluation analysis with real user data.

124

• High accuracy and minimal overhead. Through a detailed evaluation, we
demonstrated how Aegis can detect different malicious activities in a smart environment. Our results show that Aegis can achieve high accuracy and F-score and impose
minimum overhead in the system.

6.2

Differences from Existing Works

The main differences between Aegis and other existing solutions (although they are
useful) can be articulated as follows. (1) While other solutions focus on securing
shared data and improving current user permission system [JCW+ 17], Aegis detects
malicious behaviors by considering user and device activity contexts in a connected
smart environment. (2) Aegis considers both smart device settings, platform configurations, and installed apps to build a context-aware model and detect threats
at run-time which outdo user-dependent; solutions [JCW+ 17]. (3) Additionally, no
source code modification [BSAU18] is needed for Aegis to collect data from smart
devices and detect malicious activities in a smart environment. (4) Unlike threatspecific existing solutions [CBS+ 18, WHBG18], Aegis can detect five different types
of threat in a connected smart environment which makes it a more robust solution.
(5) Aegis provides a platform-independent solution as it only considers user activity
to build the context-aware model irrespective of smart systems/platforms, specific
devices, and development platforms, (6) Finally, Aegis collects data from a common
access point and performs behavior analysis at run-time which reduces cost in terms
of processing and overhead from other prior works [BSAU18, CBS+ 18]. In addition,
Aegis does not store usage data from smart devices which reduces the privacy risks

and concerns from prior solutions [BSAU18]. Table 6.1 summarizes the differences of
Aegis and other existing solutions.
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In summary, Aegis offers a context-aware security framework which uses behavior
analysis, usage patterns, and app context to detect malicious activities at run-time and
ensures security against five different threats to smart environment with high accuracy
and minimal overhead.

6.3

Design Features Considered in AEGIS

To design Aegis, we considered several features of connected smart environment to
correctly capture sensor-device correlation based on on-going user activities and build
a contextual model. In this section, we explain the design features considered in Aegis
in details.

6.3.1

Context-awareness.

Context-awareness refers to the ability of a system to use situational and environmental information about the user, location, and devices to adapt its operation accordingly [SAU17, JCW+ 17]. In a connected smart environment (e.g., smart home
system), all the sensors and devices follow different trigger-action scenarios to perform
tasks. Here, sensors are used to provide input in the devices (trigger) and devices take
autonomous decisions (actions) based on these inputs. When a user performs a task
in a smart environment, several smart sensors and devices may become active in a
sequential pattern. The pattern of active devices and sensors is different but specific
for distinct user activities. Existing smart devices and platforms cannot observe these
patterns in sensors’ and devices’ states over time and can not understand the context
of the user activity. For example, while a user moves from one bedroom to a hallway, several devices and sensors become active in a sequential manner (Figure 6.1):
moving towards bedroom door (sub-context 1: BL1, BLi1, BM1 are active), bedroom
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Aegis

Diverse generalized No source code
threats
modification

User permission
independent

Active
Run-time
Real-life
notification detection implementation

Table 6.1: Comparison between Aegis and other existing security framework for smart environment.

Prior
Context
Platform
Work
Aware independent
ContextIoT [JCW+ 17]
IoTSAT [MAH+ 16]
iRuler [WDY+ 19]
IoTWatch [BCMU19]
Network IDS [YOM+ 19]
Supervised IDS [AWS+ 19a]
SaINT [CBS+ 18]
HomeGuard [CZDY18]
ProveThings [WHBG18]
IoTDots [CBS+ 18]

door opens (sub-context 2: BL1, BLi1, BM1, BD1 are active), entering the hallway
(sub-context 3: BL1, BLi1, BD1, HLi2, HL2, HM2 are active), bedroom door and
light close and reaches the hallway (sub-context 4: HLi2, HL2, HM2 are active). To
complete the activity (moving from the bedroom to the hallway), the user must follow
the sub-contexts in the same sequential pattern. The user cannot skip one specific
sub-context and move to the next one to complete the activity. For instance, the
transition from sub-context 1 to sub-context 4 is not possible as a user cannot go to
the hallway from the bedroom without opening the door. Motivated by this, Aegis
is designed to understand this property of connected smart environment to build a
context-aware model for different user activities and usage patterns and differentiates
between benign and malicious activities of smart devices and sensors.

Figure 6.1: Context-awareness feature, which is not considered in existing solutions
to protect smart environment against cyber attacks.

6.3.2

Sensor-device Co-dependence

In a smart environment, sensors, and devices can be configured as independent entities. However, they work in a co-dependent manner to provide autonomous functionalities. For instance, smart lights can be configured with motion sensors to light
up when motion is sensed. Here, the smart light depends on the input from the
motion sensor while the motion sensor alone cannot provide any significant function
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in a connected smart environment. The functions of devices and sensors create a codependent relationship with each other. In this way, sensors and devices in the smart
environment can build many-to-many co-dependent relationships. However, existing
smart environment/platforms do not consider this co-dependent relationship and can
not visualize the context of a user activity by observing the usage pattern of smart
devices and sensors. In short, sensors and devices in a connected smart environment
are configured as independent components, but in reality they are function-wise codependent. Aegis considers these relations to build the context of the user activities
in a smart environment.
User Activity-device Correlation. In a connected smart environment, different
users utilize and control smart devices in multiple ways. For instance, a user can set
a security camera to take pictures whenever a motion is detected in the associated
motion sensors. On the other hand, users control devices in multiple ways. For
example, a user can unlock a door by using the smartphone app or entering the code
manually. Here, the state of the lock can be determined by user activity on the
smartphone or by using a presence sensor to detect the user near the smart lock.
In short, by observing the user activities in a smart environment, it is possible to
determine the normal operation of smart devices. One can define normal or malicious
user behavior with the user activity-device correlation. Current smart platforms
cannot correlate user activity and device actions correctly, which is considered as a
feature in Aegis to differentiate benign and malicious activities.

6.3.3

Multi-platform Correlation.

Modern smart systems (e.g., smart home system) allow users to install smart devices
from different vendors within the same physical environment. These installed smart
devices can perform autonomous tasks collectively via a common hub or as standalone
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devices connected to the Internet via an access point (e.g., Wi-Fi router). However,
any on-going task in a smart device can be perceived by other standalone smart
devices, even if they are not interconnected via a hub. For instance, if a user gives a
voice command to smart speaker to open the main door, a presence sensor connected
to a smart light can verify the presence of the user inside the smart environment and
confirm the user command as a valid input in the smart devices and sensors. Here,
the presence sensor can verify a benign user activity even if it is not connected to the
smart speaker. Hence, smart devices from different smart platforms are correlated
and can capture user activity context properly. In short, sensors and devices from
multiple smart platforms that are configured as standalone devices can be correlated
via user activity context. Existing smart systems do not consider these correlations
between standalone devices from multiple platforms, which is considered as a feature
in Aegis to build user activity context in a multi-platform smart environment.

6.4

Problem Scope and Threat Model

In this section, we introduce the problem scope and articulate the threat model considered in Aegis.

6.4.1

Problem Scope

This work assumes a fully automated smart home (an example of connected smart
environment), S, with several smart devices and sensors, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The smart home includes smart light, smart smoke detector, smart locks,
smart thermostats, smart speakers, motion sensors, smoke sensors, light sensors, presence sensors, and temperature sensors. Here, the following sensor-device triggering
rules are configured - the smart lights are configured with motion sensors, the smart
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smoke detector is configured with smoke sensor. Additionally, The smart home system allows manual device control by the users (e.g., unlocking smart lock with PIN).
We also assume that the user utilizes customized third-party apps to control the devices. Furthermore, the smart home system has more than one user authorized to
control the devices in the system. Authorized users in the smart home systems can
control the smart devices either via using controller devices such as smartphone or
by using voice commands via the installed smart speaker in the system. We assume
the following trigger-action incidents are happening throughout the day in the smart
home - (1) one user is walking inside the bedroom but the lights are not triggered by
the motion sensors, (2) one user is trying to unlock the smart lock using PIN code, (3)
a fire alarm installed in the kitchen is being triggered in the system, (4) a smart light
in the guest bedroom executes a blinking pattern while no user is present, (5) a user is
trying to change the temperature of the smart thermostat but the temperature is not
changing, (6) the smart speaker installed in living room executes a voice command
to turn on the smart TV even though no user is present in the room?
We propose Aegis as a novel security framework that builds a context-aware model
based on user activities to determine benign and malicious incidents in the smart
environment (in this case, smart home system). Aegis answers several questions that
may arise from the above-mentioned incidents - (1) What is the reason for no activity
in the smart light installed in the bedroom?, (2) Is a legitimate user or an attacker
is trying to unlock the door using PIN code?, (3) Is the fire alarm being triggered by
a malicious app?, (4) What caused the smart light to blink and what is the intent of
this activity?, (5) Why the user is not able to change the temperature of the smart
thermostat?, (6) Why the smart speaker is executing a voice command without the
presence of any user in the room? Aegis differentiates between normal and malicious
activities happening in a connected smart environment. Furthermore, Aegis detects
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Figure 6.2: Sample smart home/environment with multiple users generating multiple
trigger-action scenarios.
malicious activities occurring in a device or sensor by observing the ongoing activities
of all the connected devices in the smart environment.

6.4.2

Threat Model

Aegis considers anomalous user behaviors (e.g, unauthorized users changing the de-

vice states) that may disrupt the normal functionalities of the smart environment.
Also, device vulnerabilities that may cause device malfunction or open doors to
threats like impersonation attacks and false data injection attacks are considered
by Aegis. Additionally, this work assumes carelessly-designed and malicious smart
applications that may cause unauthorized or malicious activities in the smart environment. These malicious activities may facilitate side channel and denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. Moreover, Aegis considers threats arising from malicious user commands on controller device such as smart speaker. To better capture the threat model,
we classify it in the following five categories:

132

• Threat-1: Impersonation Attack. An unauthorized user can try to get access to
smart devices or applications by stealing valid user credentials or recording legitimate
voice commands using a malicious app.
• Threat-2: False Data Injection. A malicious smart app can exist in the smart
system and inject forged data (e.g., sensor data, voice commands, etc.) to perform
malicious activities. This threat represents false data injection in smart devices and
sensors.
• Threat-3: Side channel attack. A carelessly developed smart app with design imperfections installed in the smart environment/setting can perform legitimate, yet
vulnerable side-channel activities which can be harnessed by other apps (considered
malicious) in the system or the attacker himself. This threat represents a side channel
attack on smart devices and sensors.
• Threat-4: Denial-of-service. A malicious smart app installed in the system can
impede normal behavior of other smart devices, sensors, and applications. This threat
represents a denial-of-service attack in a connected smart environment.
• Threat-5: Triggering a malicious app. A malicious smart app can exist in the
system which can be triggered by a specific activity pattern or device action (e.g.,
switching a smart light in a specific on/off pattern) in a smart environment.
In Section 6.6, we present specific examples of attack scenarios that are used later
to evaluate the effectiveness of Aegis. The information leakage caused by a compromised device or untrusted communication channel in the smart environment/setting
are considered out of scope of Aegis. We also assume that the data collected from the
devices and central management system (e.g., Hub, cloud, etc.) is not compromised.
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6.5

AEGIS Framework

Aegis has four main modules: (1) data collector, (2) context generator, (3) data

analysis, and (4) action management, as depicted in Figure 6.3. First, Aegis collects
data from smart sensors and devices installed in the environment from day-to-day user
activities. The data collector module uses smart apps to collect all the device and
sensor states (active/inactive). Additionally, this module is fed from smart app rules
extracted from different smart apps using the app rule extractor and that are stored
in the multi-platform rule repository. The device state data is used to understand the
context of the user activities and feeds the context generation module. This module
creates context arrays generated from usage patterns and the predetermined user
policies in the smart apps. Each context array contains overall information of the
user activities and device states in the connected smart environment.
The context arrays generated in the context generation module are used by the
anomaly detector module to implement machine learning-based analysis and build
the context-aware model of the smart environment. Additionally, anomaly detector
module decides whether or not malicious activities occur in the smart environment/setting. Finally, the malicious activities detected by the anomaly detector module
are forwarded to the action management module. This module notifies the users regarding the unauthorized device and sensor activities. Also, it offers adaptive training
mode where users can validate any false positive or false negative occurrence and retrain the detection model to improve the performance of Aegis.

6.5.1

Data Collector Module

The data collector module has two sub-modules: device data collector and app data
collector.
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Figure 6.3: Aegis framework for multi-platform smart environment.
Device Data Collector
Aegis collects data from smart devices and sensors using the data collector module.

In a smart environment, there can be multiple devices and sensors connected through
a hub and operating in a co-dependent manner. Additionally, devices and sensors can
act as standalone smart device and perform different automated tasks individually.
The data collector module of Aegis collects the state (active or inactive) of these
devices autonomously for both connected and standalone smart devices and forwards
these data to the context generation module. Based on the type of data, the collected
data is governed by:
Data array, E = {S, D, M },

(6.1)

where S is the set of features extracted from the sensors, D is the set of features extracted from the devices, and M is the features extracted from the associated controller
devices (e.g., smartphone, smart tablet, smart speakers) in a smart environment. We
describe the characteristics of these features below.
• Features extracted from sensors (S): A smart environment such as smart home can
comprise several sensors such as motion and light sensors. They sense changes in the
vicinity of the devices and work as input to multiple devices. Sensor data can be both
logical states (e.g., motion sensor) and numerical values (light sensor). For Aegis, we
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consider both logical states and numerical values of sensors to create the context of
user activities.
• Features extracted from devices (D): In a smart environment, several devices can
be connected with each other and with different sensors or act as standalone device.
These devices remain active based on user activities in a smart environment. Aegis
observes the daily activities of users and collects the device state data (active/inactive
state) to build the context of the associated activity.
• Features extracted from controller devices (M): In a smart environment, Smartphone or tablet works as a control device to the smart system and users can control
any installed device using the associated smart app. Additionally, smart speakers
such Amazon Alexa, etc. can be used as a controller device by allowing users to
control installed smart devices using voice commands. Aegis considers any control
command given from the controller device as a feature to understand the context of
user activity. The location of the connected controller device can also work as an
input to control multiple devices. For instance, a thermostat can be configured to the
desired temperature whenever the smartphone of the user is connected to the smart
home network. Aegis considers the location of the controller device as a feature to
build the context of user activities.
As user activities on a connected smart environment can vary based on the number
of users, Aegis considers multi-user settings to understand the user activity contexts
correctly. Moreover, user activities also change based on the daily routine of users.
For this, in the data collection process, Aegis also offers time-based activity settings
(weekday and weekend settings).
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App Rule Extractor
Modern smart device platforms offer an app-centric model where users install different
apps to automate the functionality of smart devices. These apps mostly define triggeraction scenarios for specific devices. For instance, an app can automate a smart light
by configuring it with a motion sensor or a light sensor. Here, the sensors work as a
trigger and the state of the smart light (on/off) refers to the action. These triggeraction scenarios can represent the app context which can be used to validate the user
activity context in a smart environment. Additionally, the app context is also used to
train the analytical model for new devices in smart environment. Aegis utilizes source
code analysis to identify and extract relevant app information related to these triggeraction scenarios. In this work, we assume that the source code of the smart apps is
freely available for analysis. We consider this assumption realistic as some of the most
popular smart device platforms implement their apps as open-source (e.g., Samsung
SmartThings, openHAB, Windows IoT, and AWS IoT) [Sam18b, Mic20, Ope]. Aegis
implements a logic extractor to collect the smart app logic and infer the app context.
The logic extractor takes the source of the apps and generates its Asymmetric Syntax
Tree (AST). With the AST, the app rule extractor implements the Inter-Procedural
Control (ICFG). The ICFG contains the nodes that define the different trigger-action
events that are of interest of Aegis [CBS+ 18]. Further, the rule extractor visits every
single node of the ICFG and collects the trigger-action scenarios that are defined
in every app. For example, if a smart light is configured with a contact sensor,
Aegis extracts the following logic from the app. In Section 6.6, we provide the

implementation details of the app rule extractor in Aegis. Finally, as we found
most smart apps that feature the same type of devices define similar trigger-action
scenarios, we define an app rule extractor module that is able to analyze apps in
parallel to Aegis’s analysis. With this, we can collect and analyze apps from different

137

platforms and create a multi-platform app rule repository that further feeds the data
collector module previously described. There are several advantages to this design
approach. First, it permits building a corpus of trigger-action scenarios that include
information from several apps from multiple platforms simultaneously. Second, it
prevents the need of updating Aegis’s framework every time new apps and devices
are included in the smart environment. Finally, it reduces the overhead introduces
by Aegis as smart apps are mostly analyzed prior to Aegis’s execution.
Sample Smart App for App Context One of the features of Aegis is using app
context to verify the device states in the smart environment. To build the app context,
we used similar static analysis approaches used in prior works [CBS+ 18, CZDY18].
We performed a source-to-sink taint analysis similar to [CBS+ 18] to extract the app
context. Additionally, we consider the sources for smart apps proposed in [CZDY18,
JCW+ 17]. We then built the abstract syntax tree (AST) and model a trigger-action
scenario of an app. We tracked the Subscribe method to represent the trigger and
follow the conditional statement (e.g., if and switch) to reach the sink. This flow from
entry point (source) to a sink is used to construct the condition of an app which is
then represented into app context. We collected 485 official Samsung SmartThings
apps (available in their website) and created the app context database using this
method.
Listing 6.1: A code snippet of a sample smart app
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

/* This is a sample smart light app for Samsung SmartThings */
definition(
name: "Smart Light App",
namespace: "smartthings",
author: "anonymous",
description: "Turn lights on when door is open.",
category: "Convenience",
)
preferences {
section("When the door opens/closes...") {
input "contact1", "capability.contactSensor", title: "Where?"
}
section("Turn on/off a light...") {
input "light1", "capability.light"
}
}
def installed() {
subscribe(contact1, "contact", contactHandler)
}
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20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

def updated() {
unsubscribe()
subscribe(contact1, "contact", contactHandler)
}
def contactHandler(event) {
if (event.value == "open") {
light1.on()
} else if (event.value == "closed") {
light1.off()
}
}

Listing 6.2: Trigger-action scenarios extracted from a sample app.
1
2
3
4

Trigger: Contact1
Action: Switch1
Logic 1: contact1 = on, light1 = on
Logic 2: contact1 = off, light1 = off

6.5.2

Context Generation Module

The data collector module forwards the collected data to the context generation
module to build the context of different user activities. Then, the context generation
module maps and aggregates the data to build context arrays. Each context array
consists of information on the usage patterns in the smart environment for different
activities, which can be used for further analysis and to determine malicious activities
in the system. The context array modeling process has the following steps:
• Context of sensors: Sensor features collected in the data collector consists of both
logic state (on/off) and numerical values. Aegis observes the sensor data and generates the conditions of the sensors. These conditions represent the changing pattern
of the sensor. If the current sensor value is different than the previous one, Aegis
considers this as an active condition that is represented as 1. Similarly, conditions
labeled as inactive are represented as 0.
• Context of devices: Data collector of Aegis collects device state (active/inactive)
data for every connected device. These device state data are converted to logical
states (1 represents active and 0 represents inactive) to build the context of user
activities in a smart environment.
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• Context of controller devices: There are two features of the controller device (e.g.,
smartphone, tablet, speakers, etc.) that are collected by Aegis: Control command
for the devices and the location of the controller device. For any command from
the smartphone, tablet, or smart speakers, Aegis considers the active condition of
controller device which is represented as 1 in context array or 0 otherwise. A smart
environment/setting allows two different states to represent the location of the controller device - home and away. Home location indicates that the controller device is
connected to the home network and away represents otherwise. Aegis represents the
”home” location of the smartphone as 1 and the ”away” location as 0 in the context
array.
The final context array can be represented as follows:
Context Array, C = [{S1 , S2 , ..., SX }, {D1 , D2 , ..., DY }, {M1 , M2 }],

(6.2)

where S1 , S2 , ..., SX captures the conditions of X number of sensors in the system,
D1 , D2 , ..., DY the conditions of Y number of sensors in the system, and M1 , M2 the
conditions of smartphone/tablet in the system.
Context generation module also generates the app’s context. As most of the app’s
logic represents a trigger-action scenario, the context generation module converts
the logic in a binary representation. For example, the logic extracted from the app
presented in Listing 1 is given below:
Listing 6.3: Generated app context of a sample app
1 App Context 1: contact1 = 1 , Light1 = 1
2 App context 2: contact1 = 0, Light1 = 0

Here, for the contact sensor, 1 and 0 represent the contact state from ”open” or
”close” respectively. Similarly, for the smart light, 1 and 0 represent the light state
from ”on” or ”off”, respectively. These app contexts are used to validate the sensordevice co-dependence captured in the context array. Additionally, these app contexts
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are used to update the training dataset whenever a new device is added to the smart
environment.
Finally, as noted before, we found that the app context is highly-depended on the
specific type of devices and sensors the smart app controls. For instance, an app controlling a smart thermostat is likely to contain trigger-actions related to Temperature
= high, Thermostat = on. Similarly, if the smart app controls a smart light and
a motion sensor, the trigger-action Motion = on, Light = on. We use this finding
to group together apps with similar expected trigger-action scenarios and improve
the practicality of Aegis. More specifically, we consider the devices that every specific app controls to infer expected trigger-action scenarios. With this, we found that
Aegis does not need to consider and analyze every new app in the market to main-

tain the context generation module up-to-date. This finding considerably increases
the usability of Aegis as incorporating new apps to control the smart devices and
sensors would not limit the effectiveness of the context generation module.

6.5.3

Anomaly Detector Module

In the third module, Aegis takes context arrays generated in the context generation
module as input and trains a Markov Chain-based machine learning model which is
used to detect malicious activities in connected smart environment.
The Markov Chain model is based on two main assumptions: (1) the probability
of occurring a state at time t + 1 only depends on the state at time t only and (2)
the transition between two consecutive states is independent of time. Aegis uses this
Markov Chain model to illustrate a series of events in a smart environment. Here, a
series of events denotes user activity and usage pattern and the state represents the
context array at a specific time t generated in the context generation module. The
probabilistic condition of Markov Chain model is shown in Equation 6.3, where Xt
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denotes the state at time t for a user activity in the smart environment [Kei12].
P (Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) = P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = xt ),
(6.3)
when, P (X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) > 0
Aegis considers the context array given in Equation 6.2 as an array of variables and

observes its changes over time. For every user activity on a connected smart environment, several context arrays are created. These arrays follow a different but specific
pattern for different user activities. Each element of the context array represents the
condition of a smart entity (active/inactive states of sensor, device, or smartphone).
For a distinct time, t, we consider the combination of all the smart devices’ and sensors’ condition as binary output (1 for the active state of an entity and 0 for the
inactive state). Thus, the number of total states (A) will be the exponent of 2 and
can be represented as a n-bit binary number, where n is the total number of entities
in the smart environment. Let assume Pij denotes the transition probability of the
system from state i at time t to state j at time t + 1. If the smart system/setting
has n number of entities (sensors, devices, and controllers) and m = 2n states in the
system, the Markov Chain model of Aegis can be illustrated as in Figure 6.4. Here,
each transition probability from one state to another state represents an element of
the transition matrix. The transition probability matrix of the Markov Chain model
constructed from context arrays can be represented by the following equation:
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(6.4)

If the smart environment/system has X0 , X1 , ..., XT states at a given time t = [0, T ],
the elements of the transition matrix can be shown as Pij =
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Nij
,
Ni

where Nij denotes

the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1 , Xt is the state at time t, and Xt+1 is
the state at time t + 1 [Y+ 00]. If we represent Q as the initial state at time t = 0,
the initial probability distribution of the system can be represented by the following
equation:




Q = q1 q2 q3 ... ... qm ,

(6.5)

where qm is the probability that the model is in state m at time 0. Probability of
observing a sequence of states X1 , X2 , . . . , XT at a given time 1, . . . , T in the smart
environment can be computed using the following equation:
P (X1 , X2 , . . . , XT ) = qx1

T
Y

PXt−1 Xt .

(6.6)

2

As the number of states in the smart environment depends on the total number of
installed devices and sensors, predicting the probability of the next state can introduce overhead in terms of computing time and resource usage. Instead of predicting
the next state using the Markov Chain model, Aegis determines the probability of
transition between two states in the smart environment at a given time. We train the
Markov Chain model with the generated context arrays from the context generation
module and construct the transition matrix. Using this transition matrix, Aegis determines the probability of transition from one state (i.e., context array) to another
state over time. For example, in Figure 6.1, the transition between sub-context 1 and
sub-context 2 is valid as the user can perform this activity. However, the transition
from sub-context 1 to sub-context 4 is invalid as the user cannot go from the bedroom to the hallway without going through sub-context 2 and 3. Hence, the transition
probability matrix can manifest the state transition based on user activity contexts.
Let us assume a and b are system’s overall state in time t and t+1. We determine
the probability of transition from state a to b which can be found by looking up in
the transition matrix and calculating P(a,b). As users cannot skip any sub-context
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Figure 6.4: Markov Chain model for Aegis.
of an activity, P(a,b) will result in zero if transition from state a to b is malicious.
Thus, Aegis defines benign or malicious device behavior based on user activities.

6.5.4

Action Management Module

Finally, the action management module notifies the users in the event of malicious
activity in the smart environment. Action management module has two operation
modes - detection mode and adaptive training mode.
• Detection mode: In the detection mode, Aegis pushes a notification in the controller
device’s user interface (smartphone, smart tablet) to notify the users if malicious
activity is detected. Aegis provides the device ID and the installed app names to the
user for further action.
• Adaptive training mode: As Aegis builds a contextual model from user activities,
it is important to verify the correct context of an ongoing user activity [PZCG14]. In
a smart environment, users can perform different activities in an irregular pattern.
For example, a guest may come to the house which will introduce some new activity
patterns in the system. These abrupt data patterns may cause a higher false positive
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rate in the contextual model. To address this issue, Aegis offers the adaptive training
mode, a user feedback process to improve the performance. In the adaptive training
mode, whenever a malicious activity is detected, Aegis sends a notification to the
controller device’s user interface (smartphone, smart tablet) for user confirmation.
Users can either confirm the malicious activity from the controller device or mark the
activity as benign. If the user confirms the activity as benign, Aegis label that activity
context and train the framework automatically. Hence, Aegis can correctly and
automatically improve the training dataset by adding irregular or new user activity
pattern.

6.6

AEGIS Implementation

We developed Aegis as a multi-platform security framework for smart environment.
To implement and test the effectiveness of Aegis in real-life smart environment, we
chose several smart home platforms and devices including Samsung SmartThings,
Amazon Alexa, Google Home, etc. We built a real-life smart home environment
which represents the multi-platform connected smart environment. In this section,
we provide details of Aegis’s design considerations and implementation steps in the
following subsections.

6.6.1

Design Features and Goals

Existing smart platforms offer diverse sets of devices and sensors to automate dayto-day activities. However, configurations of smart devices and sensors depend on
users’ demands, device choices, home layout, home occupancy, preferences, and social relationships. As Aegis builds the context-aware model based on data collected
for user activities, we consider following design features and goals. Layouts. Smart
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(a) Aegis interface

(b) Normal Mode

(c) Adaptive
Mode

Training

Figure 6.5: User interfaces of Aegis in different operation modes.
environment such as smart home, smart office, etc. vary based on the layout as
number of devices, sensors, and apps differ in different layouts. To test the effectiveness of Aegis, we selected three different smart home layouts to represent connected
smart environment: single bedroom apartment, double bedroom home, and duplex
home. We selected these three layouts as these are the most common rental units in
USA [fHSoHU20].
Occupancy. Smart environment is typically a multi-user environment where users
share the installed smart devices and sensors. As smart environment usually have
more than one occupants, we considered several multi-user environments (two, three,
and four users in same layout) to implement Aegis in real-life.
Types of devices and sensors. As smart device and sensor configuration depends
on users’ personal needs and preferences, the types of devices and sensors installed
in the smart environment vary in different layouts. Since, Aegis offers a platformindependent security framework, we considered 14 different types of off-the-shelf devices to build a real-life smart environment.
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Date- and Time-dependent Activity. User activity in a smart setting depends on
the user’s daily routine which may change for different days of the week. For example,
a working adult may spend more time at home on the weekends than weekdays which
increases user interaction in smart devices and sensors. We considered this while
designing Aegis and implementing in real-life environment.
User-specific rules. Current smart device platforms allow users to build and define
multiple policies to control smart devices. The context of user activities may change
based on user-defined policies in a smart environment. For example, a smart light
can be controlled via the motion, door, or presence sensor. To understand the event
associated with the light sensor and build the context of user activity, one must
understand the user-defined policy enforced in the smart light. We addressed this
property in the implementation of Aegis by allowing users to define their own policies
in the smart devices and sensors in the data collection process.
Platform Independence. Smart environment allow users to install devices from
different smart device platforms in same physical environment. These devices can be
connected with each other via hub or perform tasks as standalone devices. Aegis
offers platform independence by allowing users to install smart devices from different
platforms in the same layout. Also, we considered both hub-connected and standalone
smart devices in the data collection and contextual model of Aegis.

6.6.2

Implementation

To test the efficacy of Aegis in real-life smart environment, we built a smart home
testbed to represent the smart environment. We implemented Aegis as a platformindependent security framework in the smart home system. Also, as the majority
of the smart environments support their functionality with services running in the

147

Figure 6.6: Aegis implementation in a multi-platform smart environment.
cloud, we implemented Aegis as a cloud-based solution. The integration of Aegis in
real-life smart home platforms was divided into the following integration phases.
• Smart home integration. In the smart home integration phase, we built a
customized smart app (Aegis app) to represent the data collector module described
in Section 6.5. Figure 6.5 shows the sample user interfaces of Aegis app implemented
in Samsung SmartThings platform. This app has two modules: data collection and
action management. In the data collection module, Aegis app lists the device states
as log files in smart home system and forwards the logs to Aegis’s context generation
module. Aegis app also logs the information of the installed apps to generate app
contexts in context generation module. The action management module of Aegis
app captures any notification generated in the anomaly detector (implemented in the
cloud) in the event of any malicious activity in the smart home system and notifies
the users. Additionally, users can control operational modes (detection and adaptive
training) of Aegis using the action management module.
• Cloud integration. We implemented the analytical model of Aegis (context generation and anomaly detector) as a cloud-integrated security framework. The context
generation module collects devices states forwarded from the Aegis app and creates
user activity contexts by considering device states, sensor states, and timestamp. As
users utilize different devices to implement their smart home environments, we also
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designed an app context extraction process capable of analyzing apps from multiple
smart home platforms. We implemented a tool similar to available static analysis tool
to automatically analyze and extract the trigger-action scenarios that define the app
context [BSAU18,BCMU19,CBS+ 18]. For trigger-actions defined for other platforms,
we found that the manual analysis and extraction was feasible as these platforms
mostly define specific binary combinations of trigger-action interactions to control
the devices. For the SmartThings apps, as they are written in Groovy [Sam18b], we
used specific compile-time tools offered by the Groovy Metaprogramming capabilities [Met]. We first used the ASTTransformation class to extract the app’s AST and
build its ICFG. From there, we take advantage of pre-defined class visitors to explore
the different nodes in the ICFG and extract the different trigger-action scenarios defined within the app’s event handler methods [CBS+ 18]. In total, we used the app
context extraction tool to automatically analyze 485 Smarthings apps, extracting a
total of 587 different trigger-action scenarios. These trigger-actions scenarios were
further stored in the multi-platform app rule repository that supports Aegis analysis. The app information forwarded from the Aegis app are cross-referenced with
App rule repository to add app contexts into the training dataset for data validation
purpose. The app contexts are only used in the adaptive training mode when the user
installs a new device or new apps (details in Section 6.5.4). Aegis uses the generated
app contexts to validate user activity context in a new smart home configuration to
minimize the effect of new device and app addition. The device and app contexts
are used to build the user activity context in a smart home system by the anomaly
detection module of Aegis. The anomaly detection module uses this user activity
contexts to train and detect any malicious events in the smart home (smart environment). In the event of any malicious activity in smart home system, the anomaly
detector sends a notification to the Aegis app which uses push notification to alert
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users in real-time. Figure 6.6 shows the implementation of Aegis in a multi-platform
smart environment (smart home).

6.6.3

Data Collection and Real-life Testbed

To test the efficacy of Aegis, we implemented a smart home testbed as a representation of connected smart environment where the users had the freedom to design their
own smart home configuration and perform regular activities in a timely order. While
collecting the user activity data, we considered five features that satisfy aforementioned design goals: Anonymous User ID, User Role, Smart Home Layout, Activity
Day-time, and User Policy. For each user, we assigned an anonymous ID to ensure
privacy. We also assigned a specific user role to each participant to understand the
context of the user activities in a multi-user scenario. As mentioned earlier, we considered three different home layouts (single bedroom apartment, two bedroom home,
and duplex home) and let the users choose their layout and smart devices. Moreover,
we considered users’ daily routine and collected the user activities performed in both
weekdays and weekends, separately. Finally, we allowed the users to define their own
policies in the smart home system during the data collection process.
We obtained necessary Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to collect daily
usage data of a smart home with multiple users. We invited current smart home users
to participate in our study by circulating university-wide open calls and community
outreach via emails and flyers. We selected 20 smart home users to collect daily usage
data and provided monetary compensation to the users. While selecting participants
for our study, we considered several features: (1) owns more than one smart device,
(2) uses customized or vendor-specific apps/automation rules to control devices, (3)
diverse user roles (working adults, housewives, young adults, student, etc.), (4) beginner level knowledge on using smart devices, (5) shares smart home environment
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with multiple users. To create the smart home environment, we considered the most
common off-the-shelf devices. We chose 8 types of devices and 6 types of sensors to
build the smart home testbed (total 14 types of devices). The detailed device lists
and apps selected in our smart home environment are given in Table 6.2. We collected data from 20 different individuals with different user roles, user policies, and
smart home layouts. Our dataset consisted of over 85000 events collected in a 15-day
period. We considered two implementation scenarios based on smart home platforms
while collecting user activity data.
• Single platform smart environment. Single platform smart environment (e.g.,
smart home system) offers a single access point or hub where all the installed devices
and sensors in a smart environment are connected to perform various tasks collectively.
We considered single platform smart home system in our testbed to collect daily user
activity data and implement Aegis. We chose Samsung SmartThings platform to
create the single platform smart home environment because of its large app market
and compatibility with other smart devices [Gun17]. We implemented Aegis app as a
third-party app in Samsung SmartThings hub that uses the ListEvent command from
SmartThings API to collect the device logs. These device logs are forwarded to the
Aegis’s context generation module. We also created an app context database which

consists of 485 official Samsung SmartThings apps to cross-reference and create app
contexts. Whenever users install an app in smart home system, Aegis searches for
existing app context in the database and adds the context into the training dataset
for data validation purpose. For any third party app, users can manually use the
source code of the app in Aegis and generate the app context which is later added in
the database.
• Multi-platform smart environment. For multi-platform smart environment
(smart home), we considered four different smart home platforms and devices in
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Device

Model

Description

Smart Home

Samsung

point for smart home entities.

• Samsung

Hub

SamrtThings Hub

• Supports Wi-Fi,

SmartThings App.

Selected Apps

Type
• Works as a central access

ZigBee,and Z-Wave.
• Works as a central access
Smart Speaker

Amazon Alexa

• Amazon Alexa app.

point for smart home entities.

• Samsung

• Supports Wi-Fi,

SmartThings App

ZigBee,and Z-Wave.

integration.

Google Home

• Uses a separate

Smart Light

communication bridge to

• Philips Hue app.

connect with smart home hub.

• Brighten Dark

• Uses ZigBee to

Places.

communicate with other

• Brighten my path.

components in smart

• Bright when dark

environment.

and bright after

• Supports up to 12 different

sunset.

Philips Hue Light
Bulb

sensors.
• Uses Z-Wave to connect
with other devices.
Smart Lock

• Lock it at a specific

Yale B1L Lock with

• Offers different pin code for

time.

Z-Wave Push Button

different users.

• Unlock it when I

Deadbolt

• Provides both manual and

arrive.

remote access.
• Uses Z-Wave to connect
Fire Alarm

with the hub
First Alert 2-in-1 Z-Wave
Smoke Detector and • Provides built-in smoke and

Smart alarm.

CO sensors.

Carbon Monoxide Alarm

• Uses Wi-Fi to connect with

Smart
Monitoring

Arlo by NETGEAR

System

Security System

smart home hub.

• cameras on when

• Offers both live monitoring

I’m away

and still pictures.
• Uses Wi-Fi to communicate

Smart

Ecobee 4 Smart

with smart hub.

Thermostat

Thermostat

• Can be configured with
sensors.

Smart TV

• CO detector. •

• Ecobee connect.
• Its too cold. • Its
too hot.
• Keep Me Cozy.

Samsung 6 Series

• Connects with smart home

• Power allowance.

UN49MU6290F LED

hub using Wi-Fi.

• Make it so.

Smart TV
• Uses Z-Wave to connect
Motion, Light,

Fibaro FGMS-001

& temperature

Motion Sensor

sensor
Door Sensor

with the hub.
• Can be configured with
different devices

• Any apps associated
with smart devices.

simultaneously.
Samsung

• Uses ZigBee protocol to

• Any app associated

Multipurpose Sensor

connect with smart home hub.

with smart devices.

Table 6.2: List of devices used in the data collection.
single physical environment. We chose Samsung SmartThings, Philips Hue, LIFX
smart bulb, and Amazon alexa as different smart home platforms. Here, the smart
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home platforms and devices are installed as independent entitiy and no common access
point is considered in the installation. However, they share the same network access
point and perform different tasks independently. We customized and implemented
Aegis app in each of these smart home platforms. Aegis app collects device logs using

following APIs: ListEvent command from SmartThings API, LIFX HTTP API for
LIFX smart lights [LIF18], HUE API for Philips Hue [Hue18], and Smart home skill
API for Amazon Alexa [Ale18]. All the device logs collected by Aegis app in different
smart home platforms are forwarded to cloud integrated context generation module
of Aegis. We also used existing static analysis tools [BSAU18, CBS+ 18, BCMU19] to
create app contexts from official apps and automation rules (485 SmartThings app,
20 Alexa skills, 10 LIFX rules) that are used to add app contexts in training dataset.
These device logs are used to create the context-aware model and detect malicious
activities in smart home environment.
For collecting the malicious dataset, we considered five different threat models
(Section 6.4). We built five malicious apps to represent these threats. Our malicious
apps cover several known threats presented by other researchers in [JCW+ 17, IoT17].
Our handcrafted malicious apps also included smart home attacks using smart speakers such as Amazon Alexa, Google Home, etc. [CMV+ 16, ZYJ+ 17]. To perform the
attack described in Threat 1, we built a battery monitor App for smart locks that
leaks the unlock code via SMS to the attacker. We realized the impersonation attack
by unlocking the smart lock as an outsider using the leaked unlock code. For Threat
2, we built an app that injects false smoke sensor data to trigger the fire alarm in
the smart home system. For Threat 3, we created an app that flickered a smart light
in a specific pattern while nobody was in the home. To perform the denial-of-service
attack described in Threat 4, we developed an app that stopped the smart thermostat for a pre-defined value. For Threat 5, we created an app that could generate
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Aegis Threat Model

Threat-1:
Impersonation attack

App Description
A battery monitoring app
leaks unlock code via SMS
and an attacker uses the
code to unlock the smart
lock by impersonating as
valid user
An app that captures and
replay a voice command to
impersonate valid users.

An app injecting false sensor data to a device.
Threat-2: False
data injection
A voice command that maliciously or mistakenly inject
false data to a connected
smart device
An app flickers a smart light
in a specific pattern while
no user is present.
Threat-3: Side
channel attack

Threat-4:
Denial-of-Service

Threat-5: Triggering
a malicious app

A malicious signal (audio
or light) causing a smart
speaker to execute a legit
yet vulnerable command
A malicious app that cancel any ongoing tasks in
smart devices at a predefined value
An app changing state of
devices in a specific pattern
to trigger an malicious app
in a connected device

ContextIoT [JCW+ 17]
• Backdoor pin code injection.
• Lock access revocation.
• LockManager.
• App Update – PowersOutAlert.
• Lock access revocation.
—

IoTBench [IoT17]
• Permissions- Implicit 2

Voice command attacks

—

• Stealing
voice
tack [AVEF12].
• Voice
spoofing
tack [MSS15].

atat-

• Fake alarm.
• Remote control – FireAlarm.
• Remote
command
–
SmokeDetector.
—

—

—

—

• Hidden
voice
commands [CMV+ 16].
• Dolphin attack [ZYJ+ 17].

• Leaking information.
• creating seizures using
strobed light.
• IPC – MaliciousCameraIPC & PresenceSensor.
• MidnightCamera.
—

• Side Channel - Side Channel 1.
• Side Channel - Side Channel 1.

• Disabling vacation mode.
• Abusing permission.

—

• Surreptitious surveillance.
• Undesired unlocking.
• IPC – MaliciousCameraIPC & PresenceSensor.

—

—

• Light
mands [SCR+ 19].

com-

Table 6.3: Malicious Apps mapping of Aegis, ContextIoT [JCW+ 17], IoTBench [IoT17], and existing voice command attacks.
morse code using a smart light while no person was in the room and triggered a
smart camera to take stealthy pictures. Our malicious apps cover several existing
attacks on smart home devices presented by the researchers [JCW+ 17, IoT17]. In
Table 6.3, we mapped our threat models with existing malicious apps presented by
the researchers. Additionally, we added some malfunctioning devices (e.g., a smart
lock without power, fused smart light, etc.) in the smart home system to test Aegis
in cases that include device malfunction. We collected 24 different datasets (4 dataset
for each attack scenario) for a total of over 15000 events. We used 75% of the benign user data to train the Markov Chain model. Then the remaining 25% of data
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along with the malicious dataset was used in the testing phase which is a common
practice [SAU19a, Goo19, AWS19b].

6.7

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of Aegis in detecting
malicious activities in smart environment with real user data. We train the anomaly
detector module of Aegis with data collected from multiple smart home users (representation of connected environment) for benign daily activities. For testing purposes,
we use the user data as well as the malicious data collected from the adversary model
described in Section 6.4.
In the evaluation of Aegis, we consider several research questions:
RQ1 What is the performance of Aegis in different smart home environment layouts
and devices? (Sec 6.7.2)
RQ2 What is the impact of different apps, policies, and configurations on the performance of Aegis? (Sec. 6.7.3)
RQ3 What is the impact of different user behavior on the performance of Aegis?
(Sec. 6.7.4)
RQ4 What are the performance overhead introduced by Aegis in a smart home
system? (Sec. 6.7.5)

6.7.1

Performance Metrics

In the evaluation of Aegis, we used six different performance metrics: True Positive
rate (TP), False Negative rate (FN), True Negative rate (TN), False Positive rate
(FP), Accuracy, and F-score. TP rate indicates the percentage of correctly identified
benign activities while TN rate refers to the percentage of correctly identified mali-
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cious activities. On the other hand, FP and FN illustrates the number of malicious
activities identified as benign and the number of benign activities detected as malicious activities respectively. F-score is a indicator of accuracy of a framework which
considers TP and TN as computational vector. The performance metrics are defined
by the following equations:
TP
,
TP + FN
FN
F N rate =
,
TP + FN
TN
,
T N rate =
TN + FP
FP
F P rate =
,
TN + FP
TP + TN
Accuracy =
,
TP + TN + FP + FN
2 ∗ TP ∗ TN
.
F − score =
TP + TN
T P rate =

(6.7)
(6.8)
(6.9)
(6.10)
(6.11)
(6.12)

In addition to the aforementioned metrics, we also considered several parameters such
as power usage, memory usage, CPU usage, latency, etc. to measure performance
overhead of Aegis in real-life smart environment.

6.7.2

Evaluation with Different Layouts

To evaluate Aegis in different smart environment layouts, we consider two important
criteria (1) different smart home layouts, (2) multiple numbers of users. A smart
home system can have different layouts and different number of devices. We tested
the efficiency of Aegis in a multi-user environment and different smart home layouts.
Different smart home layouts: User activities in a smart home can vary depending
on the home layout as different layouts can lead to different usage patterns. To
evaluate Aegis, we considered three different layouts: single bedroom home, double
bedroom home, and duplex home. Here, we considered a single authorized smart home
user in different layouts. We collected data from 15 different users in these layouts.
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Normal Training
Smart Home Layout Smart platforms Recall FN TN
Single Bedroom

Single platform

0.95

0.05

Home

Multi-platform

0.94

Double Bedroom

Single platform

Home

Multi-platform

Duplex Home

1

Adaptive Training

FP Accuracy F-score Recall

TN
1

FP Accuracy F-score

0.9547

0.9604

0.97

0.03

0.06 0.99 0.01

0.965

0.9643

0.97

0.03

0.93

0.07

0.9340

0.9655

0.96

0.04

0.964

0.9795

0.92

0.08 0.97 0.03

0.945

0.9443

0.945

0.055 0.99 0.01

0.9675

0.9669

Single platform

0.91

0.09

0.9119

0.9529

0.96

0.04

0.9614

0.9688

Multi-platform

0.90

0.1

0.93

0.9290

0.93

0.07

0.955

0.9543

1
1

0

FN

0
0

0.96 0.04

0

0.98 0.02
1
1

0
0

0.98 0.02

0.9712

0.9847

0.975

0.9749

Table 6.4: Performance evaluation of Aegis in different smart home layouts.
Our dataset also include single platform and multi-platform smart systems/settings.
Table 6.4 presents the evaluation results associated with different smart home layouts.
We can observe that accuracy and F-score for different layouts in single platform
smart home vary from 96-91% and 97-95%, respectively. For multi-platform smart
home, we can observe that the accuracy and F-score vary from 96-93% and 96-92% in
different smart home layout, respectively. Aegis also achieves high TP (96-91%) and
TN rate (100-96%) irrespective of layouts and number of platforms (single and multiplatform). One can safely confirm that variation in different layouts has a minimal
impact on the performance of Aegis. Table 6.4 also shows how the performance of
Aegis improves in adaptive training mode. Here, whenever the controller device (e.g.,

smartphone, tablet, etc.) is connected in the smart home network, we infer the user is
in home location and use adaptive training mode. One can notice that the accuracy
of Aegis increases from 95% to 97% in adaptive training mode for single bedroom
layout for both single and multi-platform smart systems. For double bedroom and
duplex home, Aegis achieves 96.4% and 96.1% accuracy in single platform and 96.6%
and 95.4% in multi-platform smart system, respectively. As adaptive training mode
uses user validation to reduce FP and FN events, F-Score increases to approximately
95-97% for all three layouts. In summary, Aegis can achieve accuracy and F-score
over 95% for all three smart home layouts.
Different number of authorized users: Smart environment allow users to add
more than one authorized user for the same smart system. Hence, a smart environ-
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ment can have multi-user scenarios with different user activities happening at the
same time. To evaluate this setting of the smart environment in Aegis, we collected
data from several multi-user settings with different users performing their daily activities at once. We used different smart home layouts (example of with several
multi-user scenarios (two, three, and four authorized controllers/conflicting users) in
our data collection process. Additionally, we performed the aforementioned attack
scenarios to collect malicious dataset and tested the efficiency of Aegis in different
multi-user environments. Table 6.5 illustrates the detailed evaluation of Aegis in different smart home settings. For single bedroom layout, we can observe that accuracy
and F-score reach the peak (0.9477 and 0.9729, respectively) for the two users setup.
If we increase the number of authorized users in the smart home system, the accuracy
gradually decreases with an increasing FN rate. Similarly, for double bedrooms and
duplex home layout, Aegis achieves the highest accuracy and F-score for two authorized users’ setup. Both accuracy and F-score decreases while the FN rate increases
as the number of authorized users increases. The highest accuracy achieved in two
bedrooms and duplex home layouts are 92.29% and 90.38%, respectively. As different
users interact with smart home devices in varied ways, the FN rate increases with the
number of users in the system. To minimize the number of FN events, we implement
the adaptive training mode in Aegis. In a multi-user scenario, a notification is pushed
in all the controller devices if Aegis detects a malicious event in adaptive training
mode. All the authorized users can confirm the event based on their activities and
Aegis trains the analytical model with validated data. One can notice from Table 6.5

that Aegis achieves the highest accuracy and F-Score (97% and 98%, respectively)
for two users setup in single bedroom layout. Adaptive training mode also decreases
FN rate approximately by 38.6% and increases the accuracy to 96% and 95.25% for
three and four authorized user scenarios respectively. For two bedroom and duplex
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Normal Training
Smart Home Layout
Single Bedroom
Home
Double Bedroom
Home

Duplex Home

No of

Adaptive Training
Accuracy F-score Recall

FP

Precision

FP

0.9472 0.0528

1

0

0.9477

0.9729

0.9685 0.0315

1

0

0.9711

0.9839

3

0.9399 0.0601

1

0

0.9405

0.9690

0.9564 0.0436

1

0

0.96

0.9777

4

0.9041 0.0959

0.96

0.04

0.9352

0.9312

0.9482 0.0588

1

0

0.9525

0.9734

2

0.9222 0.0778

1

0

0.9229

0.9595

0.9654 0.0346

1

0

0.9682

0.9823

3

0.9058 0.0942

0.9529

0.0471

0.9062

0.9288

0.9523 0.0477

0.9785

0.0215

0.9545

0.9652

4

0.8806 0.1194

0.8941

0.1059

0.8807

0.8873

0.9476 0.0524

0.96

0.04

0.9486

0.9537

2

0.9017 0.0983

1

0

0.9038

0.9483

0.958

1

0

0.9615

0.9785

3

0.8901 0.1099

0.9238

0.0762

0.8909

0.9067

0.9512 0.0488

0.975

0.025

0.9531

0.9629

4

0.8694 0.1306

0.8857

0.1143

0.8698

0.8775

0.9388 0.0612

0.953

0.047

0.94

0.9458

Recall

FN

FN

Accuracy F-score

Precision

2

Controllers

0.042

Table 6.5: Performance evaluation of Aegis in different multi-user scenarios.
home layout, adaptive training mode also increases the efficiency of Aegis. Adaptive
training mode reduces FN and FP rate approximately by 60% while accuracy and
F-Score increases to approximately 96% and 98% respectively in a double bedroom
and duplex home layout. In summary, Aegis can minimize the effect of conflicting
user activities in a multi-user scenario in adaptive training mode while increasing
efficiency.

6.7.3

Evaluation with Different Smart Environment Configurations

In this sub-section, we evaluate Aegis based on different smart Environment configurations including (1) different sensor configurations, (2) different user policies, (3)
different controller device configurations, and (4) number of installed apps.
Different sensor configurations: To evaluate the efficiency of Aegis based on
deployed sensors, we use several combinations of sensors to build the context-aware
model of user activities and report accuracy in Figure 6.7. Since Aegis considers
different smart sensors and devices as co-dependent components, we try to understand
to what extent changing the combinations of sensors in a smart environment affects
Aegis’s performance. For this, we tested the efficacy of Aegis with four different

combinations of sensors: without motion sensor, without the door sensor, without the
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0.4

0.9
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0.85
0.8
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Figure 6.7: Performance evaluation of Aegis with different sensors.
temperature sensor, and without the light sensor. As seen in Figure 6.7(c) and 6.7(d),
decreasing the number of sensors from the context-aware model in Aegis declines the
accuracy and F-score of the framework. Removing the motion sensor resulted in the
lowest accuracy and F-score (61% and 68% in duplex home layout, respectively). As
motion sensors are configured with the majority of the devices (smart light, smart
lock, etc.) and used in most of the user activity context, it affects the performance of
Aegis significantly. We can also observe that removing sensors from the smart home

system introduces high FN rate as our proposed framework cannot build the context
of the user activities correctly (Figure 6.7(b)). Again, Figure 6.7(c) illustrates that
removing the temperature sensor from the smart home system does not influence the
performance significantly (85-91% accuracy and 88-91% F-score in different layouts).
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The main reason is that the temperature sensor can be configured with a limited
number of devices; hence, it is affected by user activities less than other sensors.
Without the door sensor and light sensor, Aegis can achieve moderate accuracy
ranges from 77%-86% and 79%-88%, respectively. Figure 6.8 illustrates the change
in accuracy of Aegis for changing the number of sensors in different smart home
layouts. For all three smart home layouts (single bedroom, double bedroom, and
duplex home), limiting the number of sensors in the system decreases the accuracy
of Aegis. In conclusion, limiting the number of sensors in a smart environment can
reduce the efficiency of Aegis by introducing FN cases in the system.
Evaluation Based on Installed Apps: Users in a smart environment can install
multiple smart apps to configure and control the same devices or different devices at
the same time. For example, users can install two different apps to control a smart
light at a time with motion and door sensor respectively. To test the effectiveness
of Aegis based on the installed apps, we installed 12 benign apps in total in the
system to build the context-aware model of user activities. Figure 6.8(d) shows the
accuracy of Aegis in detecting malicious apps in a smart home based on installed
apps. Here, we installed different malicious apps (Section 6.4) in the system with
multiple benign apps to determine the effectiveness of Aegis. From 6.8(d), one can
notice that Aegis achieves the highest accuracy of 98.15% for Threat-2 and the lowest
accuracy of 94.34% for Threat-3 for only one benign smart app installed in the system.
With the increment of benign apps in the smart platform (highest 12 benign apps),
accuracy ranges between 98% to 95% and 94% to 92.5% for Threat-2 and Threat-3,
respectively. The accuracy of Aegis in detecting Threat-1, Threat-2, and Threat5 varies between 96% to 93%. We also tested different malicious apps installed at
once in the smart platform with a fixed number of benign apps (12 benign apps) to
understand the effectiveness of Aegis completely. Figure 6.8(e) depicts the accuracy
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Figure 6.8: Accuracy of Aegis with different number of sensors (a), (b), (c) and with
different number of benign and malicious apps (d), (e).
of Aegis based on the number of malicious apps installed in the system. One can
notice that Aegis can achieve an accuracy of 98% for one malicious app installed in
the smart home system which decreases very little with higher number of malicious
apps (92.57% with five malicious apps). In conclusion, the performance of Aegis
changed very little with the change in the number of benign apps and malicious apps
installed in the smart environment.
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(a) Voice-controlled smart devices

(b) User Policy 1

(c) User Policy 2

(d) User Policy 3

Figure 6.9: Performance evaluation of Aegis in a voice-controlled smart environment
(a) and performance of Aegis in a policy-enforced smart environment (c), (d), (e).
Evaluation Based on Controller Device Configurations: Modern smart systems allow users to configure smart devices with different controller devices. Smart
device users control devices usually via vendor-specific controller apps installed in
smartphone and tablet. Additionally, smart devices can also be controlled via voice
commands if configured with a smart speaker (e.g., Amazon Alexa, Google Home,
etc.). As explained in Section 6.4 and 6.6, attackers can manipulate voice-controlled
configuration of smart devices by injecting false commands and impersonation (details in 6.3). In this subsection, we test the efficacy of Aegis in detecting malicious
activities targeting voice controlled smart devices. From Figure 7.7(d), one can notice that the accuracy of Aegis increases with the number of voice-configured smart
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devices as the increment in number of voice-controlled devices allows Aegis to understand the user activity contexts properly. For single bedroom layout, the accuracy of
Aegis varies from 98-96% in detecting malicious activities targeting voice controlled

devices. Aegis also achieves high accuracy (96-94% and 95-92%, respectively) in double bedroom and duplex home layout. In summary, Aegis achieves high accuracy in
detecting malicious activities targeting voice-controlled configurations regardless of
environment layouts.
Evaluation Based on User Policies: In smart environment, users can define
customized policies to control the smart devices. For example, users can impose a
time window to activate a smart light in a smart home system. In this sub-section,
we test the efficiency of Aegis with different policies enforced in smart environment.
We consider the following user policies to evaluate Aegis:
User Policy 1: Users can apply time-specific operations for different smart devices
and sensors. In policy 1, users configure a smart light with the motion sensor which
will be enforced only from sunset to sunrise.
User Policy 2: Users can apply sensor specific operations for different smart devices.
In policy 2, users configure smart lights with light, motion, and door sensors.
User Policy 3: Users can configure smart speakers to control smart devices using
voice commands. In policy 3, users configure smart lights with smart speakers to
control via voice commands (e.g., bedroom light on).
Figures 6.9(b), 6.9(c), and 7.7(c) present the performance of Aegis in these policies enforced in smart environment. One can observe that Aegis achieved accuracy
as high as 95% while enforcing time-specific operations in smart environment (smart
home) (Figure 6.9(b)). The F-score also ranges from 89% to 94% for different layouts with time-specific operations with low FN rate (5%-8%). For User Policy 2,
one can observe a slight fall in the accuracy and F-score as changing sensor-device
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configuration introduces FN cases in the system. From Figure 6.9(b), we can see
that Aegis can perform with an accuracy ranging from 85% to 93% for different
layouts while changing the sensor-device configurations. Aegis also achieves F-score
ranging from 86.5-92% for different configurations. For controller-specific operation
(voice-controlled operation), the accuracy of detecting malicious events ranges from
96-93% with low FN rate (3-6%) in different smart environment layouts. Also, Aegis
achieves high F-scores (96-94%) in detecting malicious activities in voice-controlled
device configuration. In summary, Aegis can detect malicious activities in policyenforced connected smart environment with high accuracy and F-score.

6.7.4

Evaluation with Different User Behavior

In this sub-section, we test Aegis in terms of user interactions and behavior in the
smart environment. Aegis uses an adaptive training method which requires users’
feedback to detect FP and FN cases. This adaptive training method may cause
user fatigue with excessive feedback notifications [AF13]. To determine how the
user fatigue may affect the performance of Aegis, we performed accuracy vs user
feedback study which is showed in Figure 6.10(a) and 6.10(b). Figure 6.10(a) shows
the number of notifications generated in adaptive training mode by Aegis in different
smart system settings over a 10 day period. One can notice that in all three layouts
the number of generated notification decreases significantly. For the single home
layout, the number of notifications decreases by 59% in 5 days. For double bedroom
and duplex layout, the number of notifications also decreases by 52.45% and 74.67%,
respectively. This indicates that users only have to deal with higher feedback requests
for a short period of time. Note that Aegis pushes a notification for both FP and TN
events as our test dataset includes both normal user activity and malicious events.
Hence, the number of notifications generated for only FP events is lower than it seems
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Figure 6.10: Performance of Aegis in terms of user feedback (a), (b) and performance
overhead of Aegis (c), (d).
in Figure 6.10(a). For example, in day 10, the total number of notification is 10 among
which 6 notifications are from FP. Figure 6.10(b) shows how user feedback affects the
accuracy of Aegis in detecting different threats. One can notice that the accuracy of
Aegis increases very little from 50% to 100% user feedback. This indicates that if the

users actively train Aegis in the initial period (1-5 days) in adaptive training mode,
the performance improves significantly. Again, Aegis always provides the option to
choose a specific time for adaptive training mode to the users. In conclusion, Aegis
can negate the consequence of user fatigue by terminating adaptive training mode
after an initial period, which are configurable by the users.
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6.7.5

Performance Overhead

We illustrate the performance overhead of Aegis, including resource overhead and
latency. As Aegis runs in the Samsung SmartThings hub (Data Collection and Action
Management Module) and local machine (context generator and anomaly detector),
the performance overhead is minimal in terms of resources. We identify three major
features that could introduce a time delay in real-time operation.
Delay in adaptive training model: Aegis offers adaptive training mode where any
malicious event detected by Aegis is forwarded to the user for validation. Aegis uses
this validated data to retrain the analytical model which introduces a time delay in
the operation. In Figure 6.10(c), we illustrate the time needed for re-training the
framework with respect to the number of devices installed in the device. One can
notice that Aegis takes approximately 230 ms to train when the system has 6 different
devices installed in the smart environment. The training time increases to 519 ms for
24 installed devices in the smart environment. In short, Aegis introduces negligible
overhead in terms of time delay in adaptive training mode.
Delay in multi-platform smart environment: Aegis allows multi-platform system configuration where smart devices form different platforms can share the same physical
home environment. Aegis uses multiple customized apps to collect device’s and
sensor’s state information to build a context-aware model from user activities. As
smart devices from different platforms vary in resource (memory, CPU, command
execution frequency, etc.), collecting data and building context-aware model from
multi-platform smart environment introduces a time delay in the operation of Aegis.
Figure 6.10(d) shows a comparison between time delay introduced in single and multiplatform (4 different smart home platforms) smart environment with respect to number of installed devices. One can notice that for a minimum of 6 devices Aegis takes
approximately 220 ms and 300 ms in single and multi-platform smart environment,
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respectively. The highest time delay introduced in multi-platform smart environment is approximately 600 ms for 24 installed device compared to 508 ms in single
platform smart environment. In summary, Aegis introduces minimal time delay in
multi-platform smart environment compared to single platform environment. Hence,
Aegis is effective in detecting malicious activities irrespective of number of smart

devices and platforms installed in the smart environment.
Delay in action management module: Action management module of Aegis alerts
users in the event of malicious activity in smart environment. The alert message is
sent to the controller device (smartphone, tablet, etc.) in a form of notification which
introduces a time delay in the action management module. We use a SmartThings app
to send notifications to controller devices of authorized users. This app communicates
with the cloud server via http protocol which is connected with the action management
module (Section 6.5.4). On average, action management takes 210 ms time to send a
notification to the controller device from the moment of malicious activity detection
which is low for real-world deployment. In short, we conclude that Aegis meets the
efficient demands in the action management module.

6.8

User Scenarios and Benefits

In this section, we illustrate how deploying Aegis in a smart environment can help
different groups of consumers using several use scenarios and discuss different benefits
of Aegis.

6.8.1

User Scenarios

We illustrate three different user scenarios to understand the benefits of Aegis among
vendors, end-users, and developers.
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Vendors- Smart device vendors can use Aegis to detect an abnormal behavior in
a customer’s implemented smart system. Here, a customer, Alice, installs several
smart security devices (smart lock, smart camera, smart fire alarm, etc.) and the
corresponding smart apps to control them. However, one of the installed app has
malicious code that injects false sensor data when no one is at home to trigger the
fire alarm (Table 6.3- Threat- 2). As Alice does not have any idea of this malicious
event, she calls the security service provider/vendor for support. In this situation, the
security service provider can identify that the alarm is generated from a false data
from the state model generated by Aegis and support the customer with appropriate
suggestions such as deleting the malicious app, reinstalling the correct app, etc.
End-users- End-users constitute the most common victims of malicious events in
a smart environment. Attackers can perform several malicious activities including
gaining physical access to the smart environment. For instance, a smart device user,
Bob, installs a new smart lock and the corresponding app in the smart home system.
However, the installed app has a malicious snippet to forward the unlock code to the
attacker so he can unlock the smart lock by impersonating Bob (Table 6.3- Threat
1). Aegis can identify this event and notify the user in real-time. Moreover, Bob
can change the state of the lock to unlock and prevent any physical access of the
smart home. Smart device users also tend to install devices from different vendors
in the same physical environment. Aegis provides a platform-independent security
framework to the end-users which can detect malicious activities irrespective of the
platform of the devices. For instance, a malicious app can inject a voice command
to the smart speaker to open the front door (Table 6.3- Threat 2). The contextual
model of Aegis can confirm the presence of the user by checking the state of the
installed presence sensor even if it is not connected to the smart speaker. Hence,
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Aegis can detect malicious activities in smart devices using the context-aware model

in a multi-platform smart environment.
Developers- Developers or tech enthusiastic users can deploy Aegis in their smart
system and specify different rules to enhance the security of the their system. For
instance, Kyle, a smart home user, installs multiple smart lights and motion sensors
in his system. Kyle also builds a new smart app to control the lights with motion.
By using the logic extractor of Aegis, Kyle can understand whether his app logic is
correct or not. Moreover, Kyle can use the adaptive training mode to see how the
overall state of the smart home changes with new devices and apps. If the action of
the new smart lights contradicts the existing system, or any malicious event occurs
(e.g., Table 6.3- Threat 3), Kyle can understand the cause of the event and take
necessary steps. Moreover, Kyle can understand the working conditions of smart
devices and improve his technological knowledge using Aegis.

6.8.2

Discussion

Deployability in Real-life System- One of the prime features of Aegis is easy
deployability in real-life systems. Aegis uses simple smart apps to collect device
states from multiple smart platforms installed in same smart environment and build
the context-aware model. The detection mechanism runs in the cloud which does
not hamper the normal operation of the smart environment. Users can install Aegis
similarly to any other smart app.
Applicability and Real-life Threats- Security risks may arise from smart apps
performing side-channel attacks. For instance, a smart app can flash the light in a
specific pattern to leak information or trigger another connected device which can be
considered as a threat. While most of the existing solutions consider this threat as
out of scope [CBS+ 18,MAH+ 16], Aegis successfully detects such malicious behaviors.
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In addition, Aegis can detect device malfunctions inside a smart environment. For
instance, if a smart light makes light patterns while no one is around, there will be
activity in the light sensor and the light bulb, but no activity in the motion and
presence sensors. Additionally, device malfunctions inside smart environment can be
detected. For instance, if a smart light is configured with the motion sensor, one
should expect that the light turns on due to the active motion. Other outcomes from
this specific context may be categorized by Aegis as a malfunction.
Multi-user activity in smart environment- In smart environment, more than one
user may perform different activities simultaneously. As Aegis utilizes user activity
contexts to detect malicious actions, correctly distinguishing between different user
activities is key. Instead of single-context analysis, Aegis uses a pattern of contexts
to understand the user activities. Hence, Aegis can detect simultaneous activities
performed by different users and devices in a smart environment. For instance, if two
users are walking towards the same point from opposite directions, Aegis observes
the related contexts to identify two different motion activities.
Trigger-action effect time- Smart devices use sensors to automate tasks. For
instance, a smart light can be triggered by a motion sensor or a door sensor. Each
trigger-action scenario has an effect time (time duration of a device being active). This
effect time has to be correctly considered to build the context of the user activity.
Aegis mitigates this time dependency by considering the pattern of device utilization.

For instance, the user sets a smart light to remain on for two minutes if a motion is
detected. This case is detected by Aegis by checking consecutive states of the overall
smart home and is used to detect malicious apps or malfunctioning devices (if the
motion is sensed by the sensor and it holds the state for 20s, the smart light should
be also on for, at least, 20s otherwise broken or malicious). Aegis uses these trigger-
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action scenarios to mitigate the effect of the time interval and builds the contextual
model from device state patterns.
Detecting rare events- In a smart environment, different autonomous events occur
based on device configuration and user activities. These events may include rare
events such as triggering fire alarms. As Aegis uses daily user activities to train
its analytical model, these rare events might be unaddressed and flagged as threat.
To solve this, we use the app context to verify unrecognized events in Aegis. Any
alert triggered in Aegis is verified with app context generated from the installed app
(Section 4.2). If the app context is matched with the rare event, Aegis considers the
event as benign and retrain the model automatically. Users can also check and verify
rare natural events through action management module (Section 6.5.4).
Multi-platform support- Aegis supports multi-platform smart environment which
allows users to install smart devices from different platforms in the same physical
environment. For instance, users can install both Samsung SmartThings devices and
Wi-Fi devices such as LIFX smart bulbs in the same smart home. While existing
solutions cannot ensure security in this multi-platform environment, Aegis observes
devices state changes and builds a contextual model which can envision user activity
contexts and multi-platform correlation properly in a smart environment. Also, Aegis
only considers device states to build the contextual model which does not need any
platform-specific and app-specific modification. Hence, Aegis can detect malicious
activities in a multi-platform smart environment.

6.9

Conclusion

Modern app-based connected smart environment expose the smart ecosystem to novel
threats. Attackers can easily manipulate the smart devices and sensors to perform
different attacks or deceive users into installing malicious apps. However, current de-
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tection solutions only consider threats to devices and apps in the smart environment,
skipping the very-complex and rich context-based relationships among smart platforms, devices and apps. In this chapter, we presented Aegis, a novel context-aware
platform-independent security framework for connected smart environment that detects malicious device and sensor activities by (1) observing the change in device
behavior based on user activities in multi-platform smart environment, (2) correlating sensor-device trigger-action scenarios with user activities in multi-platform environment, and (3) building a contextual model to differentiate benign and malicious
behavior. We evaluated Aegis in multiple smart settings, with real-life users, with
real smart devices (i.e., Samsung SmartThings, LIFX smart bulbs, Amazon Alexa,
Google Home platform), and with different day-to-day activities. Our detailed evaluation shows that Aegis can achieve over 95% of accuracy and F-score in different
smart settings. We also tested Aegis against several malicious behaviors. Aegis is
highly effective in detecting threats to smart home systems regardless of the layouts,
smart platforms, the number of users, and enforced user policies. Finally, Aegis can
detect different malicious behavior and threats in smart environment with minimum
overhead.

173

CHAPTER 7
MULTI-USER MULTI-DEVICE-AWARE ACCESS CONTROL
SYSTEM FOR SMART DEVICES AND ENVIRONMENTS

7.1

Introduction

This chapter presents Kratos, a multi-user multi-device-aware access control system for smart environment (e.g., smart home, smart factory, smart office, etc.). We
designed Kratos based on a user study conducted among 72 smart home users to
reflect the real-life needs of access control in smart environment. Kratos introduces a
formal policy language for smart device users to create different device usage policies
by specifying their needs in a structured manner. Kratos implements a novel policy
negotiation algorithm that automatically detects and solves conflicting demands from
multiple users sharing same physical environment by leveraging user roles and priorities. Kratos generates optimized policies for multiple users in a smart environment,
reviewing the outcomes of the policy negotiation and implementing the negotiation
results over the smart devices, sensors, and installed apps. We implemented Kratos
in a real-life a multi-user multi-device smart environment (smart home system) that
include 17 different sensors, actuators, and devices. We further evaluated performance
of Kratos on 219 different policies including 146 demand conflicts and 33 restriction
policies collected from 72 smart device users. We also tested Kratos against five
different threats and achieved 100% accuracy in detecting the threats in real-time.
Finally, we performed a usability study among 43 real-life smart device users. Our
extensive evaluation shows that, Kratos can resolve demand conflicts and detect
different threats with 100% success rate with an average rating of 4.6 out of 5 in
usability in smart environment.
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Summary of Contributions: The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We conducted an access control user study with 72 different smart device users
to understand the real-life needs for multi-user multi-device access control system in smart environment.
• We introduced Kratos, a novel multi-user multi-device-aware access control
mechanism for smart environment. Kratos considers conflicting user demands
in multi-user smart environment and implements a flexible user policy-based
access control to define user roles and understand users’ demands. Kratos
introduces a formal policy language to express users’ desires and a novel policy negotiation algorithm to automatically identify and resolve conflicting user
demands and restrictions in a multi-user smart environment.
• We implemented Kratos on a real-life smart environment (smart home system) using 17 different smart devices and sensors. Further, we evaluated its
performance with 289 different policies collected from 72 different smart device
users and five different threats. Our extensive evaluation shows that Kratos
effectively identifies and resolves conflicting user demands and detects different
threats in real-time.
• Finally, we performed a usability study with 43 different smart device users
to understand the effectiveness of Kratos. Our results showed that Kratos
achieves an average of 4.6 ratings out of 5 from the users based on common
usability metrics including user friendliness, acceptability of use, availability,
real-time response, and effectiveness.
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Smartphone
Smartphone
IoT network
Smart home
Smart home
Smart home
Smart home

Domain

Multi-user A.C.
User
Conflict Overhead A. C.
Multi-device Threat
Interface resolution analysis Language
environment Model

Table 7.1: Comparison between Kratos and other access control mechanisms (A.C. stands for Access Control).

Kratos

xShare [LRH+ 09]
DiffUser [NYB+ 09]
Capability-based A. C. [GPR13]
Situation-based A. C. [SST18]
Expat [YPHC19]
Zeng et al. [ZR19]

Prior
Work

7.2

Differences from Existing Works

Table 7.1 shows the major differences between Kratos and existing access control mechanisms in smart environment. In general, previous works consider access
control needs in either single-device single-user or single-device multiple-user environment. Additionally, existing works acknowledge the conflicting user demands in
multi-user multi-device environments that reflects users’ relationships, social norms,
and personal preferences. Compared to previous works, Kratos presents a usable
fine-grained access control system that considers multi-user multi-device smart environment. Kratos reflects the user feedback in its design collected from a user
study. Kratos offers easy new-user addition with user priority level that considers device-specific usage, user-specific restrictions, location-based access, and novel
policy negotiation algorithm for resolving conflicting demands. In addition, Kratos
provides easy policy assignment and management capabilities for multiple users in a
smart environment by implementing easy-to-use user interfaces. Kratos also detects
different threats arising from over-privileged users and coarse-grained access control
systems with minimum overhead in real-life deployment.

7.3

Access Control Needs in Smart Environment

To understand the real needs for multi-device multi-user access control systems in
smart environment, we conducted a user study among 72 real-life smart device users.
We designed Kratos to address these needs in a fine-grained access control system.
As user demands in a smart environment such as smart home vary based on diverse
relationships, preferences, and social norms, it is important to understand uses’ expectation in an access control system. We obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approvals to conduct the user study and provided monetary compensation to the
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participants. We divided the survey into three main blocks of questions to efficiently
characterize users’ needs in a multi-user multi-device smart environment.
• Block 1 – User Characterization: This group of questions focused on characterizing the users based on age, technical experience, household characteristics,
etc. With this, we aim to understand the needs and interest of a diverse group
of users. We asked questions about the user’s preferences and experiences in
a smart environment including user experience, interests on particular smart
device and platform, household characteristics, social relationships and norms
in multi-user settings, etc.
• Block 2 – Smart Home Access Control : The second set of questions aimed to
characterize the user’s smart home setting preferences in different multi-user
settings. We asked questions to understand (1) users’ experience in a multiuser smart environment, (2) real-life needs for access control systems, and (3)
users’ expectations about the outcome of the access control system.
• Block 3 – Multi-user/Multi-device Scenarios: Finally, in the third block of questions, we asked the users about general multi-user and multi-device settings.
The goal of these questions is to understand users’ views regarding how different conflicting demands, policy negotiations, user restrictions, and users with
different priorities should be handled.
In the following, we present the results of the user study and explain how Kratos
reflects the needs of users in its design features.
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7.3.1

User Characterization

We surveyed a total of 72 smart device users. We fully characterize the group of users
and their households based on age, smart device usage and interests, and technical
experiences.
Age: Out of the total 72 users, 20 (27.79%) users reported ages in the range of 25-34
years, 41 (56.94%) users were in the range of 25-34 years, and 11 (15.27%) in the
range of 35-44 years.
Smart Device Usage: 60 out of 72 users (85.7%) mentioned that they either have
previously used or currently have some smart devices in their households.
Smart Device Types: We also asked users regarding the smart device types they
had experienced with. The most popular devices among the surveyed users were:
Smart TV 49 (68.06%), smart light 31 (43%), smart thermostat 20 (27.78%), smart
camera 15 (20.83%), smart lock 12 (16.67%), and smart switch 10 (13.89%).
Smart Home Platforms: We included 10 different smart device platforms and
asked users regarding their experience with these platforms. The users stated that
they were familiar with four smart device platforms: Google Home (67 users - 93.05%),
Samsung SmartThings (55 users - 76.38%), Apple HomeKit (39 - 54.16%), and OpenHAB (12 users - 16.67%). Furthermore, we questioned user regarding their likelihood
of using these smart device platforms. Similar to the previous results, Google Home,
Samsung SmartThings, and Apple HomeKit were the most preferred smart device
platforms among the users, 42 (58.33%), 20 (27.78%), and 10 (13.89%), respectively.
Technical Experience: We also characterized the users based on their technical
experience with smart devices, platforms, and Apps. Out of the total, 55 (76.38%) of
the users reported that they knew how to set up smart devices, 38 (52.78%) stated
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that they knew how to install Apps, and 35 (48.61%) said that they felt comfortable
integrating different smart devices using a hub or cloud-based platforms.
Household Characteristics: Finally, we concluded the first block of the survey by
asking questions to visualize the household characteristics of the users. The users reported that they lived with different family/roommate sizes. For instance, 26 (36.1%)
users stated that they lived in a size of 4, 17 (23.61%) reported living in a size of
3, and 21 (29.16%) users shared their spaces with at least another person. The remaining eight users lived in a family size of 5 or higher. Furthermore, we asked the
users regarding their experience in shared smart home devices and platforms. Interestingly, out of 36 users, only 4 (5.5%) reported that they did not share smart devices
with other users. Then, 63 out of the 68 remaining users disclosed that they shared
multiple smart devices with at least two more household members and up to 7.
We use the answers obtained in this block of survey questions to characterize
the targeted users of Kratos. In most cases, users of smart devices, platforms,
and apps know how to configure devices and install apps (vendor provided and thirdparty). Additionally, multi-user smart households represent a positive potential smart
environment for fine-grained multi-user access control systems like Kratos. Finally,
we note that most of the users reported that they share a smart device with at least
two other household members.

7.3.2

Smart Home Preferences and Characterization

In this block of questions, we also asked smart device users questions regarding expected access control features in a smart environment.
Multi-member Settings: We asked users if they had ever considered or felt need
to define various control policies on the other users in multi-user environment while
installing or using smart apps. In total, 53 (73.61%) users answered “Yes” to this
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question which reflects user needs of access control system in multi-user smart environment.
Multi-member Access: Further, we investigated if the users were ever had given
device accesses to other members. In this case, a higher majority of users (61 users,
84.7%) answered “Yes”
Conflicts Among Settings: In multi-user scenarios, 43 (59.72%) surveyed users
disclosed to update or re-evaluate smart device and platform settings after discovering that previous configured settings had been modified by other members of the
household that had authorized access to the devices.
Multi-member Admin Interface: Regarding the multi-member scenarios, 64 out
of 72 users agreed that smart devices, platforms, and apps should have a user-friendly
interface that can be regularly checked by the device owner to control and monitor
the access rights of installed smart devices.
Guest Access: Lastly, we asked about giving device access to guest/temporary
members (visitors, tenants, etc.). A vast majority of users (61 users - 84.72%) responded “Yes” to the option of smart Apps having an automated mechanism to revoke
temporary access requests from guest users.
Overall, these set of questions shows the need for access control mechanisms in
smart home systems. We found that the device owners frequently had to deal with
user conflicts as a result of settings changed by other members of the household.
Additionally, the device owner wants to have control regarding who accesses the
devices and desires to enforce limited access controls for the users that are not fully
trusted.
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7.3.3

Multi-user/Multi-device Access Control

Finally, we assess the need for the fine-grained access control mechanisms, and feedback of users on the design and implementation of such mechanisms. Below, we group
the responses of the users regarding the features of access control mechanisms in 10
different topics.
Integrated Access Control: We asked the users whether they felt the need of
an access control mechanism in smart environment while configuring and using smart
devices. A majority of 64 (88.8%) users answered that it would be an essential feature
and smart platforms should provide an integrated access control system reflecting user
needs.
Separated Access Control: We further asked whether there is a need for a separate
access control app/system to manage the smart devices and platforms. Surprisingly,
58 (80.56%) users positively answered. Out of 58 users, 41 (70.68%) users desired to
use an access control application if it were free and secure, while 17 users (29.32%)
stated that they are willing to pay for the access control service if available. Additionally, the users agreed to share some specific personal information (PI) with the
access control app if required for the app design. Out of 6 different options provided,
the users stated that they would allow the app to use their email address (39 users 67.24%), smart home user ID (34 users - 58.6%), smart home account credentials (31
users - 53.44%), and smart device ID (21 users - 36.2%).
User Priorities: In a multi-user environment, access control can be provided by
assigning priorities to different users. We asked the survey participants about who
in the household should have the highest (the most trusted member) and the lowest
(the least trusted member) priority. The users assigned priority levels in between
these boundaries. The “spouse/partner”, “father”, and “Mother” are among the
members with the highest priorities. On the contrary, “babysitter ”, “temporary
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guest”, “frequent visitor”, and “cleaning personnel” were among the members that
had the lowest priority. In summary, temporary users are considered as least trusted
members by the survey participants and should be given lowest priority.
Device Priorities: We evaluated what type of devices should be included in the
access control mechanism. Out of 18 device options, the devices related to security
and safety were selected to be the most important devices for access control. This
list includes devices such as smart lock, smart thermostat, smart fire alarm, smart
monitoring system, presence sensor, and smoke sensor. On the other hand, devices
with the least importance to the user were the smart coffee machine, doorbell, and
smart Light.
Automated System: Out of 72 smart device users, 45 (62.5%) users answered
positively to the possibility of having an automated negotiation system to solve access
control conflicts among users with the same level of priority.
Update Policy Feature: Out of 72 survey participants, 53 (73.61%) participants
expressed their interest in having a feature to update/change current access control
policies.
Negotiation Process: We presented four different options to the users about how
the policy negotiation process should work among users of the same priority (superusers or admin level). The answer of users shows that users desire to automate
this process with minimal interaction (51 users - 70.83%). The users’ answers also
suggested that the access control system should notify the members affected by the
policy conflict.
Multiple Policies: The users reported that the access control system should allow
multiple policies when a conflict occurs. 56 (77.78%) users suggested that a simple
notification and an automated approval of the non-conflicting policies is sufficient to
notify users regarding conflicting demands and policies.

183

Conflicting Policies: If two policies conflicts and one of them is defined from a
member with lower priority, 33 (45.83%) users suggested that the lower priority policy
should be rejected. However, 25 (34.72%) other users indicated that the member with
the higher priority should be asked to assess the possibility of changing its policy to
allow the lower priority member to add its settings without conflict. In both cases,
they again suggested that a notification system is a critical feature to resolve policy
conflicts. Furthermore, we presented a use-case scenario where a member having the
same priority level as the owner introduces a conflicting policy on behalf of a lowpriority member. In this scenario, 39 (54.17%) users suggested that both the owner
and the member with similar priority should be notified so that they can negotiate
together how to solve the conflict. However, 23 (31.94%) users proposed that the
high-priority member should be notified about the conflict with the owner and the
new policy should be automatically rejected.
Low-Priority Members: The last two questions were about managing the lowpriorities members. The majority of the users (55 - 76.38%) confirmed that the
access control system should have a feature to monitor the actions and commands
from low-priority members while other 15 (20.83%) suggested that this may be an
additional feature to have. We obtained similar results when we specifically asked
about access control for guest/temporary members. In this case, 47 (65.27%) survey
participants replied that guests/temporary users needed to have restrictions while
other 20 (27.78%) users said that this would be an additional feature to include in
the access control mechanism.
Clearly, the users had expressed their interests in having access control mechanisms for multi-user multi-device smart environment. Also, users suggested that
despite a necessary notification system, the access control mechanism should work
effectively with minimal user interaction. Finally, users stated that the access control
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system should be able to differentiate between users with different priority levels and
negotiate conflicting demands accordingly. Conflicts between users with same priorities should be resolved with the intervention when necessary while conflicts between
members with different priority levels should be resolved by rejecting the requests
from the later. Additional features were suggested to monitor and restrict the actions
from low-level priority members. In summary, our design for multi-device multi-user
aware access control system, Kratos, was heavily influenced by the needs of the users
and Kratos aims to achieve all of these desires from the users into design.

7.4

Problem Scope

In this section, we first define several important terms that we use in this work. Then,
we introduce the challenges of an access control system in the smart environment
through an example scenario in a smart home system. Finally, we articulate the
threat model considered in this work.

7.4.1

Terminology

We define several important terms that we use in this work.
Policy. In this work, we consider Policy as the group of requests made by the users
to control device usage and parameters in a multi-user smart environment. Based on
the nature of request, there are three types of policies considered in Kratos.
1. Demand Policy. We consider Demand Policy as the group of requests made by
a user or that define the control rules/configuration for a specific device or group
of devices in the smart environment. Demand policies can be general (i.e., created
by the admin and applied to all the authorized users in the system) or specific to
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a certain user. If a demand policy is general to all users, we define that policy as
General Policy.
2. Restriction Policy. We consider Restriction Policy as the set of rules that govern
the accessibility and level of control of a user or group of users to a certain device
or group or devices in the smart environment. Restriction policies regulate (1) what
devices the user has access to, (2) the time frame in which the user is authorized to
use/control the devices, and (3) the control parameter limits.
3. Location-based Policy We consider Location-based Policy as the set of automation
rules enforced to an authorized user that are only applicable if the user is connected
in the system network. Location-specific policies regulate (1) what devices the user
has remote access to and (2) the control setting limit if a specific user is not present
in the network.
Priority. We define Priority as the importance level of a user that may be used
to provide controls for users of higher priority over users with lower priority during
different smart system functionalities such as new user addition, policy enforcement,
restriction, and demand negotiation processes. In Section 7.5, we detail the different
priority levels considered in this work.
Conflict. For the purpose of this work, Conflict is defined as the dispute process that
is generated from two or more demand policies assigned by the users that interfere or
contradict based on the specific requests of the policies. Based on the nature of the
demand and restriction policies, three types of conflict can occur.
1. Hard conflict. A hard conflict occurs when demand policies of a specific device
enforced by two different users do not have any overlapping device condition.
2. Soft conflict. When demand policies enforced by the users for a specific device
have overlapping device conditions, a soft conflict occurs.
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Figure 7.1: Sample smart home with multiple users attempting to control multiple
devices with conflicting demands.
3. Restriction conflict. If the restriction policy for a specific device is being disputed
by the restricted user, Kratos identifies that as restriction conflict.

7.4.2

Problem Definition

To explain the problem of coarse-grained access control in smart settings, we consider
a use-case scenario in smart home system. We assume a smart home setting (S)
similar to the one depicted in the Figure 7.1. The smart home has several installed
devices to create an automated smart environment. In S, four different users – Bob
(father), Alice (mother), Kyle (child), and Gary (guest) interact with the devices.
We assume Bob and Alice are the owners of the smart devices and all four users
have access to the smart home system through their controller app (installed on their
smartphone or tablet). Here, the term access to the smart home system refers to the
ability to control the devices, configure the system (add/delete devices), and add new
users to the system. We assume that the users are performing the following activities
which result in conflicting demands- (1) Bob and Alice are trying to configure the

187

smart thermostat to different temperature values at the same time which results in
conflicting demand, (2) Alice tries to restrict Kyle from using the smart coffee machine
but smart home system does not allow her, (3) Alice wants to set the smart lock after
midnight, but (4) Gary wants to enter the home after midnight which results in
conflicting demand, and finally, (5) Gary wants to add his friend Steve in the system
who is unknown to Bob and Bob can not restrict the activity. Hence, a new access
control system is needed and should be designed to answer the following questions:
(1) How Bob and Alice can solve their conflicting demand and use the thermostat
simultaneously? (2) How Alice can restrict a specific device for a specific user? (3)
How Alice can give exclusive permission to use the smart lock to Gary after midnight?
(4) How Bob can limit the access of Gary to add a new user? To address these, we
propose Kratos, a fine-grained access control system for the smart home that allows
users to resolve the conflicting access control demands automatically, add new users,
select specific devices to share, limit the access to specific users, and prevent undesired
user access in the system.

7.4.3

Threat Model

Kratos considers undesired access control decisions that may arise from existing

coarse-grain solutions. For instance, a new user automatically gets full access to the
system (i.e., over privileged control) which may lead to undesired device access. Also,
Kratos considers legitimate smart home users trying to change the system settings

without authorization (e.g., overriding existing system by installing new apps) that
may result in undesired device actions such as installing unknown apps and overriding
device conditions (i.e., privilege abuse), even deleting device owners from the system
(i.e., privilege escalation). Furthermore, Kratos considers threats that arise from
inadequate, inaccurate, or careless access control to multi-user multi-device smart
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Threat

Threat-1

Threat-2

Threat-3

Threat-4

Attack Method
Over privileged
controls
Privilege
abuse
Privilege
escalation
Unauthorized
access

Attack Example
A newly added smart home user gets the access to use
all the connected devices which can lead to undesired
activities in the smart home system.
A newly added smart home user can abuse the granted
privilege to perform malicious activities in the smart
home system.
A newly added smart home user can use the legitimate
permissions to remove devices and apps, change device
settings, or make a device unavailable to the owner.
A temporarily added smart home user can have an
access to the smart home system if the owner forgets
to delete the access manually.
A newly added user adds a new user in the system

Threat-5

Transitive

who automatically gets the same privilege level as the

privilege

owner and may utilize this transitive privilege to perpetrate his/her exploits.

Table 7.2: Summary of the threat model considered for Kratos.
home (i.e., transitive privilege). In fact, access to a smart environment/platform
granted to unknown parties by an authorized user other than the owner may escalate
to additional threats (i.e., unauthorized device access), that Kratos also considers
as malicious activity. Also, if a temporary guest is not timely removed from the
system by the authorized user, it may lead to malicious activities such as sensitive
information leakage. Summary of these threats are given in Table 7.2
We do not consider any unauthorized user access due to malicious apps installed
in the system. We also assume that the smart environment is not compromised, which
means no malicious user is added automatically at the time of system installation as
they are different problems from the contributions of Kratos.

7.5

KRATOS Design

In this section, we present the architecture of the Kratos and its main components.
Kratos is a fine-grained access control system for multi-user multi-device smart en-

vironment where users can express their conflicting demands, desires, and restrictions
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through policies. Kratos allows an authorized user to add new users in the system
and enforce different usage policies to smart devices based on the needs of users and
the environment. Kratos considers all the enforced policies from authorized users
and offers a policy negotiation algorithm to optimize and solve conflicts among users.
In designing the Kratos framework, we consider the following design features and
goals.
User-friendly Interface. An access control system should have a user-friendly
interface to add or remove users and assign policies in the smart environment. We
integrate Kratos into the mobile app provided by smart platform vendors to provide
a single user interface to manage users and assign device policies in the installed
devices.
Diverse User Roles/Complex Relations. In a smart environment, users have
different roles that an access control system needs to define. For example, a user
having a parent role should be able to express controls on a user with a child role,
while adults in the same priority class should be able to negotiate the access control
rules automatically. To address this design feature, Kratos introduces user priority
in the system to define user roles.
Conflict Resolution. As discussed earlier, diverse needs in device usage result in
conflicts among users in a shared smart environment. The main challenge of an access
control system in a smart environment is to resolve these conflicts in a justified way.
In addition, users in a multi-user multi-device smart environ should agree with the
outcome of conflict resolution provided by the access control system. Kratos uses a
novel policy negotiation system to automatically optimize and resolve the conflicting
demands among users and institute a generalized usage policy reflecting the needs
of all the users. Additionally, Kratos notifies the users the results of the policy
negotiation system.
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Policy Expiration. In a multi-user multi-device smart environment, temporary
access for different smart devices might be needed for guests, occasional, or temporary
users. To automate the temporary access to the users, Kratos offers policy expiration
time in assigned devices. Kratos automatically deletes the device access and the users
from the system after the expiration period to avoid undesired access in the system.
Location-based Access. Smart devices and platforms offer remote access and users
can control the devices within the smart environment. Kratos uses the location of
the users to trigger a user-specific device policy to limit device usage and meet diverse
needs of the users. For example, the parents may want to restrict remote access of
the kids for specific devices. Kratos only allows users to access location-restricted
devices if he/she is connected to the home network.
Expressive Control. In a smart environment, a user should be able to express
the desired device settings easily. An access control system should provide a simple
method to the users to express their diverse needs efficiently and correctly. Kratos
introduces a unified policy language that covers different control parameters (e.g.,
role, environmental, time, device, location-specific expressions) of smart devices and
platforms to understand the users’ needs and control the devices accordingly.
Unified Policy Enforcement. All user commands [CBS+ 18] to the smart devices
should go through an unified access control enforcement layer to provide fine-grained
access control in smart devices and platforms. Kratos uses an execution module that
checks all enforced policies generated from user-assigned policies before executing a
command in the smart environment.
Figure 7.2 shows the architecture of the Kratos system. Kratos includes four
main modules: (1) user interaction module, (2) back-end module, (3) policy manager, and (4) policy execution module. First, the user interaction module provides
a simple user interface to add new users and assign priorities based on the user’s
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Figure 7.2: Architecture of Kratos system.
role and preferences. This module also collects user-defined device policies for smart
devices. These device policies and priority assignment data are forwarded to the
back-end module via the hub or edge devices. Back-end module captures these data
and creates user priority and device policy list for the users by analyzing the user and
device information. The policy manager module gathers user priorities and device
policies from the generated lists and triggers policy generation and negotiation process to resolve any identified conflicts. After successful negotiation, Kratos generates
final policies and forwards the policies to policy execution module which enforces the
policies to associated smart devices and apps. The following subsections details each
module in Kratos and explains how policy generation and negotiation processes are
initiated by Kratos.

7.5.1

User Interaction Module

The user interaction module collects priority assignment data and device policies
from the users using a simple user interface. It includes two sub-modules: priority
assignment and policy input .
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Priority Assignment Module.
The priority assignment module operates as a user interface to add new users and
assign priorities. Kratos introduces a formal format to specify new users, illustrated
as follows: Ua = [Aid , Nid , P, D, T ], where, Aid is the unique ID of the commanding
user, Nid is the new user ID that is added in the system, P is the priority level of the
new user, D is the permission to add or remove devices from the system, and T is
the validity time of the new user in the system. The user priority level is used in the
policy generation module to initiate policy negotiation process and resolve conflicting
demands. For adding a new user and assigning priorities, we consider the following
rules to avoid conflicts in the priority assignment.
• Each user has an authority to add new users and assign a priority.
• The Owner of the device/system will have the highest priority in the system.
• Priority in the system is depicted with a numerical value. The lower the priority
of a user, the higher is the level of priority. For example, the owner of the device has
the priority of “0”.
• Each user can only assign the same or higher value of the priority to a new user,
e.g., a user with a priority of “1” can only assign priority of “1” or higher to a new
user.
• If two existing users add the same new user with a different priority level, the user
with a higher priority level gets the privilege to add the new user.
• If two existing users with the same priority level assigned different priority levels
to a new user, the system notifies the existing users to fix a priority level of the new
user.
• Each user can assign permissions for adding or removing devices to a new user if
the commanding user has the same permission.
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@U1 : Alice
U2 –
U3 –
U3 –
U4 –
U4 –
@U2 : Bob
U1 –
U3 –
U4 –
@U3 : Kyle
U1 –
U1 –
@U4 : Gary
U1 –
U1 –

restrict smart thermostat between 60-70 degrees.
restrict access to smart coffee maker.
allow access to smart bulb at the child room if U4 is home.
allow access to smart bulb at the guest room.
restrict access to smart lock at the home door from 12:00 AM
to 6:00 AM.
restrict smart thermostat between 75-80 degrees.
allow access to smart bulb in the child’s room between 7:00
PM and 7:00 AM
allow access to smart lock at the guest room and the home
door
desires to access smart bulb at the child room
desires to access coffee maker
desires to access smart lock at the guest room and the home
door at 3 AM
desires to access the smart bulb in guest room

Figure 7.3: An example demand and restriction requirements of users in Figure 7.1.
The priority assignment of Kratos can also be configured to define the roles of
the users. For example, the smart home system in Figure 7.1, Alice and Bob (parents)
can be assigned to priority 0, Gary (guest) can be assigned to priority 2, and Kyle
(child) can be assigned to priority 3. We use this priority list to explain the functions
of Kratos throughout the paper. In Kratos, administrator or homeowner obtains
the privilege to define the priority-role mappings in the system. Kratos also allows
the users to add temporary users by specifying validity time (T ) of a user in the
system. After the specified validity time, Kratos removes the user from the system
automatically preventing any unauthorized access from a temporary user or guest.

Policy Input Module and Access Policy Language.
Policy input module provides an interface to the users for assigning policies in smart
devices. Authorized users can choose any installed smart device and create device
policies using policy input module. To define the device policies, Kratos introduces
a formal access control policy language for the smart environment to express complex and diverse user preferences (e.g., users’ demands, desires, and restrictions) by
utilizing an existing open-source smart environment ecosystem (e.g., Samsung Smart-
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Things). Each user defines a policy about their preferences for installed smart devices
and any restriction over others’ accesses in the system. For instance, sample policies
for the smart home of four users shown in Figure 7.1, where each user defines her
requirements for other users in a smart home with the thermostat, bulbs, lock, and
coffee maker, are shown in Figure 7.3. This criteria defined by the users are used
throughout this sub-section to construct their policies.

Policy Structure.
Kratos represents the policies as collections of clauses. The clauses allow each user

to declare an independent policy for their demands and other users. The clauses have
the following structure: husersi : hdevicesi : hconditionsi : hactionsi. The first part
of the policy is users, which includes the information of both policy assigner and
assignee. The second part, devices, specifies the device or a list of devices included in
this statement. Kratos uses device ID assigned by the smart platform to distinguish
device-specific policies in a multi-device environment. The third part, conditions, is a
list of device conditions defining different control parameters (time-based operation,
values, etc.) based on the capabilities of the smart devices. For instance, a user
may define a condition where only a pre-defined range of commands or only a certain
time-window is matched. The final part of the policy is hactioni which states the
clause type, demand, restrict, or location. We note that the Kratos’s policy language
allows users to define multiple clauses. For instance, a user may restrict a distinct
subset of smart devices for different conditions and different users. A sample policy
scenario is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
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@U1 restrict :: : thermostat1 : temperature ∈
/ [60 − 70] ;
restrict :: U3 : coffeemaker : ;
location :: U3 : bulb3 : location ∈ [Home];
demand :: U4 : bulb4 : ;
restrict :: U4 : lock1 : time ∈
/ [6 : 00am − 9 : 00pm];
@U2 restrict :: : thermostat1 : temperature ∈
/ [75 − 80] ;
demand :: U3 : bulb3 : time ∈ [7 : 00pm − 7 : 00am];
demand :: U4 : lock1 , lock4 : ;
...
...

Figure 7.4: Sample policy clauses to partially implement demands and restrictions
shown in Figure 7.3.

7.5.2

Back-end Module

The user interaction module collects the user credentials and device policies generated
using the access policy language. It then forwards them to the back-end module
where these data are stored and formatted for policy generation and negotiation.
The back-end module has two functionalities: (1) generating user priority list, and
(2) generating device policy list.

User Priority List.
The back-end module collects the credential arrays and creates a database for authorized users and their assigned priorities. All the credential arrays are checked with
the priority assignment rules (explained in Section 7.5.1) and sorted as valid and invalid priority assignments. For each invalid priority assignment, the back-end module
notifies the users who initiated the priority assignment. The back-end module also
checks the validity of the users added in the user priority list based on the specified
time in the credential arrays. The back-end module automatically removes user with
expired validity and updates the user priority table. A sample priority list is given in
Figure 7.5.
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Device Policy List.
The back-end module accumulates all the policies assigned by the users and creates
a database based on the device ID. As explained in Section 7.5.1, the access policy
language assigns a device ID to determine the intended policy for each device. This
list is updated each time a user generates a new policy.

7.5.3

Policy Manager Module

The policy manager module collects the user priority list and device policy list from
the back-end module and compares different user policies. This module consists of
two sub-modules (policy negotiation module and policy generation module) to initiate
the policy negotiation and generation processes.

Policy Negotiation Module
The policy negotiation module compares all the user-defined policies and detects different types of conflicts based on user priorities and demands. Similar to traditional
RBAC, Kratos uses assigned user roles and priorities to understand the user needs

Figure 7.5: A sample user priority list generated by Kratos.
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in a smart environment hierarchy. However, a smart environment needs a more finegrained approach than RBAC to address the conflicting scenarios based on users’
relationship, social norms, and personal preferences. To address these diverse needs,
Kratos uses an automatic policy negotiation module to resolve conflicts in multi-user

smart environment. The policy negotiation module identifies types of conflicts based
on user roles and priorities, categorizes the conflicts based on implemented policies,
automatically decides whether a policy should be executed or not, starts a negotiation method between conflicting users using notification methods, and chooses an
optimum operating point for both users upon mutual agreement. For policy negotiation, Kratos considers two essential research questions: (1) How does Kratos
handle the policy conflicts between users with the same and different priority levels?,
and (2) How does Kratos handle restriction policies without affecting smart devices
operations?, In the following, we address these questions.
The policy negotiation algorithm of Kratos processes all the policies and computes the negotiated results by modeling the users’ authorities (classes, roles) in a
multi-layer list. User authorities are split into ordered classes. Class 0 has the highest
priority, and a higher class number means a lower priority. Each class may include a
list of users (or roles as roles are just a set of users). Users at the same priority class
shares the same priority. Kratos considers three types of conflicts (hard, soft, and
restriction conflicts) between user policies after users are classified into authorities.
When two different policies include clauses of the same user’s access for the same
device, there can be an interference between those clauses. Any such possible interference is further checked to disclose the potential conflicts. In this, hard conflicts
can happen when two interfering clauses dictate different actions for some overlapping cases or dictate the same action for never overlapping cased. In other words,
when policies have no possible way of cooperation or compromising, Kratos detects
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a hard conflict. However, if the same action exists with some common overlap while
opposite actions never occur together, such interference is a soft conflict. Moreover,
hard and soft conflicts are further categorized as Priority Conflicts or Competition
Conflicts based on the priority of policy owners. When the conflict happens between
users’ policies who have different priority classes, Kratos defines a hard or soft priority conflict. However, if the users have the same priority, hard or soft competition
conflicts happens. For hard priority conflicts, Kratos enforces the policy defined by
the user with higher priority. In hard competition conflicts, Kratos initiates a negotiation process between the users with an average operational condition calculated
from both policies. If the users mutually agree with an average operational condition,
Kratos creates a new policy for the targeted device. In case of no mutual operation

condition, Kratos notifies the higher priority user/admin to resolve the dispute with
a common policy. In the case of both soft priority and soft competition conflicts,
the result of the negotiation process of Kratos is a new clause with common set of
conditions. If any interference is caused by the nature of action requested in two
different policies, Kratos detects a restriction conflict in the system. By incorporating these with hard, soft, and restriction conflicts, Kratos overall implements five
distinct conflict types. (details in following subsections 7.5.3 and 7.5.3).

Policy Negotiation Algorithm
In the policy negotiation algorithm of Kratos, each policy clause is compiled into a
quintuple, Ψ = {P, U, D, C, A}, where P is the policy assigner (that shows who states
this clause), U is the assignee (about whom this statement is), D is the targeted
smart device, C is a set of conditions over D and U , and configurable environmental
attributes, and finally A ∈ {demand, restrict} is the action requested by this state-

199

ment when the set of conditions are satisfied. Kratos implements an algorithm to
solve the policy conflicts through a set of equations as follows:

interf ere(Ψi , Ψj ) ← Ui = Uj ∧ Di = Dj

(7.1)

hard conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ← interf ere(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ (
(Ai 6= Aj ∧ ∀c ∈ Ci ∩ Cj : Θ(V(c, Ci ), V(c, Cj )))

(7.2)

∨(Ai = Aj ∧ ∃c ∈ Ci ∩ Cj : ¬Θ(V(c, Ci ), V(c, Cj ))))
sof t conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ← interf ere(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ (
(Ai = Aj ∧ ∀c ∈ Ci ∩ Cj : Θ(V(c, Ci ), V(c, Cj )))

(7.3)

∨(Ai 6= Aj ∧ ∃c ∈ Ci ∩ Cj : V(c, Ci ) 6= V(c, Cj )))
HP C(Ψi , Ψj ) ← hard conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ Ξ(Pi ) 6= Ξ(Pj )

(7.4)

SP C(Ψi , Ψj ) ← sof t conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ Ξ(Pi ) 6= Ξ(Pj )

(7.5)

HCC(Ψi , Ψj ) ← hard conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ Ξ(Pi ) = Ξ(Pj )

(7.6)

SCC(Ψi , Ψj ) ← sof t conf lict(Ψi , Ψj ) ∧ Ξ(Pi ) = Ξ(Pj )

(7.7)

RC(Ψi , ψj ) ← Restriction conf lict(Ψi , ψj ) ∧ Ξ(Pi ) > Ξ(Pj )
(7.8)
∧Ai = restrict

where Ψi , Ψj is the evaluated pair of policies, and V(c, C) is the value function that
returns the value of conditional c in the set C, Θ(x, y) checks the overlap between
the provided (x, y) tuple and Ξ(u) returns the priority of user u as the value of user’s
assigned priority class.

Policy Negotiation Process.
The negotiation N between two given policy clauses (Ψi , Ψj ) can be formally expressed and computed by a sample function as in Equation 7.9.
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Ψi if Ξ(Pi ) > Ξ(Pj )


,



Ψ otherwise
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{Pi ∪ Pj , Ui , Di , Ci ∪ Cj , Ai }
if Ai = Aj



 {P ∪ P , U , D , C ∪ ¬C , A } otherwise ,
i
j
i
i i
j
i
N(Ψi , Ψj ) = (

majority vote(Ψi , Ψj ) if binary(Di )


,



arbitrate(Ψi , Ψj )
otherwise


(



{Pi ∪ Pj , Ui , Di , Ci ∪ Cj , Ai }
if Ai = Aj



 {P ∪ P , U , D , C ∪ ¬C , A } otherwise ,
i
j
i
i i
j
i

if HP C(Ψi , Ψj )
if SP C(Ψi , Ψj )
(7.9)
if HCC(Ψi , Ψj )
if SCC(Ψi , Ψj )

Figure 7.6: Negotiation algorithms to resolve conflicts where HPC is hard priority
conflict, SPC is soft priority conflict, HCC is hard competition conflict, and SCC is
soft competition conflict.
Here, as an example, in the case of a hard priority conflict, (e.g., mother vs. child
with contradicting clauses) result is the clause of the user with the higher priority (e.g.,
mother). For hard competition conflict, both the users are notified with overlapping
conditions assigned in the policies and Kratos offers a common operating condition
to the users. This common condition is enforced as a policy to the device upon users’
agreement. On the other hand, in the case of both soft priority and soft competition
conflicts, the result of the negotiation is a new clause with common set of conditions.
For restriction conflict, both restricted user and policy assigner are notified and if the
policy satisfies conditions in Equation 8, restriction policy is enforced in the device.

Policy Generation Module
The goal of the policy generation module is to construct valid policies that reflect the
demands and restrictions of all authorized users based on the device policies generated
in the user interaction module. The generated policies are passed to the back-end
module and stored in a database. Thereafter, these policies are enforced in smart
devices. The negotiated policies computed by the policy negotiation algorithm are
converted into enforceable access control rules. The negotiated policy clause, Ψ =
{P, U, D, C, A}, has a 5-tuple format and is indeed well suited for existing attributebased access control (ABAC) systems. Thus, Kratos uses an ABAC-like enforcement
for the final generated rules. Here, the policy, B, is the set of {action, subject,
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resource, constraints} tuples for a negotiated device policy. An example of mapping
a sample policy to ABAC rule through a transformation function can be illustrated
as follows:
ABAC(Ψi ) {B | action (B) = Ai ∧ subject (B) = Ui
∧ resources (B) = Di

(7.10)

∧ constraints(B) = TCi }

where TC {c | c satisfies the same conditions of C in mapped attributes into ABAC
policy. Here, ABAC(Ψi ) holds a direct translation of actions, subjects, resources,
and constraints. We develop an ABAC-like rule generator that enforces the rules
in a control device. The generator is integrated into the hub device as a unified
enforcement point.

7.5.4

Policy Execution Module

Policy execution module enforces the final policies generated from the policy negotiation process. Smart devices can be controlled through a controller app (installed in
smartphone/tablet) or by installing different device-specific apps in the smart platform (e.g., Samsung SmartThings). Policy execution process appends the generated
policies in the smartphone controller app or the installed smart apps. To append the
policies, Kratos adds conditional statements to the app source code to enforce the
policies. When a user tries to change the state of the device, the app asks the policy
execution module to check in the policy table generated by the policy generator. If
an acceptable condition is matched, the policy execution engine returns the policy to
the app and creates a binary decision (true for the accepted policy and false for the
restricted policy) in the conditional branches. Based on the decision enforced by the
policy execution engine, the user command in a smart app is executed.
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7.6

KRATOS Implementation

We implemented Kratos in Samsung SmartThings platform which has the largest
market share in consumer IoT, supports highest number of off-the-shelf smart devices,
and open-source apps [Gun17].

7.6.1

Implementation and Data Collection

We setup a smart home system to represent a smart environment and test the effectiveness of Kratos in a real-life setting. We used Samsung SmartThings hub and
connected multiple smart devices and sensors to the hub to create a functional smart
environment. The complete list of devices in our smart home system is provided in
Table 7.3. The setup included four different types of devices: smart light, smart lock,
smart thermostat, and smart camera, which are some of the most common smart
devices used in smart environment (e.g., smart home system) [Sta17]. We also used
three different types of sensors: motion, temperature, and contact sensors to provide
autonomous control. Further, we collected data from 43 different smart device users.
We selected the participants by conducting an institution-wide open call for participation and flyers for community outreach. We obtained the necessary Institutional
Review Board approval for collecting data from real-life smart device users. While selecting participants for our study, we considered several features: (1) owns more than
one smart devices, (2) shares smart environment with multiple users (e.g., parents,
partners, friends, or housemates), (3) diverse user roles (working adults, housewives,
young adults, student, etc.), and (4) beginner level knowledge on using smart devices.
The participants were grouped into 14 different groups and asked to choose their roles
in a smart environment. First, we recorded different conflicting scenarios experienced
by the users and asked them to use Kratos to assign device policies. We investigated
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several multi-user scenarios for the policy generation and negotiation processes as
detailed below:
Device Type

Model

Smart Home Hub
Smart Light
Smart Lock

Samsung SamrtThings Hub
Philips Hue Light Bulb
Yale B1L Lock with Z-Wave

1
4
1

Smart Camera

Push Button Deadbolt
Arlo by NETGEAR Security

1

Smart

System
Ecobee 4 Smart Thermostat

1

Fibaro FGMS-001 ZW5 Motion

6

Thermo-

stat
Motion Sensor

Quantity

Sensor with Z-Wave Plus MulTemperature

tisensor
Fibaro FGMS-001 ZW5 Motion

Sensor

Sensor with Z-Wave Plus Mul-

Door Sensor

tisensor
Samsung Multipurpose Sensor

1

2

Table 7.3: Devices and sensors used in our smart home setup to evaluate Kratos.
Scenario 1: Multiple policies for the same device. We selected common devices (e.g.,
smart thermostat) and enforced different policies set by multiple users. Users assigned
demand and restriction policies in the system for the same device. We collected 44
sets of policies (a set of policy includes at least two policies from multiple users) which
included 13 hard, 17 soft, and 8 restriction conflicts.
Scenario 2: Multiple policies for different devices. We used multiple devices from
the same device category (e.g., smart light, smart lock, smart thermostat) to enforce
different policies over the same type of devices. Here, we collected 48 sets of policies
from 43 users which resulted in 15 hard, 22 soft, and five restriction conflicts.
Scenario 3: Multiple apps for the same device. In the smart environment, we allowed
users to install different apps to control the same device (e.g., smart light). For example, multiple users can configure a smart light with both motion and door sensors
using different apps. We chose three different smart light apps available in SmartThings marketplace (light control with motion sensor, door sensor, and luminance
level, respectively) and asked the users to install preferable apps and assign device
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policies accordingly. Here, we collected 35 sets of policies including 8 hard, 18 soft,
and five restriction conflicts.
Scenario 4: Single app for multiple devices. We considered an individual app controlling multiple same types of devices in the smart environment/system. We chose
a single light controlling app to control four different lights and asked users to enforce device policies in different devices using one single app. We collected 32 sets of
policies in this scenario which includes 12 hard, 15 soft, and 3 restriction conflicts.
Scenario 5: Temporary users in the system. We considered a temporary user/guest is
added in the system and trying to access a smart light and smart lock after the access
is expired for that specific user. We collected 30 sets of policies in this scenario.
Scenario 6: Location-based access in the system. In the location-based access control,
we allowed multiple users to set location-based policies for a smart thermostat. Here,
users are allowed to define both location-based restriction and demand policies. We
collected 30 sets of policies in this scenario.
Malicious scenarios. We also implemented five real-life threats in our smart environment testbed to generate malicious data and further evaluate the effectiveness
of Kratos (more details in Section 7.7) . For Threat-1 (Over privileged controls),
we asked the users to add restriction clauses to the smart thermostat and asked the
restricted users to change the temperature. For Threat-2 (Privilege abuse), we asked
a newly added user with lower priority to install a new app in the smart system and
trigger a smart camera. Threat-3 (Privilege escalation) is presented by a scenario
where a new user changed the lock code of a smart lock and removed the smart lock
from the environment. For Threat-4 (Unauthorized access), we added a temporary
authorized user with limited priority and asked the users to control a smart thermostat outside their accepted time range. For Threat-5 (Transitive privilege), we asked
the user with lower priority to add a new user with higher priority in the system.
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(a) User Management

(b) Policy Management

(c) Instruction Set

(d) Notification System

Figure 7.7: User interfaces of Kratos

7.6.2

User Interface

We built a SmartThings app that represents the user interaction module described in
Section 7.5. This app has two modules: user management and policy management.
The user management module allows users to add new users and assign priorities.
In addition to adding a new user and assigning priorities, our implemented system
allows the owner/admin to define role-based priority levels to the different users. We
define five different roles and priority levels in Kratos (i.e., father/owner - priority
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0, mother/owner - priority 0, adult - priority 1, guest - priority 2, child - priority 3).
These roles and priorities can be assigned by the smart home owner or by authorized
users with the same or higher priority to the one being assigned. Upon created a
new role/priority, the information is sent and stored in the backend server. In the
policy management module, users select devices and create new policies. Kratos
provides options to add either general device policies (intended for all existing users)
or policies that apply only to specific users. Kratos allows users to use different device
conditions (operation-based, time-based, value-based, etc.) to define the policies.
As our implementation environment had devices that only allows time-based and
value-based conditions, we classified the policies in three different possible categories:
(1) time-based device policy, (2) value-based device policy, and (3) time-value-based
policy. The policies for different devices in our implementation can be represented by
a device policy array: Device Policy, P = {U, D, C1 , C2 , R}.
• User ID (U): The first element of the policy array is to identify the policy assignee.
We utilized the user email as a personal identifier in our implementation.
• Device ID (D): SmartThings assigns a unique device ID for each installed device
which was used for the devices and policies.
• Time conditions (C1 ): Users could assign a start time and an end time for any
device action in the policies. For example, a smart light can be accessed from sunset
to sunrise only.
• Value conditions (C2 ): Users could assign a maximum and minimum value to
specify an acceptable range to control a device functionality. For example, a user can
set the operational range of a thermostat from 68◦ F to 70◦ F.
• Restricted User (R): High-priority Users could define the restriction policy for a
specific lower-priority user by adding the user ID to the restricted user’s list. Users
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could also assign general policies (Section 7.4.1) for the devices by assigning ’0’ in
this field.
Figure 7.7 shows the user interface of Kratos. We implemented Kratos as a
customized smart app in Samsung SmartThings platform. We built the Kratos
app in Groovy platform and installed the app using SmartThings web interface. As
Samsung allows each users to install customized apps in same smart environment
using the web interface, Kratos app can be easily installed in each user’s controller
device in multi-user smart environment. Each user can use official SmartThings app
in the controller device to use Kratos app to assign new users and device policies.
The information of new users and device policies are forwarded to the policy generator
via the backend server for generating final device policies.

7.6.3

Policy Enforcement

The final step during implementation is to enforce the generated policies by Kratos.
We utilized 10 different official SmartThings apps that control 17 different devices
and installed them in the smart home/environment. We installed all the apps and
observed the user-specific policies generated in the policy generation module. We
modified these apps to connect with the backend server and capture the generated
policies from the policy generator. These policies were appended to the conditional
statements inside the app to execute the policies. A sample modified app is given
below to illustrate the steps to enforce policies in a SmartThings app.
Listing 7.1: Policy enforced at install-time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

definition(
name: "Big Turn ON modified",
namespace: "smartthings",
author: "Anonymous",
description: "Turn your lights on when the SmartApp is tapped.",
category: "Convenience",
iconUrl: "https://s3.amazonaws.com/smartapp-icons/Meta/light_outlet.png",
iconX2Url: "https://s3.amazonaws.com/smartappicons/Meta/light@2x.png"
)
import groovy.time.∗
preferences {
section("When I touch the app, turn on...") {
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

input "switches", "capability.switch", multiple: false
input name: "email", type: "email", title: "Email", description: "Enter Email Address", required: true,
displayDuringSetup: true}}
def installed()
{ atomicState.SmartLightTimes = [:]
atomicState.SmartLightAdmins = [:]
atomicState.SmartLightUsers = [:]
atomicState.SmartLightDevID = [:]
atomicState.SmartLightTimeStart = [:]
atomicState.SmartLightTimeEnd = [:]
log.debug "${new Date()}"
getSmartLightJsonData()
def item = atomicState.SmartLightUsers.indexOf(email)
if (item>=0){
int index = atomicState.SmartLightUsers.indexOf(email)
def between = timeBetween (atomicState.SmartLightTimeStart[index], atomicState.SmartLightTimeEnd[
index])
if (between == true){
subscribe(location, changedLocationMode)
subscribe(app, appTouch)
log.info app.getAccountId()}}

30
31
32
33
34 }
35 def updated()
36 { atomicState.SmartLightTimes = [:]
37
atomicState.SmartLightAdmins = [:]
38
atomicState.SmartLightUsers = [:]
39
atomicState.SmartLightDevID = [:]
40
atomicState.SmartLightTimeStart = [:]
41
atomicState.SmartLightTimeEnd = [:]
42
getSmartLightJsonData()
43
44
def item = atomicState.SmartLightUsers.indexOf(email)
45
if (item>=0){
46
int index = atomicState.SmartLightUsers.indexOf(email)
47
def between = timeBetween (atomicState.SmartLightTimeStart[index], atomicState.SmartLightTimeEnd[
index])
48
if (between == true){
49
unsubscribe()
50
subscribe(location, changedLocationMode)
51
subscribe(app, appTouch)}}
52 }
53 def changedLocationMode(evt) {
54
log.debug "changedLocationMode: $evt"
55
switches?.on()}
56 def appTouch(evt) {
57
log.debug "appTouch: $evt"
58
switches?.on()}
59 def getSmartLightJsonData(){
60
def listTimes = []
61
def listAdmins = []
62
def listUsers = []
63
def listIDs = []
64
def listTimeStarts = []
65
def listTimeEnds = []
66
def params = [uri: "https://mywebserver/xxxyyyzzz/2/public/values?alt=json",]
67
try {
68
httpGet(params) { resp −>
69
for (object in resp.data.feed.entry){
70
listTimes.add (object.gsx$time.$t)
71
listAdmins.add (object.gsx$adminemail.$t)
72
listUsers.add (object.gsx$restricteduseremail.$t)
73
listIDs.add (object.gsx$deviceid.$t)
74
listTimeStarts.add (object.gsx$timerangestart.$t)
75
listTimeEnds.add (object.gsx$timerangeend.$t)
76
}
77
atomicState.SmartLightTimes = (listTimes)
78
atomicState.SmartLightAdmins = (listAdmins)
79
atomicState.SmartLightUsers = (listUsers)
80
atomicState.SmartLightDevID = (listIDs)
81
atomicState.SmartLightTimeStart = (listTimeStarts)
82
atomicState.SmartLightTimeEnd = (listTimeEnds)}
83
} catch (e) {
84
log.error "something went wrong: $e"}
85 }
86
87 def timeBetween(String start, String end){
88
long timeDiff
89
def now = new Date()
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90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

}

def timeStart = Date.parse("yyy-MM-dd’T’HH:mm:ss","${start}".replace(".000-0400",""))
def timeEnd = Date.parse("yyy-MM-dd’T’HH:mm:ss","${end}".replace(".000-0400",""))
long unxNow = now.getTime()
long unxEnd = timeEnd.getTime()
long unxStart = timeStart.getTime()
if (unxNow >= unxStart && unxNow <= unxEnd)
return true
else
return false

7.7

Performance Evaluation

We evaluate Kratos by focusing on the following research questions:
RQ1 How effective is Kratos in enforcing access control in multi-user scenarios while
handling different threat models? (Sec 7.7.1)
RQ2 What is the overhead introduced by Kratos on the normal operations of the
smart environment/setting? (Sec. 7.7.2)

7.7.1

Effectiveness

In this sub-section, we present the experimental results of Kratos while enforcing
access control in different multi-user smart environment scenarios and threat models.
We first considered a use case scenario to explain the results of Kratos in different smart device operations. Then, we considered six different utilization scenarios
(explained in Section 7.6) to evaluate the effectiveness of Kratos.
To understand the performance of Kratos, we assume two users Alice and Bob
using the same smart thermostat and assigning different policies according to their
needs. This usage scenario may lead to conflicts in which case Kratos uses policy negotiation module to solve the conflicts. For instance, let us assume Alice and
Bob has the same priority level which is 2 and assign temperature range 60-70 and
75-80 respectively. Kratos considers this as a hard competition conflict and starts
the negotiation process with average range 67-75. If Alice and Bob both agree with
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Kratos outcome

Conflict type Policy example
Hard priority
conflict

Soft priority
conflict

Hard
competition
conflict

Soft
competition
conflict

Restriction
conflict

Temporary
access

Locationbased
access

Alice (priority-1) and Bob
2) set up the temperature
70 and 75-80 respectively in
thermostat.
Alice (priority-1) and Bob
2) set up the temperature
70 and 65-75 respectively in
thermostat.

(priorityrange 60the smart
(priorityrange 60the smart

Alice (priority-2) and Bob (priority2) set up the temperature range 6070 and 75-80 respectively in the smart
thermostat.

Alice (priority-2) and Bob (priority2) set up the temperature range 6070 and 65-75 respectively in the smart
thermostat.
Alice (priority-1) set the temperature
range 60-70 and restrict Bob (priority2) to change the thermostat. Bob sets
the temperature range 75-80.
Alice
(priority-1)
added
Gary
(priority- 4) as a temporary user
for 2 days. After 2 days, Gary tries to
unlock the smart lock.
Alice (priority-1) set up the temperature range 70-72 and restrict Kyle
(priority-3) from using the smart thermostat remotely. Kyle sets the temperature range 74-76.

As

Alice

has higher priority,
sets the thermostat to
60-70 and notifies the users with
the decision
• As Alice has the higher priority,
Kratos sets the thermostat to
60-70 and notifies Alice with common range (65-70).
• If Alice agrees with common
range, Kratos sets the temperature range 65-70.
• Kratos starts the negotiation with average range (67-75)
and upon mutual agreement from
the users set the range.
• If the users fail to agree,
Kratos notifies higher level
user/admin to decide the policies.
Kratos sets the temperature
range 65-70 and notifies the users
with updated policy.

Kratos

Kratos

sets the temperature
range 60-70 and notifies Bob regarding restriction.

Kratos

automatically detects
the expired validity for smart home
access and deletes Gary from authorized user list to prevent any
undesired access.
• If Kyle is not in the home network, Kratos disregard Kyle’s
access policy.
• Kratos checks the location of both Kyle and Alice. If
only Kyle is home, Kratos sets
the temperature range 74-76. If
both Kyle and Alice are home,
Kratos sets the temperature
range 70-72.

Table 7.4: Different usage scenarios and outcomes of Kratos.
the range, Kratos generates a new policy for the thermostat with the temperature
range 67-75 and enforces this in the device. On the other hand, if Alice and Bob
cannot agree, Kratos notifies a higher level user/admin to resolve this conflict by
assigning a new policy for the device. We also consider a temporary user scenario in
evaluating Kratos where Alice (priority-1) adds a temporary user Gary (priority-4)
in the system for 2 days. After the validity period (2 days), Gary tries to access the
smart devices. However, Kratos automatically detects any expired validity of the
users in the system and restricts the temporary users to access the system. Table 7.4
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summarizes the outcome of Kratos in different usage scenarios. Table 7.5 also shows
the summary of policy conflicts and negotiations between smart device users in different multi-user scenarios explained in Section 7.6. In Scenario-1, Kratos successfully
negotiated 44 sets of policies collected from 43 users and executed the generated policies in the smart environment. Average policy generation time including the policy
negotiation was 0.68 seconds. In Scenario-2, Kratos evaluated 48 sets of policies in
total with an average policy generation time of 1.2 seconds. In Scenario-3 and 4,
Kratos manages 35 and 32 sets of policies with an average generation time of 0.86

and 0.48 seconds respectively. In Scenario-5, Kratos successfully manages 20 sets
of policies and automatically detects unauthorized access for expired temporary access. For location-based access in Scenario-6, Kratos successfully manages 30 sets of
policies and provides location-based acess to multiple users. Kratos also successfully
resolves all the conflicts generated in different scenarios. In summary, Kratos successfully resolved the policy conflicts and created optimized final policies that could
be executed within different smart apps.
We also evaluated the effectiveness of Kratos in preventing different threats in
the smart environment. We considered five different threats presented in Section 7.6.
We collected data from fifty malicious occurrences in total to evaluate Kratos against
these threats. Table 7.6 summarizes the performance of Kratos in identifying different threats. In each of these scenarios, Kratos detected the policy violation with
100% accuracy and effectively notified the smart homeowner/policy assigner via push
Usage

No. of

No. of hard

No. of soft

Restriction

Scenario

policies

conflicts

conflicts

policies

Average

Success

time (s)

rate (s)

Scenario-1

44

13

17

8

Scenario-2

48

15

22

5

6

0.68

100%

6

1.2

100%

Scenario-3

35

8

18

Scenario-4

32

12

15

5

4

0.86

100%

3

2

0.48

Scenario-5

30

-

100%

12

6

12

0.2

100%

Scenario-6

30

10

8

8

4

0.32

100%

No conflicts

Table 7.5: Kratos’s performance in different scenarios.
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notifications. For Threat-1, Kratos achieves the lowest average detection and notification time 0.25 and 0.4 seconds respectively. To identify Threat-2 and 3, Kratos
takes 0.4 and 0.47 seconds on average with average notification time 0.6 seconds. For
Threat-4 and 5, the average detection time is 0.35 and 0.28 seconds, respectively. In
summary, Kratos can detect different threats with 100% accuracy and notify users
with minimum delay.
Threat
model

No. of
occurances

Success
rate

Average Detection
time (s)

Average Notification
time (s)

Threat-1
Threat-2
Threat-3
Threat-4
Threat-5

10
10
10
10
10

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

0.25
0.4
0.47
0.35
0.28

0.4
0.6
0.6
0.52
0.45

Table 7.6: Performance of Kratos against different threats.

7.7.2

Performance Overhead

We considered the following research questions to measure the performance overhead
of Kratos:
RQ3 What is the impact of Kratos in normal operations of the smart environment/settings? (Table 7.7)
RQ4 What is the impact of Kratos in executing a user command in the smart
environment via the smart apps? (Table 7.8)
RQ5 How does the impact of Kratos change with different parameters in the smart
environment/setting? (Figure 7.8)
For different multi-user scenarios, we considered four different scenarios as explained
in Section 7.6.
Latency Introduced by Kratos. Kratos considers three different types of conflicts
(hard conflicts, soft conflicts, and restriction policy) during policy generation and
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Delay:
Min = 0 ms
Max = 280 ms
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Min = 0
Max = 60
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Delay:
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200
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5
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10

15
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30

200

Delay:
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150

Time (ms)

300

Time (ms)

25

(b)

350

250
200

No. of Users:
Min = 1
Max = 6

150
100

20

Number of Conflicts

1

2

3

4

5

Delay:
Min = 0 ms
Max = 198 ms

100

No. of Devices:
Min = 0
Max = 16

50

6

Number of Users

0

0

5

10

15

Number of Devices

(c)

(d)

Figure 7.8: Impact of different evaluation parameters on Kratos’s performance: (a)
number of policies, (b) number of conflicts, (c) number of users, and (d) number of
devices.
negotiation based on user priorities and policy types. These policy generation and
negotiation processes normally introduce latency in the normal operations of smart
devices and the smart apps to analyze given policies and solving conflicts. Table 7.7
illustrates the delay introduced by Kratos while handling the policy conflicts and
negotiations. We note that the average negotiation time increases with the number
of policies for all types of policy conflicts. For hard conflicts, the average negotiation
time is 0.403 seconds for ten policies, which increases to 1.21 seconds for 30 policies.
Because the hard conflicts require all the conflicted users to interact with the system
to resolve the conflicts, it takes more time than soft conflict and restriction policies.
For soft conflicts, the average negotiation time is 0.27 seconds for ten policies which
increases to 0.73 seconds for 30 policies. For the restriction policies, the latency is
introduced only when a low-priority user tries to assign policies to high-priority users.
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In this case, average negotiation times vary from 0.102 seconds to 0.25 seconds from
10 to 30 policies.
Conflict types

Hard conflict

Soft conflict

Restriction Policy

No. of Policies

Average negotiation time (s)

10

0.403

20

0.715

30

1.21

10

0.27

20

0.53

30

0.73

10

0.102

20

0.117

30

0.25

Table 7.7: Overhead of Kratos in handling policy negotiations.
Impact of Kratos on Executing User Commands. As the policies in Kratos
are enforced in the smart apps installed via the controller device (e.g., smartphone
and smart tablet), it introduces overhead in the controller devices while installing
the apps and executing users’ command. Table 7.8 depicts the impact of Kratos on
executing user commands based on generated policy. Here, we used eight different
apps to measure the performance overhead of Kratos. We also considered three types
of constraints on the policies: time constraint, value constraint, and both time and
value constraints. Time constraint refers to the specific time range for the desired
action of a smart device (e.g., turning on lights at sunset) while value constraint
refers to the specific range of inputs to a smart device (e.g., the temperature of
the smart thermostat). With no policy enforced on a device, the average time to
install an app and execute user command is 1.3 seconds with 1.75% and 1.6% of
CPU and RAM utilization, respectively. For time constraints and value constraints,
the average time is 1.72 and 1.46 seconds, respectively. Average CPU and RAM
utilization are almost similar for both time and value constraints (2.1-2.2% and 2.252.6%, respectively). For both time and value constraints, the average execution time
increases to 1.92 seconds. The CPU and RAM utilization also increases to 2.5% and
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2.82%, respectively. Considering the CPU and RAM available in modern smartphones
and tablets, the overhead introduced by Kratos can be considered negligible [SAU17,
SAU19a, SAU19b].
Type of policy

Avg. time (s)

Avg. CPU usage

Avg. RAM usage

No policy

1.3

1.75%

1.6%

Time constraint

1.72

2.2%

2.6%

Value constraint

1.46

2.1%

2.25%

Time and Value constraint

1.92

2.5%

2.82%

Table 7.8: Overhead of Kratos in policy executions.
Impact of Different Parameters on Performance Overhead. Kratos considers different parameters in smart environment to define and execute device policies
reflecting diverse user demands. Here, we observed the performance overhead of
Kratos by changing various parameters. As policy generation and negotiation are

executed at the backend server, Kratos does not pose any performance overhead to
computational parameters (CPU and RAM utilization). The only noticeable change
is observed in delay imposed by Kratos in the normal operation of the smart devices
and apps. In Figure 7.8, the delay introduced by Kratos is shown based on the
number of policies, conflicts, users, and devices. One can notice from Figure 7.8(a),
the delay introduced by Kratos increases with the number of policies generated by
the users. Kratos introduces 90 ms delay in the operation for five policies to execute a user command which increases to 280 ms delay for 60 policies. The delay
increases linearly with the number of conflicts and users in the system (Figure 7.8(b)
and Figure 7.8(c)). The highest delay to execute a user command is 368 ms, which
occurs when the system includes 30 different policy conflicts. Kratos also takes 310
ms to execute a command with six different users presents in the system. This delay
is the result of the overhead introduced by notifying different users about executing
the command. For the number of devices, the delay introduced by Kratos becomes
steady after adding 12 different devices in the smart environment (Figure 7.8(d)).
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7.8

Usability Study

To understand the usability of Kratos among users, we also performed a second
usability study with 43 smart home users. Again, although it is not the primary goal
of this work, it is important to understand the users’ perspectives on the usability
effectiveness of Kratos.
Again, we obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and we gave monetary compensation to the users to test our proposed access control system. In this
study, users experienced the proposed access control system in a real-life smart environment (smart home system) supported by Samsung SmartThings. We created
SmartThings app for Kratos and made it available to the users to install and use it
to add new users, add demand policies, add restriction policies for specific users, and
experience policy conflict resolution provided. The questions included in the usability
study were divided into three different categories:
• Installation and tutorial: In this part, users were asked to install the Kratos app
in the system and learn how to use Kratos in the smart environment.
• Policy enforcement and notification system: In the second part of the usability test,
users were asked to create different types of policies (demand and restrict policy) using
Kratos and experience the notification system implemented in Kratos.

• Policy conflict and implementation: In the last part, users experience the conflict
resolution of Kratos and observe the implemented policies in the system.
In the following, we summarize the findings of the usability study and discuss
how users took Kratos in a smart environment. A summary of the study is given in
Table 7.9.
Installation and tutorial. 95.3% of the users installed the app successfully using
the instructions provided in the app and 97.7% of the users thought the provided
tutorial was adequate to operate the app and perform different functions successfully.
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Category

Rating

Category

User interface
Tutorial
Installation process
Notification system
Availability
Ease

Rating

Processing time
Policy generation
Conflict resolution
User restriction
User-friendly
Effectiveness

Table 7.9: Summary of the usability study of Kratos.
In terms of device availability for policy enforcement, Kratos scored 5 on a scale of
5.
Policy enforcement and notification system. In terms of priority assignment,
93% users understood and correctly added new users in the system. For assigning
demand policies, 100% of the users successfully enforced and understood the notifications correctly. 97.7% users understood the notification messages clearly.
Policy conflict and implementation. In this part, users experience how Kratos
implemented the generated policies in the system and resolve conflicts between different user demands. Finally, the 97.7% of users were satisfied with the demand
policy decisions generated by Kratos while 100% of the users were satisfied with the
restriction policy decisions.

7.9

Benefits of KRATOS

In this section, we explain the benefits of Kratos in smart environment using a
use-case scenario of smart home. Consider a user, Bob, who defines himself as a
technology savvy person and owns a smart home (an example of smart environment).
The home is set with devices such as smart lock, thermostat, fire alarm, and smart
coffeemaker. Bob’s is the head of a family of three members, including his wife Alice,
and his teenage son Matt. Finally, Bob is an enthusiastic entrepreneur that offers
high-quality vacation rentals to Airbnb users.
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Efficient Conflict Resolution. With several devices shared among all household
members (including the Airbnb tenant), Bob feels that there is an immediate need
for some control mechanism that defines how all the smart devices are being set
up and managed among the different users. However, despite trying devices and
smart apps from different platforms (e.g., Samsung SmartThings, Google Home, etc.),
Bob cannot find a feasible and user-friendly solution that consider the needs of the
different users (e.g., Bob and Alice’s priority is to keep the thermostat temperature
as high as possible while Matt’s idea is to have cooler temperature). Kratos offers
an access control mechanism for the smart environment that allows Bob to provide
access control based on the users’ needs and priorities.
Multi-users/Multi-devices. As mentioned before, Bob’s setup comprises several
different devices with different levels of usability based on their impact on the quality
of life of users and their contribution to the general protection and security of the
household. Additionally, different users may have different levels of access based on
Bob’s and the household’s best interests. Based on these scenarios, Bob expects
an smart home access control system capable of managing multi-user and multidevice environments. Kratos realizes and offers an access control system where the
administrator (i.e., Bob) can assign priority levels to the different devices and users.
This allows control mechanisms that consider the importance of the various devices,
but also the needs of the users based on admin’s pre-defined priorities.
Suitability for Complex User Demands. Users’ demands can be very complex at
times. For instance, in addition to the demands and interests of Bob, Alice, and Matt,
new access control policies can be generated in case Bob decides to give some control
to his Airbnb tenant Ed. Adding new users and devices to an already configured
system increase the complexity due to new conflicts between users and policies. To
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solve these issues, Kratos can actively analyze and solve policy conflicts through
negotiations in an optimized fashion based on the different user and device priorities.
Inherent Security. Bob has certain rules to protect his ecosystem. First, securityrelated devices (e.g., smart lock) have the highest priority. Second, he would like
to have strict and unique control over these devices, so no other user can change
their settings or expected behavior. Finally, users with the lowest priority (e.g., Ed)
should not be able to add new devices, change device settings, etc. Our framework
was designed to provide inherent security based on the specific user’s needs. Specifically, Kratos offers the means to provide complex control and demands through
comprehensive policy negotiation and conflict resolution.
Intuitive and Easy User Interaction. Finally, Bob desires a user-friendly tool,
especially because some users with little technical knowledge may need to interact
with the new access control system. Kratos addresses all the steps from gathering
users’ declared demands and policies to access control enforcement with minimal user
interaction. For this, our framework learns from the different priorities from users and
devices to create efficient and fully automated policy conflict resolution mechanisms.
Encrypted Sensitive Data. Kratos accumulates user preferences, device usage,
and connected users’ credentials which can be considered as sensitive data. These
data should be encrypted to ensure privacy of the users. Kratos is implemented in
Samsung SmartThings which uses encrypted communication channels between smart
home devices and the controller devices (smartphone, tablets, etc.). Furthermore,
we used encrypted cloud space (Google Cloud) to store the user priority list and
generated device policies to ensure user privacy in Kratos.
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7.10

Conclusion

In a smart environment (e.g., smart home, smart office, smart factory, etc.), multiple
users have access to multiple devices simultaneously. In these settings, multiple users
may want to control and configure the devices with different preferences which give
rise to complex and conflicting demands. In this chapter, we explored the need of
fine-grained access control mechanism in smart environment and developed Kratos, a
fine-grained access control system that addresses the diverse and conflicting demands
of authorized users in a shared multi-user multi-device smart environment. Kratos
implements a priority-based policy negotiation technique to resolve conflicting user
demands in a shared smart environment. We implemented Kratos on real-life settings
and evaluated its performance through real smart devices in a multi-user setting.
Kratos successfully covers the users’ needs, and our extensive evaluations showed

that Kratos is effective in resolving the conflicting requests and enforcing the policies
without significant overhead. Also, we tested Kratos against five different threats
and found that Kratos effectively identifies the threats with high accuracy.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we introduced a comprehensive security framework for smart
devices and applications to detect emerging sensor-based threats. Our developed
frameworks tackled five main security concerns of sensor-enriched smart devices, applications, and settings. First, we presented a detailed study of sensor-based threats
on smart devices and provided taxonomy of existing threats considering attack characteristics, targeted components, attack mechanisms, and impact on smart device
operation. Based on this analysis, we developed three security mechanisms to secure sensors in smart devices and applications. We designed a context-aware security
framework to detect sensor-based threats in standalone smart devices such as smart
phone, smart watch, etc. Further, we developed a platform-independent contextaware security solutions to detect threats in connected smart devices in a smart
setting (i.e., smart home). Finally, we presented a fine-grained access control system
for multi-user multi-device smart environment to prevent unauthorized and malicious
sensor access.
To detect sensor-based threats in standalone smart devices, we introduced 6thSense,
a novel context-aware intrusion detection framework. 6thSense observes and learns
the changing patterns of the sensors states and correlates with ongoing user activities to detect malicious sensor activities in smart devices. For each user activity,
6thSense learns the sensors patterns and builds a context-aware model. Then, in
the detection phase, 6thSense uses different machine-learning techniques to match
activity contexts with sensor patterns and detects malicious sensor activities. To
test the effectiveness of 6thSense, We implemented 6thSense in an Android-powered
smartphone and a smart watch and collected user activity data from 100 different
real-life users. Furthermore, we tested 6thSense against three different sensor-based
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threats. Our extensive evaluation showed that 6thSense is effective in detecting different sensor-based threats with high accuracy and minimal overhead.
The second security mechanisms proposes Aegis, a platform-independent contextaware security framework to detect malicious activities in connected smart environment such as smart home, office, etc. In a smart environment, multiple smart devices
and sensors can connect with each other to perform different user-defined tasks collectively. As different user activities in a smart environment triggers a different but
specific sensor-device pattern, Aegis correlates these sensor-device relation with app
contexts and builds a contextual model to characterize benign user activities. In the
detection phase, Aegis checks current states of the smart devices and sensors with
learned user behavior and utilizes a Markov Chain-based machine learning technique
to detect ongoing malicious activities. We implemented Aegis in different real-life
smart home systems and collected data from 20 real-life users. We also considered
different smart device settings, platforms, and user-defined policies to test the efficacy
of Aegis against five different threats. Our evaluation shows that Aegis can detect
different threats in smart environment with high accuracy and F-Score. Furthermore, Aegis yields minimum overhead which makes this solution suitable for real-life
deployment.
Finally, to limit unauthorized and malicious sensor access in smart environment,
we introduced Kratos, a fine-grained multi-user multi-device-aware access control
system. Kratos introduces a formal access control language that allows users to
define access policies for smart devices in a shared smart environment. Kratos also
offers a novel policy negotiation algorithm that automatically detects conflicting user
demands and initiates automatic negotiation by leveraging user roles and priorities.
Finally, Kratos monitors assigned user policies and enforces the negotiation results
on installed smart devices, sensors, and apps to limit unauthorized access. We imple-
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mented Kratos in multi-user smart environment and collected device policies from
72 real-life smart device users. We also tested Kratos against five different threats
and achieved 100% accuracy. Furthermore, we performed a detailed usability study
with 43 smart device users to understand the users’ perceptions on access control
systems in multi-user smart environment. Our usability study shows that Kratos
resolves diverse demands and achieves an average of 4.6 out of 5 in usability based
on user friendliness, ease of use, and effectiveness.
For every security mechanisms presented in this dissertation, we collected data
from real-life smart users and improved our design features. We collected user defined configurations and smart device settings in the data collection process of Aegis
and tested the effectiveness based on collected user data. Furthermore, as access control systems closely depends on users’ demands, we performed both user study and
usability study for Kratos. The user and usability study indicates that our designed
security frameworks can effectively detect sensor-based threat in smart devices while
satisfying user demands as a security framework.
We present several key directions for future research.
• In this dissertation, we presented three unique security mechanisms to secure sensors in smart devices, applications, and settings. However, most of the smart devices
are resource-constrained devices and implementing external security mechanisms can
affect the normal operation of the devices. Although we implemented all the developed security framework in real-life smart devices and systems, real-life deployment
of these frameworks may introduce new implementation challenges such as powerfrequency trade-off in resource-limited smart devices, latency in real-time systems,
etc. To overcome these challenges, proposed security frameworks should be implemented in an adaptive manner and in-depth investigation should be conducted to
minimize the overhead.
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• Sensor-based threats are relatively new and very few comprehensive studies are
available to understand the characteristics of these threats. This dissertation presents
a comprehensive study of existing sensor-based threats and presents different security
mechanisms to secure sensors in smart devices and environment. However, more
detailed study should be conducted to understand users views on sensor-based threats.
• Smart devices vary in operating system, programming language, and implemented
protocols which make it hard for the researchers to develop standard security mechanisms to secure sensors in smart devices. This dissertation presents platform-independent
security mechanisms to effectively detect sensor-based threats in different smart devices and systems. However, several smart device platforms are closed source and do
not allow any third-party program integration. One future research direction should
be standardization of smart devices platforms to implement and test the proposed
security framework in different smart devices and systems.
• Finally, although we considered comprehensive threat models for each security
mechanisms proposed in this dissertation, we believe that new sensor-based threats
can be available in the wild. In future, proposed security mechanisms should be tested
against new sensor-based threats available in real-life.
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Dürmuth, Earlence Fernandes, and Blase Ur. Rethinking access con-

233

trol and authentication for the home internet of things (iot). In 27th
USENIX Security Symposium, Baltimore, MD, 2018.
[HLM+ 16]

Grant Ho, Derek Leung, Pratyush Mishra, Ashkan Hosseini, Dawn
Song, and David Wagner. Smart locks: Lessons for securing commodity internet of things devices. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia
conference on computer and communications security, pages 461–472.
ACM, 2016.

[HON+ 12]

Jun Han, Emmanuel Owusu, Le T Nguyen, Adrian Perrig, and Joy
Zhang. Accomplice: Location inference using accelerometers on smartphones. In Fourth International Conference on Communication Systems
and Networks, pages 1–9. IEEE, 2012.

[HS12]

Tzipora Halevi and Nitesh Saxena. A closer look at keyboard acoustic
emanations: random passwords, typing styles and decoding techniques.
In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer
and Communications Security, pages 89–90. ACM, 2012.

[HSH+ 13]

Ragib Hasan, Nitesh Saxena, Tzipora Haleviz, Shams Zawoad, and
Dustin Rinehart. Sensing-enabled channels for hard-to-detect command
and control of mobile devices. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security,
pages 469–480, 2013.

[Hue18]

Philips Hue. How to develop for hue: Hue api, 2018.

[iOSa]

Apple developer documentation. https://developer.apple.com/
documentation. Accessed: 2015-12-1.

[iOSb]

Core motion.
https://developer.apple.com/documentation/
coremotion. Accessed: 2017-10-23.

[IoT17]

IoTBench Repository, L. Babun, Z. Berkay Celik and A. Kumar Sikder.
https://github.com/IoTBench, 2017. [Online; accessed January2020].

[JCB16]

Maia Jacobs, Henriette Cramer, and Louise Barkhuus. Caring about
sharing: Couples’ practices in single user device access. In Proceedings
of the 19th International Conference on Supporting Group Work. ACM,
2016.

234

[JCP17]

William Jang, Adil Chhabra, and Aarathi Prasad. Enabling multi-user
controls in smart home devices. In Proceedings of the Workshop on
Internet of Things Security and Privacy. ACM, 2017.

[JCW+ 17]

Yunhan Jack Jia, Qi Alfred Chen, Shiqi Wang, Amir Rahmati, Earlence
Fernandes, Z Morley Mao, Atul Prakash, and Shanghai JiaoTong Unviersity. Contexiot: Towards providing contextual integrity to appified
iot platforms. In Proceedings of The Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, 2017.

[JLLA15]

Zhe Ji, Zhi-Yi Li, Peng Li, and MaoBo An. A new effective wearable
hand gesture recognition algorithm with 3-axis accelerometer. In 12th
International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and Knowledge Discovery
(FSKD), pages 1243–1247, 2015.

[JNS13]

Suman Jana, Arvind Narayanan, and Vitaly Shmatikov. A scanner
darkly: Protecting user privacy from perceptual applications. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 349–363, 2013.

[JPPS11]

G Joy Persial, M Prabhu, and R Shanmugalakshmi. Side channel
attack-survey. Int J Adva Sci Res Rev, 1(4):54–57, 2011.

[Kei12]

Julian Keilson. Markov chain models—rarity and exponentiality, volume 28. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.

[KJL20]

Hyosu Kim, Byunggill Joe, and Yunxin Liu. Tapsnoop: Leveraging
tap sounds to infer tapstrokes on touchscreen devices. IEEE Access,
8:14737–14748, 2020.

[KKZK12]

Raees Khan, Samee U Khan, Rifaqat Zaheer, and Sharifullah Khan. Future internet: the internet of things architecture, possible applications
and key challenges. In 10th International Conference on Frontiers of
Information Technology (FIT), pages 257–260. IEEE, 2012.

[KLW+ 19]

Sean Kennedy, Haipeng Li, Chenggang Wang, Hao Liu, Boyang Wang,
and Wenhai Sun. I can hear your alexa: Voice command fingerprinting
on smart home speakers. In 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications
and Network Security (CNS), pages 232–240. IEEE, 2019.

[KMP17]

Won Min Kang, Seo Yeon Moon, and Jong Hyuk Park. An enhanced
security framework for home appliances in smart home. Human-centric
Computing and Information Sciences, 7(1):6, 2017.

235

[KPM+ 18]

Deepak Kumar, Riccardo Paccagnella, Paul Murley, Eric Hennenfent,
Joshua Mason, Adam Bates, and Michael Bailey. Skill squatting attacks
on amazon alexa. In 27th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 33–47,
2018.

[KPYK18]

Ah-Lian Kor, Colin Pattinson, Max Yanovsky, and Vyacheslav
Kharchenko. Iot-enabled smart living. In Technology for Smart Futures, pages 3–28. Springer, 2018.

[KS16]

Muhammad Hassam Khan and Munam Ali Shah. Survey on security
threats of smartphones in internet of things. In 2016 22nd International Conference on Automation and Computing (ICAC), pages 560–
566. IEEE, 2016.

[LBAU17]

Juan Lopez, Leonardo Babun, Hidayet Aksu, and A Selcuk Uluagac.
A survey on function and system call hooking approaches. Journal of
Hardware and Systems Security, 1(2):114–136, 2017. Accessed: 04-172020.

[LCY+ 18]

Yi Liang, Zhipeng Cai, Jiguo Yu, Qilong Han, and Yingshu Li. Deep
learning based inference of private information using embedded sensors
in smart devices. IEEE Network, 32(4):8–14, 2018.

[LG17]

Lg watch sport. http://www.lg.com/us/smart-watches/lg-W280Asport, May 2017.

[LIF18]

LIFX. Lifx http api, 2018.

[Liv16]

Mobile World Live. Analysis: Mobile world congress 2016 wrap-up,
March 2016.

[LL19]

Yang Liu and Zhenjiang Li. aleak: Context-free side-channel from your
smart watch leaks your typing privacy. IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, 2019.

[LLC+ 19]

Zhen Ling, Zupei Li, Chen Chen, Junzhou Luo, Wei Yu, and Xinwen
Fu. I know what you enter on gear vr. In 2019 IEEE Conference on
Communications and Network Security (CNS), pages 241–249. IEEE,
2019.

236

[LML+ 10]

Nicholas D Lane, Emiliano Miluzzo, Hong Lu, Daniel Peebles, Tanzeem
Choudhury, and Andrew T Campbell. A survey of mobile phone sensing. IEEE Communications magazine, 48(9), 2010.

[LPMS12]

Mariantonietta La Polla, Fabio Martinelli, and Daniele Sgandurra. A
survey on security for mobile devices. IEEE communications surveys
& tutorials, 15(1):446–471, 2012.

[LRH+ 09]

Yunxin Liu, Ahmad Rahmati, Yuanhe Huang, Hyukjae Jang, Lin
Zhong, Yongguang Zhang, and Shensheng Zhang. xshare: supporting impromptu sharing of mobile phones. In Proceedings of the 7th
international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services.
ACM, 2009.

[LS19]

Jessy Lin and Jason Seibel. Motion-based side-channel attack on
mobile keystrokes. https: // pdfs. semanticscholar. org/ 95cb/
6a266e7a7319334775d8c89e353adf9b514e. pdf , 2019.

[LVM09]

Ondrej Linda, Todd Vollmer, and Milos Manic. Neural network based
intrusion detection system for critical infrastructures. In International
Joint Conference on Neural Networks, pages 1827–1834. IEEE, 2009.

[LWZ+ 13]

Lingguang Lei, Yuewu Wang, Jian Zhou, Daren Zha, and Zhongwen
Zhang. A threat to mobile cyber-physical systems: Sensor-based privacy theft attacks on android smartphones. In 12th IEEE International
Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, pages 126–133, 2013.

[LYC+ 19]

Li Lu, Jiadi Yu, Yingying Chen, Yanmin Zhu, Xiangyu Xu, Guangtao
Xue, and Minglu Li. Keylistener: Inferring keystrokes on qwerty keyboard of touch screen through acoustic signals. In IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications, pages 775–783, 2019.

[LZCC14]

Changmin Lee, Luca Zappaterra, Kwanghee Choi, and Hyeong-Ah
Choi. Securing smart home: Technologies, security challenges, and security requirements. In Communications and Network Security (CNS),
2014 IEEE Conference on, pages 67–72. IEEE, 2014.

[LZD+ 15]

Xiangyu Liu, Zhe Zhou, Wenrui Diao, Zhou Li, and Kehuan Zhang.
When good becomes evil: Keystroke inference with smartwatch. In
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pages 1273–1285. ACM, 2015.

237

[M+ 08]

Gerard CM Meijer et al. Smart sensor systems, volume 7. Wiley Online
Library, 2008.

[MAbM14]

Teddy Mantoro, Media A Ayu, and Siti Munawwarah binti Mahmod.
Securing the authentication and message integrity for smart home using
smart phone. In Multimedia Computing and Systems (ICMCS), 2014
International Conference on, pages 985–989. IEEE, 2014.

[MAH+ 16]

Mujahid Mohsin, Zahid Anwar, Ghaith Husari, Ehab Al-Shaer, and
Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman. Iotsat: A formal framework for security
analysis of the internet of things (iot). In Communications and Network
Security (CNS), 2016 IEEE Conference on, pages 180–188. IEEE, 2016.

[MAJH16]

Anindya Maiti, Oscar Armbruster, Murtuza Jadliwala, and Jibo He.
Smartwatch-based keystroke inference attacks and context-aware protection mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 795–806, 2016.

[mar]

Who leads os share in internet of things era?
https:
//spectrummattersindeed.blogspot.com/2017/04/who-leadsos-share-in-internet-of.html. Accessed: 2017-10-23.

[MBN14]

Yan Michalevsky, Dan Boneh, and Gabi Nakibly. Gyrophone: Recognizing speech from gyroscope signals. In USENIX Security Symposium,
pages 1053–1067, 2014.

[MBY+ 19]

J. Myers, L. Babun, E. Yao, S. Helble, and P. Allen. Mad-iot: Memory
anomaly detection for the internet of things. In 2019 IEEE Globecom
Workshops (GC Wkshps), pages 1–6, 2019.

[Met]

Metaprogramming.
http://docs.groovy-lang.org/docs/next/
html/documentation/core-metaprogramming.html.
[Online; accessed January-2020].

[MHSJ18]

Anindya Maiti, Ryan Heard, Mohd Sabra, and Murtuza Jadliwala. Towards inferring mechanical lock combinations using wrist-wearables as
a side-channel. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, pages 111–122. ACM,
2018.

[Mic19]

Trend Micro. Google play apps drop anubis banking malware, use
motion-based evasion tactics, 2019.

238

[Mic20]

Microsoft. Windows IoT core documentation, 2020.

[MJ18]

Anindya Maiti and Murtuza Jadliwala. Light ears: Information leakage
via smart lights. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.07814, 2018.

[MJHB15]

Anindya Maiti, Murtuza Jadliwala, Jibo He, and Igor Bilogrevic.
(smart) watch your taps: side-channel keystroke inference attacks using
smartwatches. In Proceedings of the ACM International Symposium on
Wearable Computers, pages 27–30. ACM, 2015.

[MJHB18]

Anindya Maiti, Murtuza Jadliwala, Jibo He, and Igor Bilogrevic. Sidechannel inference attacks on mobile keypads using smartwatches. IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing, 17(9):2180–2194, 2018.

[MLMK15]

Weizhi Meng, Wang Hao Lee, SR Murali, and SPT Krishnan. Charging
me and i know your secrets!: towards juice filming attacks on smartphones. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical
System Security, pages 89–98, 2015.

[MLT+ 16]

Tara Matthews, Kerwell Liao, Anna Turner, Marianne Berkovich,
Robert Reeder, and Sunny Consolvo. ”she’ll just grab any device that’s
closer”: A study of everyday device & account sharing in households.
In Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems. ACM, 2016.

[MS12]

Saurabh Mukherjee and Neelam Sharma. Intrusion detection using
naive bayes classifier with feature reduction. Procedia Technology,
4:119–128, 2012.

[MSS15]

Dibya Mukhopadhyay, Maliheh Shirvanian, and Nitesh Saxena. All your
voices are belong to us: Stealing voices to fool humans and machines.
In European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 599–
621. Springer, 2015.

[MSS16]

M. Mohamed, B. Shrestha, and N. Saxena. Smashed: Sniffing and
manipulating android sensor data for offensive purposes. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, pages 1–1, 2016.

[MV15]

Byungho Min and Vijay Varadharajan. Design and evaluation of feature distributed malware attacks against the internet of things (iot).
In Engineering of Complex Computer Systems (ICECCS), 2015 20th
International Conference on, pages 80–89. IEEE, 2015.

239

[MVBC12]

Emiliano Miluzzo, Alexander Varshavsky, Suhrid Balakrishnan, and
Romit Roy Choudhury. Tapprints: your finger taps have fingerprints.
In Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Mobile systems,
applications, and services, pages 323–336. ACM, 2012.

[MVCT11]

Philip Marquardt, Arunabh Verma, Henry Carter, and Patrick Traynor.
(sp)iphone: Decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile
phone accelerometers. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pages 551–562, 2011.

[MWA+ 19]

Nikolay Matyunin, Yujue Wang, Tolga Arul, Kristian Kullmann, Jakub
Szefer, and Stefan Katzenbeisser. Magneticspy: Exploiting magnetometer in mobile devices for website and application fingerprinting. In
Proceedings of the 18th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic
Society, pages 135–149, 2019.

[MZL20]

Jian Mao, Shishi Zhu, and Jianwei Liu. An inaudible voice attack to
context-based device authentication in smart iot systems. Journal of
Systems Architecture, 104:101696, 2020.

[Ngu15]

Trang Nguyen. Using unrestricted mobile sensors to infer tapped and
traced user inputs. In 12th International Conference on Information
Technology-New Generations (ITNG), pages 151–156. IEEE, 2015.

[nie17]

How much time do people spend on their mobile phones in 2017?
https://hackernoon.com/how-much-time-do-people-spend-ontheir-mobile-phones-in-2017-e5f90a0b10a6, May 2017.

[NPDS13]

Cornelius Namiluko, Andrew J Paverd, and Tulio De Souza. Towards
enhancing web application security using trusted execution. In WASH,
2013.

[NSG+ 14]

Sukhvir Notra, Muhammad Siddiqi, Hassan Habibi Gharakheili, Vijay
Sivaraman, and Roksana Boreli. An Experimental Study of Security
and Privacy Risks with Emerging Household Appliances. In Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2014 IEEE Conference on, pages
79–84. IEEE, 2014.

[NSN14]

Sashank Narain, Amirali Sanatinia, and Guevara Noubir. Singlestroke language-agnostic keylogging using stereo-microphones and domain specific machine learning. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference

240

on Security and Privacy in Wireless & Mobile Networks, pages 201–212,
2014.
[NSRU19]

AKM Iqtidar Newaz, Amit Kumar Sikder, Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman, and A Selcuk Uluagac. Healthguard: A machine learning-based
security framework for smart healthcare systems. In 2019 Sixth International Conference on Social Networks Analysis, Management and
Security (SNAMS), pages 389–396. IEEE, 2019.

[NVHBN16] Sashank Narain, Triet D Vo-Huu, Kenneth Block, and Guevara Noubir.
Inferring user routes and locations using zero-permission mobile sensors. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 397–413,
2016.
[NWX+ 20]

Rui Ning, Cong Wang, ChunSheng Xin, Jiang Li, and Hongyi Wu.
Deepmag+: Sniffing mobile apps in magnetic field through deep learning. Elsevier Pervasive and Mobile Computing, 61:101106, 2020.

[NYB+ 09]

Xudong Ni, Zhimin Yang, Xiaole Bai, Adam C Champion, and Dong
Xuan. Diffuser: Differentiated user access control on smartphones.
In 6th International Conference on Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems.
IEEE, 2009.

[OC15]

Colin O’Flynn and Zhizhang Chen. Power analysis attacks against ieee
802.15.4 nodes. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015:529, 2015.

[OHD+ 12]

Emmanuel Owusu, Jun Han, Sauvik Das, Adrian Perrig, and Joy
Zhang. Accessory: Keystroke inference using accelerometers on smartphones. Proc. of HotMobile, 2012.
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